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Abstract
This thesis consists of three self-contained essays evaluating topics in family structure,
household wealth, and married women’s labour decisions using Canadian data.
The twentieth century has seen significant changes in family formation and dissolution
in Canada. Chapter 1, coauthored with Ana Ferrer, investigates the role of family structure
(family disruption or reconstitution) on cognitive outcomes of primary school Canadian
children. We focus on reading and math scores of these children and look into differential
effects by gender as well as child’s cultural background, which is an important dimension
to consider in diverse societies. Using the rich panel data information from the National
Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth (NLSCY), collected biennially since 1994,
we find substantial disadvantages in reading, but not math, scores among children in
single parent families, relative to children in intact families. However, we find that single
parenthood seems to affect boys more than girls in terms of their reading performance, but
girls’ math performance suffers more than that of boys when in step families. In addition,
when looking into differential effects across cultural/religious affiliations of family structure
on cognitive performance, we typically observe differential effects in math, but no reading
scores. These results suggest that exploring the heterogeneity of children’s performance
responses to family disruption might be an important factor in assessing the benefits of
programs aimed at helping children to cope with family disruptions.
It is worth noting that changes in marital status of parents not only affect their chil-
dren’s performances but also influence their own welfare. The spouse (typically the wife),
who usually has less labour market attachment compared to the other spouse (typically
the husband) due to the traditional gender roles, is less likely to accumulate much assets
during the marriage. Therefore, this spouse with less assets might have less intra-household
bargaining power and could potentially face worse financial conditions in the event of a
divorce compared to the other one. Chapter 2, coauthored with Stéphanie Lluis, studies
a reform of the marital property law following the amendment of the Civil Code of Que-
bec to improve economic equality between spouses by imposing an equal division of the
family assets when a marriage ends. This change created an unexpected shift in the bar-
gaining power of the spouse with relatively lower investment in the family assets, usually
the wife. We explore whether and if so how the changes in this redistributive divorce law
impacted female spouses’ labour market decisions and individuals’ marital decisions. We
use a difference-in-difference approach and exploit detailed information on female labour
supply and marital status from the Canadian Labour Force Survey (LFS) data to analyze
outcomes before and after the reforms in Quebec, relative to other provinces which did not
experience marital property law changes over that time period. We find that the reform of
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marital property law that improve economic equality between spouses in Quebec reduced
married women’s hours of work and the adverse employment effect is relatively stronger
for less educated women (the most disadvantaged spouse) and among couples with larger
wealth as measured by the ownership of the couples’ property. At the extensive margin,
we find that the redistributive law change significantly decreased the labour force par-
ticipation of the relatively more educated married women but increased the labour force
participation of the relatively less educated women (among married women who stayed
married). This differential result by education among married women suggests that the
labour supply impact of the redistributive law change likely depends on the decision to
stay married as marital decisions are also part of the household bargaining outcome. We
investigate this question by studying the Quebec amendment impact on divorce rates and
the decisions of whom to marry. We find that the redistributive law change had no impact
on overall divorce but significantly increased the likelihood of divorce/separations among
less educated spouses. In addition, over the sample of young individuals deciding whether
or not to marry, the Civil Code amendment contributed to increasing the proportion of
marriages in which the wife is more educated than the husband.
The intra-household bargaining position is not the only factor that could affect female
labour supply as well as people’s marital decisions. The wealth of a household is also
another important factor that might influence spouses’ decisions in the labour and marriage
markets. Chapter 3 examines the impact that changes in household wealth due to the
house price variations during the 1990s and 2000s had on the labour market behaviour of
Canadian married women. House prices in Canada have tripled over the past decades. This
dramatic rise has essential effects on households’ wealth and the wealth effects might be
different on house owners versus renters (potential house buyers). I use time-series average
house prices data from the Canadian Real Estate Association’s Multiple Listing Service
data set (CREA MLS) which covers the entire Canada, 102 real estate boards (REBs),
and provides detailed geographical variations in house prices in both urban and rural
areas. Then, I link these house prices to each respondent in the confidential longitudinal
household files - the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID). Estimating the causal
effects of housing wealth changes on female labour supply is challenging. For instance, The
life-cycle theory of the labour supply emphasizes that unexpected gains in wealth should
decrease household labour supply. However, wealth changes due to rising house prices
could be anticipated by a household. Thus, there might be no effect if the household was
forward looking and incorporated these expected wealth changes into their decisions. In
addition, the reverse causality between house prices and female labour supply has been
highlighted in literature. Rising housing prices induce more female spouses to participate
in the labour market to offset the future housing purchase costs if their families intend
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to enter homeownership or balance rising rental prices. Nonetheless, it is also plausible
that more working women in one area, which contributes to a higher proportion of two-
earner households with stronger payment capacities, may bid up the house prices there.
Therefore, I apply two strategies to overcome these challenges. My first strategy is to
calculate a measure of house-price shocks which is aimed at capturing unexpected variations
in local house prices, rather than variations that could be anticipated by people. My second
strategy is constructing comprehensive and exogenous topography instruments to address
the reverse causality between the house prices and female labour supply. After capturing
unexpected changes in local house prices, among house owners, I find that an increase in
(positive) house-price shocks causes a reduction in the likelihood of participation of married
women. At the intensive margin, I find that an increase in the house price shocks induces
a decrease in annual work hours of a woman at the low percentile. Additionally, I find
heterogeneous effects of house-price shocks on women’s labour supply depending on their
education level and residence locations. These results are consistent with the prediction
of family labour supply and life-cycle models, which indicates that unexpected gains in
wealth should decrease household labour supply. There is no evidence showing that house-
price shocks have labour effect on renters in this study, which might suggest that they
choose to delay to enter homeownership or find a cheaper residence instead of adjusting
their labour supply when an appreciation of house prices occurs. The IV approach which
uses the fraction of buildable land and the difference in elevation as the instruments also
provides consistent results as the house-price shock approach does.
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Chapter 1
Family Structure and Child Cognitive
Outcomes: Evidence from Canadian
Longitudinal Data of Children
1.1 Introduction
The twentieth century has seen significant changes in family formation and dissolution
in North America. Over the past twenty years, the fraction of married individuals in
the US has gone from 52 percent in 2017 to 61 percent in 1980, while the fraction of
divorced individuals has doubled (from five percent to ten percent).12 Similar divorce rates
are reported for Canada in this period.3 The rise in family dissolution implies a higher
fraction of children living in non-intact families - either families headed by a single parent or
families in which one (or both) of the parents is not the biological parent. Over 50 percent
1U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1981 (102d edition.) Washington,
D.C., 1981.
2U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplements, 2000 to
2017.
3Comparable numbers are not available for Canada since the 1981 Census does not identify individ-
uals living common law. However, other studies document an increasing proportion of individuals living
common law among those in a couple, from 6% in 1980 to 20% in 2011 (Milan (2013)).
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of US children and 30 percent of Canadian Children live in non-intact families (Livingston
(2014); Statistics Canada (2017)).45 These changes in family structure may have important
consequences for child well-being, since family disruptions are generally associated with a
range of negative outcomes for the children involved, both cognitive and emotional, such as
mental health, educational attainment, earnings, and employment status. In this paper, we
focus on reading and math scores of primary school Canadian children to explore the effect
of family disruption on their cognitive outcomes. Additionally, we look into differential
effects by gender as well as child’s cultural background, which is an important dimension
to consider in diverse societies. Given the increase in the number of children experiencing
family disruptions, investigating the association between changes in marital status and
children’s outcomes seems crucial to inform social policy.6 If there are significant negative
effects on child outcomes caused by family dissolution or reconstitution, adequate support
policies could be put in place to attenuate these effects and give all children an equal start
in life.
The main psychological theories attempting to explain how family structure affects chil-
dren performances stress that lack of resources such as income and/or parental involvement
in specific family structures reduces children’s attainment. In addition, parental conflict
before a divorce or the involvement of new family members after remarriage may induce
stress on children, which could affect their performances (Haveman and Wolfe (1995); Am-
ato (2000); Hill et al. (2001)). In the United States, the literature investigating these
connections finds that children raised by divorced or separated couples were more likely to
have psychological and behavioral problems compared to children raised in intact families
(Aughinbaugh et al. (2005) and Amato and Anthony (2014), among others). The influence
of living in a non-traditional family on children’s cognitive outcomes, such as test scores,
has also been analyzed extensively (Gennetian (2005) and Sanz-de Galdeano and Vuri
(2007)). Many of these papers find a negative impact on children’s cognitive outcomes due
4Part of the striking difference comes from the age of children considered (17 and younger in the US,
14 and younger in Canada). Approximately, twice as many of these children who are in non-intact families
in both countries are living with a single parent, while the rest live with blended families.
5Statistics Canada. Fifty Years of Families in Canada: 1961 to 2011. Statistics Canada, 2012.
6See for instance, Biblarz and Gottainer (2000); Gruber (2004); Björklund et al. (2007) and references
wherein.
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to parental divorce that diminishes or disappears once family and individual background
is accounted for.
It is unclear what would be the effect of remarrying (or starting a new relationship)
on children. It is possible that individuals who experienced a failed relationship will weigh
higher education, income or “good” parental skills heavily in a second relationship, and
that these positive parental skills of step-parents improve children’s performance (Hofferth
and Anderson (2003); Gennetian (2005)). On the other hand, children might resist the
new relationship, leading to high stress and resulting in worse school performance (Kiernan
and Mensah (2009)).
In Canada, the literature has linked family disruption or reconstitution with nega-
tive consequences for children’s non-cognitive outcomes. Pagani et al. (1998) found that
teenage boys who experienced family reconstitution are more likely involved in delinquency
than those who stayed in intact families. Similarly, Strohschein (2005) and Strohschein
(2012) documents a positive relationship between parental divorce and children’s anxi-
ety/depression, and Kerr and Michalski (2007) - when studying hyperactivity problems -
report an advantage for children living in intact families compared to those living in step
families. Ram and Hou (2003) have also investigated the adverse impact of living in a
non-intact family on children’s cognitive outcomes. They find that one possible explana-
tion for children’s lower performance in cognitive (math or reading scores) outcomes and
negative emotional-behavioral outcomes (hyperactivity, offense, or aggression) is linked to
the deterioration of economic resources typically accompanying family disruption.
The challenge of identifying the causal effect of family structure on child’s cognitive
outcomes lies in disentangling it from other factors, also affecting the child’s academic
performance, such as socioeconomic factors, including parental involvement in the child’s
education. Preexisting problems such as parental conflict before the divorce or breaks in the
child’s routine (during a separation preceding a divorce) might affect children’s outcomes
as well. In this regard, the impossibility of fully capturing all related factors can overstate
the detrimental impact of divorce. Researchers have employed various methodologies to
deal with this omitted variable bias and tried to identify the causal effect of parental
divorce or remarriage. The traditional Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model, often used to
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investigate the effect of parental dissolution/reconstitution on cognitive outcomes, cannot
fully control for the omitted variable bias (McLanahan et al. (2013)). Later studies use
relatively more advanced statistical models, such as the value-added (VA) model, or fixed
effect (FE) models to control for some unmeasured variables from the previous period
that may influence current children’s outcome (Ram and Hou (2003); Aughinbaugh et al.
(2005); Gennetian (2005); Sanz-de Galdeano and Vuri (2007); Amato and Anthony (2014);
Arkes (2015)). An alternative methodology uses parental death, or divorce-law reforms as
natural experiments, to investigate the influence of changes in parents’ marital status on
children (Corak (2001); Gruber (2004)). While the estimates of this approach can produce
unbiased estimates for the treated population, they are sensitive to the randomness of
the event or the validity of the instrumental variable used. Propensity score matching
models (Amato (2003); Hannan and Halpin (2014)) also rely heavily on how good the
match between the treated and control group is. Each of these approaches has advantages
and limitations, emphasizing the importance of investigating whether results are robust
across multiple models (McLanahan et al. (2013)). In this study, we use the broad set of
variables available in the NLSCY to control for confounding effects in our initial estimation.
Additionally, we exploit the panel nature of our data, estimating a VA model and FE model
to further isolate the effect of family structure on children’s outcomes.
An important dimension that might be lost in fixed effect models is the heterogeneity
in children’s responses. Specifically, children in different population groups might have
different ability to adjust to changes in family structure they have experienced. In the
U.S., some studies highlight the importance of investigating the heterogeneity of the fam-
ily structure effect. They have analyzed how the effect of family structure differs by gender,
or race/ethnicity (e.g., Fomby et al. (2010); Lee and McLanahan (2015)).7 In Canada, re-
search has provided only limited evidence in this area (Beaujot et al. (2013)). Our main
contribution is that, in addition to extending the analysis to a longer period and alternative
methodologies, we disentangle part of the heterogeneity in children responses. Specifically,
7Lee and McLanahan (2015) find that the effect of family instability on cognitive outcomes is stronger for
girls than boys, for Black children than White/Hispanic children in the U.S.. However, in terms of socioe-
motional performances, the effect of family instability is stronger for boys than girls, for White/Hispanic
children than Black children.
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we explicitly examine a differential effect by gender, religion (Catholic/non-Catholic) and
by Canadian/French heritage claimed by the parents.8 Our estimates suggest that such
heterogeneity is important. Previous results pointed towards small, non-statistically sig-
nificant effects on children’s math performance. Our analysis suggests that these mask a
differential effect along those dimensions and therefore more tailored polices to help chil-
dren cope with family instability could increase their well-being. We also find a differential
effect by gender in reading scores.
The remainder of the study is organized as follows: Section 1.2 explains the data and
presents methodology used in this article. In Section 1.3, we present regression results an-
alyzing the family structure effect on children’s cognitive outcomes. Section 1.4 concludes.
1.2 Data and Methodology
1.2.1 The National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth
(NLSCY)
The data used in this article comes from the National Longitudinal Survey of Children and
Youth (NLSCY). The NLSCY collected comprehensive information on Canadian children
and “the person most knowledgeable about the child (PMK)” (excluding children who live
on Indian reserves and institutionalized children) regarding their education, health, envi-
ronment, development, behavior, friends and activities (Statistics Canada (2008)). It also
reports children’s reading (for school children aged 4 or 5) and math scores (for school-
children aged 7 to 15 years). The math test score is derived from the Mathematics Com-
putation Test given to school children during the interview, which measures the students’
skills of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division of numbers. The reading com-
prehensive test is derived from the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test – Revised (PPVT-R),
which was “designed to measure children’s receptive or hearing vocabulary skills” (Statis-
8We use the term Canadian/French heritage very loosely, being limited by the nature of questions in
the survey and the reported cell size of the categories.
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tics Canada (2008)). We used a normalized version of these scores as dependent variables
in this study.
The children in our sample range from ages 1 to 5 during the initial cycle, turning 11 to
15 during the sixth cycle. There are 2,227 children with valid math test values across the
three later cycles (Cycles 4 through 6) and 1,962 children with valid reading test values
in either of two initial cycles (either Cycles 1 and 2, or Cycles 2 and 3).9 We excluded
children living in adoptive or foster families from the dataset since we want to focus our
attention on children who remain in the care of at least one biological parent.10 (See the
timing of the data in Table A.5 in the Appendix).
The family structure at the time of the test is our main variables of interest. Our
definition of family structure is based on the child’s living arrangement in each period.
We consider (1) Intact families (the child lives with his/her two biological parents), (2)
Lone-parent family (there is only one biological parent present), (3) Step families (the child
lives with one biological parent present and his/her married or common law partner, who
is not biologically related to the child).
We include a broad set of current family characteristics that may potentially help to
isolate the effect of family structure. Some of these variables are standard in the literature
analyzing child outcomes, such as the child’ s age and gender, whether the child has an
education disability or the number of siblings. Also standard is the inclusion of parent’s
characteristics that might account for differential approaches to parenting, such as the
PMK’s age, gender and education, the PMK’s age at birth of the child, PMK’s place of
birth (whether born in Canada or not), and whether the PMK’s was a teen parent. For the
analysis of math scores, collected in later cycles, we also account for preexisting problems
by including variables for previous (during cycles 1 to 3) changes in family structure and in
9No child has valid reading scores across all first three cycles of the NLSCY, due to the age restriction
of this test.
10Many studies indicate that the social attitude towards biological and adoptive parents is different
(Brodzinsky (1987); Kressierer and Bryant (1996)). Adoptive or foster children also show a higher risk
of behavior and academic problems compared to those who live with their biological parents (Haugaard
(1998); Wierzbicki (1993)). Our dataset has less than 3% children in an adoptive or foster family, which
impedes us to focus on this issue.
6
the PMK’s employment history. These could affect the child’s outcomes either by directly
affecting the long-term behavior of the child or by changing the amount of resources (in
time and money) available to the child, which may in turn have long-term effects on
cognitive performance.11 Finally, we include a set of controls aimed to account for resources
available to the child, such as the number of adults in the household, household income and
the PMKs’ depression and family functioning scores.12 Household income is reported by
categories in the first three cycles of the NLSCY, and as a continuous variable in cycles 4
through 6. We also introduce the PMK’s current work status in each cycle (either employed
or non-employed) as a further approximation of time resources available to the child, once
household income has already been included as a control variable.
1.2.2 Descriptive Statistics
Most children in our sample lived or stayed in intact families and the percentage of children
in intact families decreased slightly over time (88% in cycle 1 to 71% in cycle 6). PMKs are
mostly employed in each cycle (over 70%), or remained employed between two adjacent
cycles (over 63%). The percentage of PMKs employed and staying employed increased
slightly over time and it is generally higher during cycles 4 through 6, coinciding with
better economic conditions in the early 2000s. Along these lines, the fraction of PMKs
experiencing changes in working status during cycles 1 through 3 is relatively large (29.4%)
as Canada’s economic struggled through the slow recovery of the early 1990s bust. (See
Appendix Table A.8 and Table A.9).
Children’s average age ranges from 66 months in the reading sample to 139 months in
the math sample, equally distributed by gender.13 The average reading and math scores are
100.69 and 457.13, respectively, with children in step families showing a slight advantage
11Although the NLSCY has rich information in terms of parenting and family situations, it does not
provide the actual time the PMK spends with the child.
12A high score of the PMK’s depression or family functioning shows the presence of depression and
family dysfunction respectively (Statistics Canada (2008))
13Following Chen et al. (2015), we used the actual age of children in months in the analysis in order to
control for the difference of ability in children who are relatively young compared to their classmates.
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on math scores – but not on reading scores - than those in intact families and children in
intact families a slight advantage in reading scores relative to the other children. Children
in single parent families do not show an obvious disadvantage. PMKs are most likely the
mother of the child. Most PMKs have at most a high school diploma and are born in
Canada (a higher fraction than in the total population). The average depression score
for the PMK is about 4 (on a scale from 0 to 36) suggesting that the levels of depression
are low on average, but more prevalent in single parent homes (6.6 to 7.6). Most families
have no additional adults in the household and reside in a CMA. About 23% of children in
the reading sample live in a low-income household.14 Household income averages $75,913
before taxes and deductions in the math sample. Average household income in single
parent families is much lower than in the other families ($39,772), even though it includes
child and spousal support from former partners.15 Average family functioning score is
about 8 (on a scale from 0 to 36) suggesting relatively low levels of family dysfunction,
which is higher in single parent homes (9 to 12). (See Appendix Table A.6 and Table A.7)
1.2.3 Empirical Model
Identifying the association effect of family structure on children’s performances requires
disentangling it from other aspects of family background that can affect cognitive perfor-
mance and taking into account the initial disadvantage of children in non-intact families.
To this effect, we apply different identifications strategies in this work. First, we used a
standard OLS model to ascertain the effect of family structure on child reading and math
scores after controlling for observable characteristics. Second, we use a VA model, which
includes a lagged value of the dependent variable, to control for some unmeasured variables
from the previous period that may influence current child’s outcomes. Third, we use indi-
vidual and time specific FE models to control for time-invariant unobserved child/family
characteristics that may further influence children’s outcomes.
The basic equation we estimate for the OLS model is
14A family is considered as a low-income family when its income is below the pre-tax low-income cut-off
(LICO) after the family size and the community have been taken into account (Statistics Canada (2008)).
15Household income is provided in real 2002 Canadian dollars, using CPI with 2002 basket content.
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yit = α0 + α1SPit + α2SFit + α3Xit + δt + γp + εit (1.1)
where yit represents the child i’s reading or math scores in cycle t (t = 1, 2, 3 in reading
scores analysis and 4, 5, 6 in math scores analysis). SPit and SFit stand for Single parent or
Step family. Xit is a group of control variables, which contains basic characteristics of the
child, PMK and household, as well as – in the case of the math sample - previous changes
in family structure and PMK’s work status. δt and γp are year and province fixed-effect.
εit is the error term. α is a vector of parameters to be estimated, with α1 and α2, being
the primary focus of this analysis.
Despite the broad set of controls that we are able to include in the analysis, it is
plausible that there are unobserved factors correlated with family structure that affect
children’s performance and introduce a bias in our analysis. Specifically, current reading
and math skills are likely based on previously obtained skills and may be due to some
(unobserved) action taken in the past to change previous scores, such as engaging extra
tutorial time in the school. If these actions are linked to changes in family structure, they
might introduce a bias in our estimates. For instance, a bad score may induce parents
in intact families to engage a tutor, but low grades may remain unaddressed in families
struggling through divorce or separation. Hence, the adverse effect of separation may be
related to lack of tutorial support, rather than the separation per se. The VA model
incorporates these unobserved actions through past scores:
yit = α0 + β0yit−1 + α1SPit + α2SFit + α3Xit + δt + γp + εit (1.2)
where yit−1 represents child i’s reading or math scores in cycle t-1 and the rest of the
variables are as before. For the reading sample, t=2,3, whereas t=4,5 in the math sample.
Finally, it is possible that there are unobserved time invariant characteristics that influ-
ence performances, such as a child’s innate reading or math ability. The panel dimension
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of our data allows eliminating the influence of such time-invariant characteristics through
FE models, which isolates the effects of all time invariant characteristics.
yit = α0 + α1SPit + α2SFit + α3Xit + δt + γp + ci + εit (1.3)
where ci is a person-specific indicator that controls for time invariant unobserved charac-
teristics such as parental and children’s abilities.
In each equation, the reference group is composed by children who were in an intact
family, α1 and α2 are the parameters estimating the effect of single parent and step family
structures on reading or math scores relative to children in intact families. All models use
a robust standard error regarding heteroskedasticity across children or families.
1.3 Results
Table 1.1 presents the effect of family structure on reading and math performance for the
specified models. Children in single-parent families score between four and 18 points lower
in their reading tests than do those in intact families. The estimates are significant in
both OLS and VA models. Children in step families score between one and five points
lower in their reading tests than do those in intact families, however, the estimate is never
significant, except when no other controls are included in the regression. It is worth noting
that previous reading scores have a significant and positive effect on current reading scores
(column 3). Children in single parent families score around nine points less in math than
children in intact families. However, the relationship is no longer significant under any
model once a full set of controls is added to account for confounding effects. Similarly,
living in step families seems to have little effect on children’s math outcomes across these
models. Again, not surprisingly, previous math scores have a significant and positive
effect on current math scores (column 7). The effect of other control variables is reported
in Appendix Table A.10 to save space. It is worth mentioning that some, such as past
changes in family structure and past changes in PMKs’ work status, have little or no effect
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on children’s achievements. Other, such as the basic demographic characteristics of children
and PMKs - have an impact on children’s reading and math scores. The PMK’s education
(having at least high school education) has positive effects on children’s outcomes, while
having a learning disability has a negative effect.
1.3.1 Heterogeneous Effects: Gender
So far, our results show that family structure has a somewhat significant effect on children’s
reading performance, but little impact of family structure on children’s math performance.
It is plausible however, that this is the result of aggregation, which might mask differential
effects in different subgroups of the population. In particular, it is plausible that family
structure has a differential effect in young boys and girls. Numerous studies find that
boys behave differently than girls, particularly if raised in disadvantaged circumstances
(Autor et al. (2016)). In addition, since mothers (fathers) tend to allocate more time
parenting daughters (sons), daughters may receive more parental attention than boys in
single parent households typically led by women – or less attention in step-families if the
mother remarries (Baker and Milligan (2016); Bertrand and Pan (2013)). To address
this possibility, we include an interaction between the family structure indicators and an
indicator for girl child in our models.
Table 1.2 shows the effect of family structure on the child’ s reading (columns 1-3) and
math (columns 4-6) sample by gender using the OLS, VA and FE models. The coefficient
of Single parent family or Step family represents now the effect on the reading /math scores
of boys living in single parent family or step family respectively. The sum of the coefficients
of Single parent family and Girl*Single parent family (the sum of the coefficients of Step
family and Girl*Step family) represents the effect on the reading /math scores of girls in
the specified families. The interaction coefficient, Girl*Single parent family or Girl*Step
family, then shows the differential effect that family structure has on girls relative to boys.
Boys in single parent families score between 8 and 19 points lower in their reading tests
than boys in intact families; the estimate is significant in both OLS and value-added models





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































families score between 9 (-8.32 - 0.75 = -9.07 (SE 7.37)) and 17 (-18.49 + 1.70 = -16.79
(SE 3.87)) points lower in their reading tests than girls in intact families, the estimate is
significant in both OLS and value-added models. Living in step-families has little effect on
both boys’ and girls’ reading scores.16 On the other hand, living in single-parent families
has relatively little effect on both boys’ and girls’ math performance.17 However, while
living in step-families has no distinct effect on boys’ math score, relative to boys in intact
families, it does on girls, who score between 16 and 31 lower points than boys in math test if
living in step families. Although the results from the FE are not significant, the magnitude
of the coefficient is rather large, so it is likely that the imprecise estimates relate to the
small number of transitions in the data (see Table A.9 for the distribution of children by
the transition in family structure). The total effect on math scores for girls in step families
relative to girls in intact families is large in magnitude, around 20 (SE 7.90) and 13 (SE
8.58) and 22 (SE 17.07) points lower in the OLS, VA and FE models respectively, although
only the OLS result is statistically significant.
1.3.2 Heterogeneous Effects: Cultural Heritage
Another dimension that can have significant effect on the child academic performance
relates to the parenting style as influenced by the parent’s cultural ancestry. Different
cultures put different stress on the role of parents in child’s development and education.
For instance, traditional cultures tend to promote a strict division of labour in terms of
child rearing, emphasize the nurturing role of mothers and relegating fathers to a secondary
role in early childhood development. If that is the case, the effect of family dissolution
on these families may create a larger vacuum in the time and resources available to the
child than in families with a more equal distribution of tasks. For instance, mothers
could be ill prepared to assume an active role in the labour market, or if forced to do
16In the OLS model, the total effect on girl’s reading scores in step families relative to girls in intact
families is, -1.03 - 0.70 = -1.73 and statistically insignificant (SE 2.49). The VA and FE estimates are
qualitatively similar.
17In the OLS model, the total effect on girl’s math scores in single parent families relative to girls in
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































so, have difficulty balancing work and family life. Similarly, fathers may have difficulties
with shared custody if they are ill equipped to take care of children. While these skills
can be learned, it may take a longer time for “specialized” parents to adjust to the new
parameters of parenthood, than for parents that already have an equal partnership in child
rearing before family dissolution. Culture may also affect the attitudes towards family
dissolution per se. For instance, a strong position against divorce may intensify conflict
in the family before or after family dissolution, with the subsequent effect on children
(Obergruber (2016)). We use the religious affiliation of the PMK and the cultural group
the PMK identifies him/herself with, to explore whether culture mediates the effect of the
family structure on child performance.
We identify the religious affiliation of the PMK as Catholic, or non-Catholic to under-
stand whether religion mediates the effect of family structure on the reading and math
performance of children. It is not clear what the direction of the effect would be. Tradi-
tionally, one could expect Catholic families to avoid divorce, if it is perceived as a stigma,
increasing the possibility of conflict around family dissolution. It is unclear if these tra-
ditional views are aligned with the way modern Catholics practice their religion. We
introduce an interaction of religious affiliation with family structure to identify whether
Catholic PMKs show a differential effect of family structure on children’s performance.
In the NLSCY, PMKs are also asked to identify themselves with different ethnic/cultural
groups. “To which ethnic or cultural group(s) did your ancestors belong?” respondents
are offered different possible answers to which they answer “Yes” or “No”. The first of-
fered answer is “Canadian?”, followed by “French?”, successive answers (up to nineteen
possibilities) cover the majority of traditional and new ethno-cultural groups arriving to
Canada. Multiple affirmative answers are possible and the PMK can identify him/herself
with several of these cultural groups. This structure complicates the construction of a
precisely defined variable for cultural identity. We choose to distinguish between Canadian
and French heritage because they may best reflect differences in social values that are
mimicked by policy institutions as discussed in Beaujot et al. (2013). Moreover, although
a substantial fraction of our sample (around 80%) identifies with more than one cultural
identity, more than half the PMKs identify themselves with at least one of these groups
15
(Canadian or French). This makes these two groups of particular interest in terms of explor-
ing heterogeneity.18 To try isolating the effect of these two cultural identities on cognitive
performance, we estimate regressions separately for those families where the PMK identi-
fies him/herself as Canadian and those families where the PMK identifies him/herself as
French, including an indicator for whether the PMK identifies him/herself with a unique
cultural group.19 Approximately one third of the Canadian responses correspond to a
unique identifier, whereas a little under one fifth of the French responses do. The coef-
ficient of this “unique” identifier is negative and insignificant in the Canadian heritage
sample and significant, but small, for the French heritage sample in the VA models. It
is worth noting that the distribution of respondents across provinces, Quebec versus Rest
of Canada (RoC), is surprisingly even, with a 50/50 split among those with a Canadian
identifier, and 63/37 distribution among those with a French identifier. Note that all our
specifications include provincial and CMA indicators, so the coefficients are to be inter-
preted net of any provincial/CMA idiosyncratic effect (particularly differences in schooling
systems). The characteristics of families by religious affiliation or cultural group can be
found in Appendix Table A.11. In general, the three groups share similar characteristics
with the exception of the proportion of PMKs who are Canadian born, which is smaller
among Catholic families. In the math sample, the average household income is slightly
higher in Catholic families than in other groups.
Table 1.3 shows that, consistently with the literature, single parenthood is associated
with a significant decline in reading scores - between 11 and 20 points - but the impact is
mostly similar between Catholic and non-Catholic PMKs (Arkes (2015)). We find, however,
a strong and significant negative effect of single parenthood on math scores, between 14
to 18 points lower for non-Catholic families. However, here children in catholic, single
parent families show an advantage relative to other children in single parent families. In
fact, there is no difference between catholic children in single parent families and those
18The results are robust to slight modifications of the definition of Canadian heritage to include those
who identify themselves as uniquely from “British”, Scottish or “Irish”, since these groups very rarely
identify the PMK uniquely.
19Self-identification is an endogenous choice of the individual and correlated with unobservable char-
acteristics affecting cognitive performance. We do not have a way to address this source of endogeneity,
hence we opt to estimate the effect of family structure separately for the two groups.
16
in (catholic), intact families. For instance, using OLS estimates, the former group scores
2.4 points lower in math tests than the later (-16.16 + 13.74 = -2.42) and the effect
is statistically insignificant. The results are qualitatively similar in the value-added and
fixed-effect models.
Table 1.4 continues to document the disadvantage of children in single parent families,
who score between 6 and 14 points lower reading scores than children in intact families.
Results are quite robust, even in the FE model, which are similar although less precisely
estimated. Most significantly, both cultural affiliations perform similarly in the tests.
The results for math scores are somewhat surprising, relative to those obtained for
the whole sample. Recall that in general, non-intact families perform worse relative to
intact families. In our sample of Canadian self-identified PMKs (column 7 in Table 1.4)
we observe a similar pattern, with children of single parents/step families scoring 17/15
points below of children in intact families with the same heritage. However, among children
of PMKs claiming French cultural affiliation (column 8 in Table 1.4), those in single parent
households score 14 points below children in intact families, but children in step families
score 11 points higher. These numbers are not precisely estimated, most likely due to
small sample sizes, but the larger (and positive) estimates are robust through the OLS
and VA. The coefficient is not positive in the FE specification, but it is substantially lower
than that reported for the Canadian group. We interpret this result as suggestive that
step families within the context of French cultural identification have an advantage to





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1.4 Discussion and Conclusion
We investigate the role of family structure on cognitive outcomes of children using the
NLSCY. In agreement with the literature, we find substantial disadvantages in reading,
but not math, scores among children in single parent families, relative to children in intact
families. However, we find that single parenthood seems to affect boys more than girls in
terms of their reading performance, but girls’ math performance suffers more than that
of boys when in step families, a result consistent with Sanchez et al. (2004). In addition,
when looking into differential effects across cultural/religious affiliations of family structure
on cognitive performance, we typically observe differential effects in math, but no reading
scores. These results suggest that exploring the heterogeneity of children’s performance
responses to family disruption might be an important factor in assessing the benefits of
programs aimed at helping children to cope with family disruptions.
Differential effects by gender could be related to parental allocation of time and re-
sources by gender of the offspring (Bertrand and Pan (2013); Baker and Milligan (2016);
Lundberg (2017)). If fathers spend more time with their biological male children and moth-
ers with their biological female children, boys who have experienced divorce might have
lower reading skills due to the absence of a (biological) father figure since the development
of this skill requires much parental involvement. Further evidence suggests that boys’ per-
formances are more likely affected by their father absence than girls’ (Autor et al. (2016);
Lundberg (2017)). In addition, a mother’s divorce or remarriage may limit the resources
(both familial and economic resources) she previously devoted to the female offspring from
a previous relationship. Therefore, girls who have experienced family instability might
have lower math skills due to this lack of resources. Moreover, many studies indicate that
girls have more emotional problems in step families than boys do and the long-term re-
lationship of stepfather-son is better than that of stepfather-daughter (Clingempeel et al.
(1984); Bray and Berger (1993); Lundberg (2017)). Thus, persistently living in a step
family might disrupt girls’ performances more than boys’.
Beaujot et al. (2013) suggests that institutional differences between Quebec and the
Rest of Canada have contributed to differentials in fertility, family structure and parental
20
work patterns, all of which may contribute to explain the differential effects by French
heritage (net of the well-known differences in common law rates in Quebec), in particular
the unusual relative positive math performance of children in step families relative to
children in French intact families. Similarly, the differential effect for catholic single parents
suggests that catholic affiliation provides access to positive supportive structures.
The models discussed here take a static view on the effect of family structure, con-
sidering only whether the current family structure affects children’s performances and not
whether it is changes in family structure that might be the most disruptive for the child’s
(Wu and Martinson (1993); Amato (2000); Crosnoe et al. (2014); Obergruber (2016)). To
take into account these aspects of family dynamics, in alternative specification we have
looked at whether transitions in family structure also affect academic scores. We replaces
SPit and SFit by a vector of transitions in family structure: (1) the child stayed in intact
families in both adjacent cycles (reference group); (2) the child stayed in single-parent fam-
ilies in both adjacent cycles; (3) the child stayed in step-families in both adjacent cycles,
and (4) the child experienced a change in family structure between two adjacent cycles.20
The results are similar when we consider transitions in family structure as the main in-
dependent variable and can be found in Appendix (Table A.1, Table A.2, Table A.3 and
Table A.4). These models support the idea that children’s academic achievement depends
heavily on the amount of resources, in either time or money, invested by the PMK. The
role of PMK’s engagement in the labour force on children’s outcome has been the subject
of much debate (Gruber (2004)). While additional income brought in by the working PMK
may increase resources that can be devoted to the child’s education reducing the stress of
money pressures on the family, participation in the labour force will reduce the time that
the PMK spends with the child, which has a beneficial influence on child measures of well-
being. A back of the envelope calculation based on OLS results from Table A.1 (column
20The category “change in family structure” includes children who either moved from an intact family to
a non-intact one, or moved from a single-parent family to a step family, or moved from a step family to a
single-parent one. We combine these three cases due to the small sample sizes involved in these transitions.
When analyzing reading scores, we use just “stay in non-intact families” and “change in family structure”,
due to the relatively small sample size available for analysis. We exclude an unusual scenario, children who
transferred to an intact family from a non-intact family, because there were only a handful of observations
for this scenario.
21
5), suggests that the PMK becoming non-employed is associated with an increase of 26.03
additional points in the math test, but an increase of $24,500 in household income – the
average employment income in our sample - only improves math scores by 3.19 points.21
To finish we would like to remark that the fact that we find differential effects in Math,
but less so in reading when looking at different groups, could be related to the age groups
involved. Children aged 7 to 15 will likely react to family disruptions more strongly than
younger children, or might be experiencing long term effects of family instability. It is
possible that similar effects can be perceived in the reading scores of children as they grow
older (Arkes (2015)).
2126.03 is the coefficient of the indicator for the PMK’s moving from employment to non-employment.
The coefficient of household income is 0.13 (0.13*24.5=3.19).
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Chapter 2
Marital Property Laws and Women’s
Labour Supply
2.1 Introduction
Since the 1980s, women’s labour force participation has increased substantially, especially
among married women.1 In addition, the share of two-earner couples and the contribution
of the wife to household income has also substantially increased.2 These trends reflect
interactions between labour supply and marital decisions evolving as a result of social
and economic policies (e.g. divorce law and child-care service reforms) changing attitudes
toward women at work and incentivizing employment. Moreover, who controls family
resources affects not only consumption expenditures (Lundberg et al. (1997); Ward-Batts
1According to Statistics Canada Labour Force Survey data (LFS), the labour force participation (LFP)
rate among Canadian women aged 15 years and older increased by about 10 percentage points (from 48.5%
in 1978 to 58.1% in 1998) over the two decades following the start of the first workplace and family reforms.
The LFP rate of married women increased by 15 percentage points (from 47.1% in 1978 to 62.3% in 1998),
while the rate (already high) increased much less among divorced/separated women (from 60.3% in 1978
to 64.6%in 1998).
2The proportion of two-earner couples has increased from 52.1% to 59.8% and the wife’s contribution
from 26% to 32.8% between 1979 and 1998 (Chiappori et al. (2005) based on US data from the BLS). In
Canada, the fraction of two-earner families in Canada was 45.09% in 1985 and 54.68% in 1995 from our
calculation using the LFS data.
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(2008)) but also each spouse’s time allocation (Schultz (1990)). By creating laws and
policies affecting the distribution of resources between men and women, the government
has the potential to promote outcomes that help to reduce women’s entry into poverty
and improve well-being inside and outside marriage (Smock et al. (1999); Bedard and
Deschenes (2005)).
In this paper, we study the effect of a redistributive divorce law on the labour supply
of married women and on couples’ marital decisions in Canada. The 1989 amendment of
the Civil Code of Quebec was made to favour economic equality between spouses by im-
posing an equal division of the family patrimony (family house, vehicles and the spouses’
retirement savings). This change created an unexpected shift in the bargaining power of
the spouse with relatively lower investment in the family assets, typically the wife.3 The
potential increase in the share of the family assets at divorce associated with the redis-
tributive change could lead to a reduction the labour supply of married women, especially
among long-term married couples more likely to have accumulated family assets. The re-
distributive change is also likely to impact the marital decisions of couples already married
or thinking about marriage as the unexpected bargaining power shift may have created
unresolvable tensions or changed expectations about the financial implications of investing
in a marriage.
We use a difference-in-difference approach and exploit information on female labour
supply and marital status from the Canadian Labour Force Survey data to analyze out-
comes before and after the reforms in Quebec, relative to other provinces. Our main
research question applies to three outcomes: Did the change in the redistribution of re-
sources within couples influence 1) the labour force participation and hours of work of
married women, 2) divorce transitions, and 3), the marital decision of young and never
married individuals regarding whom to marry.
3According to the Canadian Census in 1981 and 1986, the average contribution of the husband to family
income was 70.20% (48.74% corresponds to labour income and 21.46% to non-labour income). In the 1990s,
the average contribution of the husband to family income only reduced to 64.29% (40.90% corresponds
to labour income and 23.39% to non-labour income) so the contribution of the wife increased but the
husband’s contribution still represented the majority of the family wealth. Regarding house ownership by
gender among couples, 94.14% of house owners were men and only 5.86% were women in the 1980s. In
the 1990s, 89.51% of them were men and 10.59% were women.
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The period of the Quebec marital property law change is interesting because over the
mid 1980s to mid 1990s, women’s involvement in the workplace was rapidly growing. On the
other hand, finding the ideal dataset covering that time period is challenging. The Labour
Force Survey (LFS) data provides demographic and labour market information over several
years of data covering the pre- and post- treatment periods. However, the question related
to marital status does not distinguish marriage from common law unions until the mid
1990s which is after our main period of study. The distinction is available in the marital
status question of the Canadian Census data but the information is available over only two
years of the pre-intervention period (1981, 1986) leaving insufficient variations to exploit
in a DiD estimation setting. We perform our main estimations using the LFS data but
use the Census data for additional checks and conclude that our results are unlikely to be
driven by the inclusion of common law couples.4
An advantage of the LFS data is that it contains detailed demographic and labour
market information for a representative sample of Canadian households that we exploit to
address our research questions. We use information on home ownership and education of
each spouse to further analyze whether the effect of the Quebec marital property law change
more strongly impacted the labour supply of married women for couples with greater assets
(home owners as opposed to renters) and of married women with lower earnings potential
(such as less education) suggesting a weaker bargaining position prior to the law change.
We also take advantage of the panel format of the LFS data to measure the dynamics of
divorce transitions of couples married before and after the law change. We use information
on age and the age of a couple’s children whenever relevant to further identify long-term
couples more likely to respond to the policy change. The household format of the LFS
allows us to compare the profile of each member of the household to estimate the extent of
assortative matching among newly married couples. Finally, we employ additional selection
criteria to address possible confounding effects coming from other policy changes that took
4While the literature notes a greater incidence rate of common law unions in Quebec in the mid 1980s
relative to other provinces (Statistics Canada (1997); Le Bourdais and Lapierre-Adamcyk (2004)), the
trends in the rate of incidence of common law unions are in fact very similar before the mid 1990s and
only started to change in Quebec relative to the rest of Canada in the later part of the 1990s. Our results
on the other hand show that the significant labour supply impact of the Quebec marital property law is
found in the earlier part of the 1990s.
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place in Quebec around 1989 (e.g. an amendment to the social assistance policy, a new
family allowance policy and a parental wage assistance program). Our results are robust
to these checks as well as a falsification test based on an analysis of the Quebec law change
on single women for whom a labour market response to the Quebec marital property law
change is not expected.
The literature on the economics of the family is broad ranging from theoretical mod-
elling of family decisions to empirical investigations of societal and legal determinants of
marriage and divorce rates. The collective bargaining theory of marital decisions empha-
size the importance of an intra-household sharing mechanism and distribution factors that
impact each spouse’s labour and consumption decisions within the household (Manser and
Brown (1980); McElroy and Horney (1981); Chiappori (1988); Chiappori (1992); Brown-
ing and Chiappori (1998); Chiappori and Ekeland (2001); Chiappori et al. (2002)). In
these models, a wife’s labour supply is predicted to decrease when her bargaining power
rises, where bargaining power is determined by human capital investments, ownership of
assets (non-labour income), social networks, and by redistributive family laws. For ex-
ample, reforms in divorce or marital property laws that redistribute household assets (or
the future stream of income from such assets) in favour of one spouse (usually women),
raise the spouse’s bargaining power thereby reducing their labour supply (Agarwal (1997);
Chiappori et al. (2002)).
The empirical literature on the economics of the family that studies the link between
marital property divorce laws and female labour supply is relatively small and focused on
the US (Peters (1986); Parkman (1992); Gray (1998); Stevenson (2008); Voena (2015)). A
few studies have analyzed marital property reforms in other countries (Kapan et al. (2008);
Brassiolo (2013); Ziparo (2017)). Overall, and especially among the more recent studies5,
the results generally support the collective model’s prediction that a redistributive divorce
5Among the earlier studies that have investigated how the adoption of unilateral divorce influences
women’s labour supply in the United States, Gray (1998), estimating data at two points in time, finds
that a wife’s labour supply increases with her increasing bargaining position (as measured by the adoption
of the unilateral divorce law), which is inconsistent with the prediction of the collective model. Stevenson
(2008), however, criticized Gray’s results emphasizing the idea that variations in bargaining power within
the household might be captured by cross-states variations in property division rules than the adoption of
unilateral divorce.
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law favouring one spouse, by increasing her bargaining power within the household, reduces
her labour supply. In the US, Voena (2015) explores panel data on married women who
stayed married throughout the sample period and finds that their employment declines
in states where the unilateral divorce imposes equal division of property and the intra-
household bargaining power shifts to their benefit. Similarly, Kapan et al. (2008) and
Brassiolo (2013) analyze reforms in property division regimes in England and Wales, and
Spain, respectively, applying a difference-in-difference methodology to panel data. The
empirical results in both studies show that labour supply decreased for wives who married
before the policy changes and stayed married afterwards, when the property division regime
became favourable to them. It is also worth noting that the work disincentive effect
in these three studies is estimated shortly after the reform, but long-term effects may
be different (Ziparo (2017)). Moreover, divorce reforms may have differential impact on
couples’ decisions depending on marriage duration as divorce risk declines with increasing
returns from marriage investments (Simard-Duplain (2018)). We also hypothesize that a
redistributive divorce law is likely to have stronger (likely short-term) effects coming from
unanticipated wealth changes resulting from an equal sharing rule among more mature
marriages whose accumulated assets are large. In Canada, Ligon et al. (2003) analyzed the
association between the matrimonial property laws and female suicide. They find that the
reforms, reduced married women’s suicide. To our knowledge, there has been no empirical
economic investigations of the impact of the 1989 Civil Code amendments in Quebec on
women’s labour supply.
Our study complements the literature in three ways. First, we test whether the Civil
Code reform in Quebec lead to a reduction in the labour supply of married women as a
result of increased bargaining power consistent with the prediction of the collective model
of household bargaining. In the Canadian context, we are able to isolate the impact of the
marital property regulations determined at the provincial level from the no-fault divorce law
that was adopted nationwide. We exploit a unique change in the marital property law that
took place only in Quebec and no other provinces thereby allowing us to differentiate the
time trends from the law-specific effects. Second, the rich information provided in our data
allows us to further study the bargaining power implications of the redistributive divorce
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law by further estimating the impact of Quebec’s reforms by the educational attainment
of the wife and property ownership of the couple. Third, we emphasize selection issues
associated with any analysis of the impact of a matrimonial regime amendment on the
labour supply of married women who stayed married after the reform by estimating the
impact of the Quebec Civil Code reform on marital decisions and on measures of assortative
mating. Family law reforms not only influence the decision to marry or divorce, they are
also likely to affect couples’ decisions of whom to marry by inducing people to marry a
partner with a similar background (assortative matching). Some studies have explored
whether couples show similarity in educational attainment and cultural background in the
United States (Mare (1991); Kalmijn (1994); Pencavel (1998); Watson et al. (2004)).6 Our
study adds to this literature by exploring whether a law change towards more equitable
sharing of resources among spouses at dissolution increases the likelihood that individuals
with the same financial profile will decide to marry. To our knowledge, in Canada, no
literature has exploited the exogeneity of legislation changes to analyze the impact of these
law reforms on people’s decisions of whom to marry.
The remainder of the study is organized as follows: The next Section presents an
overview of the literature and the institutional background pertinent to the present study
and question. In particular, Section 2.2.1 reviews the literature on household labour supply
and family laws, and Section 2.2.2 describes the marital property law in Quebec as well as
the rest of Canada. Section 2.3 explains the data, measurements and provides descriptive
statistics. Section 2.4 presents the methodology used in this paper as well as results.
Section 2.5 concludes the work and discusses future steps.
6These measures include the differential of education, age, cultural background, political orientation,
and emotional personality. Kalmijn (1994), Pencavel (1998), Watson et al. (2004) find that couples have
shown similarity in educational attainment since the 1980s. Mare (1991) indicates that this fact was also
true even before the 1980s using five decades data. Moreover, Watson et al. (2004) suggest that newlyweds
have also shown significant similarity in other attributes such as age, cultural background, and political
orientation.
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2.2 Literature and Institutional Background
2.2.1 Theoretical and Empirical Studies
The significant growth in labour force participation and post-secondary education of women
over the last decades strengthened their influence over economic decisions within the house-
hold. In parallel, the modelling of intra-household decision-making developed rapidly;
moving away from the traditional unitary model which assumes common preferences and
single pooling of resources, the models introduced mechanisms reflecting the sharing and
distribution of resources within the household and in particular, the concept of a cou-
ple’s bargaining power (Thomas (1990); Hoddinott and Haddad (1995); Lundberg et al.
(1997)).7
Because the internal allocation process of the intra-household resources among family
members cannot be identified under the single decision-making unit assumption of the
unitary model (Chiappori (1992)), alternative multi-agent household models have devel-
oped in which household members’ preferences depend on each other. Manser and Brown
(1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) developed the cooperative bargaining model based
on Nash bargaining theory in which husbands and wives have heterogeneous utility func-
tions that depend on their own consumption and leisure, as well as on shared household
public goods. They cooperate in intra-household decisions regarding the labour market,
consumption, and the sharing of public goods.
The collective model generalizes the mechanism behind the cooperative bargaining
model (Chiappori (1988); Chiappori (1992); Browning and Chiappori (1998); Chiappori
and Ekeland (2001); Chiappori et al. (2002); Blundell et al. (2007)). The model relies
on the assumption that households’ decisions are Pareto-efficient and the idea that given
preferences that can either be “egotistic” or “caring”, it is possible to define a sharing
7For example, Lundberg et al. (1997) reject these hypotheses based on analyzing a 1979 child benefit
policy reform in the United Kingdom that changed this child financial subsidy recipients from fathers
to mothers. They find that this income redistribution induced families to spend more on women’s and
children’s clothing, while less on men’s clothing. These findings suggest that wives usually place more
weight on their children and families’ expenditures than husbands do.
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rule identifying how household ressources are allocated to household members.8 The de-
cision process involves two stages: first, all household members decide a “sharing rule” to
share the household non-labour income, according to factors such as the wage rate, non-
labour income, and their attributes; second, each member individually chooses his/her own
labour involvement and consumption subject to the corresponding budget constraints and
the sharing rule.
Additionally, the “distribution factors” introduced in the collective model framework
permit an analysis of the influence of the intra-household decision-making in the presence
of exogenous shocks generated by quasi-natural experiments such as legislation changes
(Chiappori et al. (2002); Kapan et al. (2008))9. The collective model predicts that a wife’s
participation in the labour market decreases if she gains more intra-household bargaining
power. The same prediction is also found in the dynamic version of the collective model
presented in Voena (2015).10
The empirical literature that exploited the exogeneity of family-related policy changes
(enhancing women’s bargaining position within a marriage and their financial welfare after
divorce) investigated the impact of these law reforms on women’s labour supply (Peters
(1986); Parkman (1992); Gray (1998); Genadek et al. (2007); Stevenson (2008); Kapan
et al. (2008); Brassiolo (2013); Voena (2015); Ziparo (2017)). Overall, the results are
generally supportive, especially among the more recent studies, of the collective model’s
prediction that a redistributive divorce law favouring one spouse, by increasing her bar-
gaining power within the household, reduces her labour supply.
In the U.S., several researchers explore the impact of the adoption of unilateral divorce
8Under the egotistic preference, a person’s utility only depends on his/her own consumption and leisure.
In contrast, under the caring assumption, a person’s preference depends on both his/her own and the
spouse’s utility (Chiappori et al. (2002)).
9Chiappori et al. (2002) and Kapan et al. (2008) define the “distribution factors” as any exogenous
variables that can influence the intra-household decision process without affecting individuals’ preferences
or budget constraints.
10The collective model predicts that a wife decreases her labour supply (increases her leisure) if she gains
more intra-household bargaining power. It is worth noting that a wife’s leisure is defined by economists as
non-labour time which includes all unpaid activities such as (unpaid) household productive work as well
as leisurely activities. A decrease (increase) in a wife’s labour supply does not necessary mean an increase
(decrease) in her leisurely activities (Gray (1998)).
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on women’s labour supply (Peters (1986); Parkman (1992); Gray (1998); Chiappori et al.
(2002); Genadek et al. (2007); Stevenson (2008); Voena (2015)). Some early studies find a
positive association between the bargaining power and wives’ labour supply (Peters (1986);
Parkman (1992); Gray (1998)). For instance, Peters (1986) and Parkman (1992) indicate
a positive impact of the unilateral divorce law on female labour force participation. Using
data at two points in time, these results have been questioned by Gray (1998) who first finds
an insignificant impact on women’s labour supply as a result of this unilateral divorce law,
without controlling for the marital property law in each state. After the marital property
laws have been taken into account, he finds that married women in the community-property
states, which strengthened wives’ rights, are more likely to increase their labour supply;
while wives in the common-law states, which weakened married women’s rights, are more
likely to decrease their labour supply11. This positive relationship is inconsistent with the
prediction of the theoretical models1213.
In contrast, a more recent study by Voena (2015), found a negative relationship between
the bargaining power and wives’ labour supply. Exploring panel data with longer time
periods compared to that of previous literature, Voena (2015) finds a decline of women’s
employment due to the unilateral divorce in equal division of property states, where the
intra-household bargaining power shifts to their benefit. This finding is consistent with
predictions by the collective model14.
11In the community-property states, property accumulated during marriage is considered as community
property. In contrast, in the common-law states, property accumulated during marriage by each spouse is
his/her own property.
12Gray (1998) explains this contradiction with a shift in their allocated time from home production to
the labour market. He indicates that a woman’s non-labour time could consist of two parts: leisure and
home production hours. Under this assumption, when her bargaining power increases, she will allocate
more time to the labour market from her home production hours, rather than from her leisure time.
13Stevenson (2008), however, has revisited this research and criticized the results in Gray (1998), indi-
cating that the effects of the unilateral divorce law on wives’ labour supply is independent of the property
division rules in the state. Stevenson (2008) has pointed out the omitted variable bias and potential prob-
lems of coding states by their property division regimes in Gray (1998) and indicates that married women
increased their labour supply after the adoption of the unilateral divorce law, regardless of the marital
property laws. Genadek et al. (2007) also suggest that the effect of the unilateral divorce law on wives’
labour supply is independent of the property division rules in the states through analyzing the effects of
this law change on married mothers and non-mothers’ labour supply.
14Chiappori et al. (2002) also find that married women reduced their labour supply when the divorce
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Three studies focus on marital property division law reforms in in France, England
and Spain (Ziparo (2017); Kapan et al. (2008); Brassiolo (2013)). The legal changes were
similar in all three cases in that the reforms were intended to insure a more equal division
of assets at dissolution of the marriage. In France, it was done by reforming the default
matrimonial regime of the country. In Spain and England, it was done by ruling over
the default regime (of separate ownership of property) by entitling the financially weaker
spouse (typically the wife) to an economic compensation that reflected a more equitable
sharing of the assets acquired during marriage in case of a divorce.
In France, the change took place in 1966 through a reform of its matrimonial regime (the
“universal community” regime) by eliminating the husband’s right to manage the separate
property of his wife and limiting his right and power to manage the common assets. The
new legal regime automatically established upon marriage included personal and real assets
acquired by the spouses during the marriage. The new default regime (in the absence of
any marital contract) is called the partnership of acquests. In Spain, the legal change took
place in Catalonia in 1993 and modified the existing default property division regime (the
separate property regime where property is divided based on which spouse owns the legal
title) at divorce to introduce an economic compensation to the spouse who has financial
disadvantages.15 In England, a change towards equal division of assets was implemented
in 2000 following a landmark decision by the House of Lords (white v. White) where the
default regime was based on the principle of separate ownership of assets.
Note that Ziparo (2017) does not find a significant negative employment effect when
comparing the labour supply responses of women married following the matrimonial regime
reform in France compared to women married before the policy changes. However, his study
points to the different timing at which the pre- and post-reform impacts were measured.
The work disincentive effect found in the other studies (Kapan et al. (2008); Brassiolo
laws enhanced their rights with the functional-form model in the collective model they developed.
15The policy reforms to the separation of property regime in Catalonia were the following: in 1993,
the financially weaker spouse would receive an economic compensation in the event of a divorce; in 1998,
marital contracts could include marital property provisions when a marriage ends. The empirical results
indicate that wives’ labour supply reacted in the opposite way under these two reforms: it decreased when
the first change improved wives’ bargaining power, but increased after the second change, when the scope
of the marriage contract canceled this improvement.
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(2013); Voena (2015)) is estimated shortly after the reform, but long-term effects may be
different.16 In addition, divorce reforms may have differential impact on couples’ deci-
sions depending on marriage duration as divorce risk declines with increasing returns from
marriage investments (Simard-Duplain (2018)). We also hypothesize that a redistribu-
tive divorce law is likely to have stronger (short-term) effects coming from unanticipated
wealth changes resulting from an equal sharing rule among more mature marriages whose
accumulated assets are large.
Furthermore, Frémeaux and Leturcq (2013) note in their analysis of the evolution of
the matrimonial regimes in France that while the adoption rate of the default regime of the
partnership of acquests newly implemented in 1966 increased slowly over the following two
decades to become the regime chosen by the majority of married couples, the progression
slowed down afterwards.17
Similar developments in matrimonial regimes happened in Quebec as the civil code of
Quebec was largely inspired by the French civil code. On the other hand, family law in
the other provinces of Canada is governed by common law. In the next subsection, we
present details regarding the differences in the matrimonial regimes in Quebec and the rest
of Canada and the different timing of the reforms.
In general, comparing the context of the changes just described in France, the UK,
Spain and the US with the Quebec amendment of the civil code, the Quebec initiative
arose in the late 1980s, two decades after and separately from the no-fault divorce law
implemented throughout Canada (implemented in 1968). It was also two decades after
the first reform of the matrimonial regime in Quebec changing the default regime from the
“universal community” regime restricting the power of decision of the wife to the more
egalitarian regime of the partnership of acquests (implemented in 1970). The initiative
16Kapan et al. (2008) show that a property division regime reform in England and Wales, by giving a
greater proportion of the total assets to the disadvantaged spouse, negatively impacted the labour supply
of wives. Brassiolo (2013) examined two changes of the separation of property regime in Catalonia using
a difference-in-difference approach and found similar negative employment outcomes for wives.
17The authors offer two reasons: between 1990 and 2010, the marriage rate declined as common-law
unions increased and the choice of the matrimonial regime based on the separation of ownership among
married couples gained in popularity.
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that lead to the 1989 amendment initially came from a report submitted by the Conseil
du Statut de la Femme to the Quebec government (report written by Mailloux and Olivier
(1986)). Concerns were raised that a large proportion of married couples had not adopted
the default regime of the partnership of acquests more likely to protect the spouse with
fewer assets and wealth invested in the marriage and were instead married under the
regime of separate ownership of property (about 52% of married couples over the 1971-
1985 time period, annex 1 of the report). The amendment when in effect, applied to
all married couples irrespective of the matrimonial regime chosen by the couple or when
they got married and likely affected more strongly couples with the conventional regime
involving few commonly own wealth and acquests.18 In Canada, there has been no empirical
economic investigations of the impact of the 1989 Civil Code amendments in Quebec on
women’s labour supply.
Regarding the question of whether family-related law reforms affect individuals’ marital
decisions as well as the issue of assortative matching, some researchers have explored
the influence of adopting unilateral divorce law or no-fault divorce law on divorce rates
(Peters (1986); Allen (1998); Gray (1998); Friedberg (1998); González and Viitanen (2009);
Brassiolo (2013)). Peters (1986) and Gray (1998) indicate that the adoption of unilateral
divorce laws in the United States does not increase divorce rates. This finding is consistent
with the Coase Theorem which suggests that the likelihood of divorce should be similar
under either mutual consent or unilateral divorce laws if spouses can transfer resources to
each other with insignificant cost (Gray (1996)). However, Friedberg (1998) has suggested
that this legal shift in the United States increases individuals’ likelihood of divorce. Allen
(1998) and González and Viitanen (2009) also find this growing effects on divorce rates
due to the adoption of no-fault divorce law in Canada and Europe, respectively. Brassiolo
(2013) has analyzed an unexpected reform on marital property division in the event of
a divorce in Spain. This study also suggests that this reform, which allows women to
gain more bargaining power within marriage, has increased the divorce rate. Our paper
investigates this question using Canadian 6-month panel data to more closely estimate how
18There was an 18 months period from July 1989 until December 1990 during which couples married
before July 1989 were able to opt out of the amendment. By October 1990, only about 2% of married
couples had opted out (Le Soleil (1990)).
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the Quebec redistributive divorce law affected individuals’ marital status transitions. Many
researchers have analyzed the issue of assortative matching, using various measurements
(e.g., the differential of education, age, cultural background, political orientation, and
emotional personality), to indicate the level of similarity between spouses in the United
States (Mare (1991); Kalmijn (1994); Pencavel (1998); Watson et al. (2004)). Our study
add to this literature by exploring whether a law change towards more equitable sharing
of resources among spouses at dissolution increases the likelihood that individuals with
the same financial profile decide to marry. According to our knowledge, in Canada, no
literature has exploited the exogeneity of legislation changes to analyze the impact of these
law reforms on people’s decisions about whom to marry.
2.2.2 Marital property laws in Canada
In Canada, the marital property law in each province was reformed during the middle of
the 20th century. Table B.1 in the Appendix presents the marital property act in each
province in 1989 (the year of the change in Quebec). Note that the titles of the marital
property laws are different across provinces; For example, in Quebec, this law is called
“family patrimony rules”, however, Ontario uses “Family law Act” as the title. Each of
these laws has been amended several times by its own provincial government.
Marital property law at Divorce in Quebec before and after 1989 Act
From Table B.1 in the Appendix, we can see that, in Quebec, the 1989 Act amended the
Civil Code to favor economic equality between spouses. First, this amended law created
a concept of “family patrimony” and specified which kind of property should be included
in this creation. Properties included in the family patrimony are (1) The houses where
a family is living (2) Objects in the family’s homes for furnishing or decorating (3) The
motor vehicles for family’s use (4) The retirement savings accounts. Second, this amended
law specified that the value of the family patrimony should be equally divided between
spouses after deducting any debts in the event of a divorce, even if some of the property
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does not belong to the common property. Third, any property excluded from the fam-
ily patrimony is divided following the matrimonial regime rules, which is “partnership of
acquests”, or “separation as to property”, or “community of property” depending on cou-
ples choices as well as the date of marriage (https://www.educaloi.qc.ca/en/capsules/
matrimonial-regimes-rules-managing-and-dividing-property)19.
Before the 1989 Act, all properties were divided following the matrimonial regime rules.
The new act created an unexpected change in the intra-household financial situation of cou-
ples where one spouse, typically the wife, has little ownership of and is less equally invested
into the assets contributing to the family patrimony. Despite the growing emancipation of
women in the 1980s, by 1989, the husband was still typically the principal income earner,
and the house was usually under the name of the husband (Gray (1998); Chiappori et al.
(2002); Stevenson (2008)). According to the Canadian Census ((1981, 1986, 1991 and
1996), the average contribution of the husband to family income was 70.20% (48.74% cor-
responds to labour income and 21.46% to non-labour income) in the 1980s. In the 1990s,
the average contribution of the husband to family income only reduced to 64.29% (40.90%
corresponds to labour income and 23.39% to non-labour income) so the contribution of
the wife slightly increased but the husband’s contribution still represented the majority of
family wealth.
Regarding house ownership among married people, only 5.86% were women in the
1980s. In the 1990s, only 10.59% were women.20 As a result, wives with relatively lower
19“If a couple signed a marriage contract in front of a notary, their matrimonial regime is the
one stated in the contract. If they did not sign a marriage contract in front of a notary, or if
their marriage contract doesn’t mention a matrimonial regime, then the regime depends on when
they were married. Community of property used to apply automatically to all couples married
before July 1, 1970 who had not chosen a matrimonial regime in a notarized marriage contract.
Spouses today can still choose the community of property regime in a marriage contract. Partner-
ship of acquests applies automatically to all marriages in Quebec since July 1, 1970 if the spouses





20In the Canadian Census, respondents are only surveyed to answer whether the dwellings they are
living in are owned by a family member. Therefore, the house ownership of a respondent himself/herself
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earnings potential who accumulated less into the payment of the family house, the car and
with little pension income (having invested less time in the labour market and more time
into home production) are at a disadvantage during property division at divorce under the
rules of matrimonial regimes that failed to consider economic equality between spouses.
Additionally, these assets (family home, vehicle, and pension plan) usually contribute a
significant portion of the total family property. In summary, having an equal share of
the family property after divorce is expected to improve women’s bargaining power and
economic conditions.
According to the Statistics Canada Survey of Consumer Finances and Survey of Finan-
cial Security, the share of the value of the principal residence and other real estate assets
as well as the vehicle in total family assets was 47.90% in 1984, the share of the value of
financial assets (such as pension plans and stocks) in total family assets was 21.10%. In
1999, the share of the value of the principal residence and other real estate assets as well
as the vehicle in total family assets was 45.80%, the share of the value of financial assets
in total family assets was 31.10%.21
The new family patrimony act created an unexpected change in the intra-household
financial situation of couples by imposing a particular definition of the family patrimony
to be equally shared. It applied to all married couples irrespective of their chosen or
default matrimonial regime. Even for couples under the default partnership of acquests who
already commonly shared their house and any other assets acquired during the marriage,
the unexpected change they likely faced is the automatic sharing of the pension benefits
which before the 1989 amendment were considered own property.
is not clear. We use the information regarding whether a respondent is the primary household maintainer
to proxy his/her ownership.
21The other categories included in total family assets are equity in business (“the estimated amount
the respondent would receive if the business were sold, after deducting any outstanding debts to be paid”
(Statistics Canada (2012))) and other non-financial assets.
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Marital property laws at Divorce in the rest of Canada
In 1989, the other (common-law) provinces of Canada had introduced the concept of equal
division of the family property in their marital property laws for several years already (Ap-
pendix Table B.1). Before their reforms, the existing matrimonial regime, the “separation
of property”,22 implied that individuals kept their own property after divorce; however,
the property accumulated during the marriage was frequently placed under the husband,
who was usually the principal income earner in the family.
From Appendix Table B.1, we see that the basic idea of the equal sharing of family
property is similar across provinces, even though the regulations in each province vary
in details such as the right to share the family home, the concept of family property
and the division of pre-marriage property. For example, even though the presumption of
property division at divorce is equal distribution, the marital property law in Alberta does
not specify how to share the family home directly and clearly. Additionally, Ontario and
Newfoundland and Labrador laws describe how to share the family home in the case when
the family home belongs to the pre-marriage property, but the other provinces do not.
Ontario, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland and Labrador amended their marital property acts
around 1989, and the others did not.
In order to conduct a treatment analysis in Quebec using a differences-in-differences
model, we need to find a comparison group of provinces such that marital property laws
have not been updated or replaced around 1989. As a result, Ontario, Nova Scotia, New-
foundland and Labrador are excluded. We use the remaining six provinces as the control
group since they have relatively similar marital property regulations23. The marital prop-
erty laws of these provinces defines the equal rights and responsibilities for each spouse.
If the marriage ends, the family property will be divided in half along with the debts and
22“Separation of property is the legal regime which now applies in all provinces, meaning that each
spouse fully owns whatever he or she purchases. However, ownership is often uncertain over time or if
a joint bank account served as the source of the purchase.”(http://www.duhaime.org/LegalResources/
FamilyLaw/LawArticle-35/Matrimonial-Property-Law-in-Canada--A-Primer.aspx)
23We also conducted a differences-in-differences analysis using all provinces except Quebec for the com-
parison group as a robustness check. The results, not reported here, are qualitatively similar to those that
exclude Ontario, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland and Labrador.
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liabilities. We can therefore compare the impact of the adoption of equal sharing of the
marital property in Quebec on the labour supply comparing the changes before and after
the 1989 amendment and differencing out the labour supply trends of the comparison group
of provinces who had already adopted a system of equal division of the marital property.
2.3 Data and Measurement
The data used in this paper comes from the monthly Labour Force Survey (LFS) over
the period 1985-1995. We drop observations referring to the period between July 1, 1989,
and Dec 31, 1990. During this period, couples married prior the date (July 1, 1989) could
choose whether the new family patrimony rules would apply to them. They had until
December 31, 1990 to opt out of the amendment. Therefore, we exclude this period from
our sample in order to avoid confounding effects coming from couples’ decisions to review
their marriage contract. The pre-intervention years are 1985-1989 (until June of 1989) and
the post-intervention years are 1991-1995. The LFS is a representative monthly household
survey that provides detailed information on individuals’ labour supply and marital status
as well as several additional demographic characteristics.
Table 2.1 presents the summary statistics of the basic characteristics of the LFS (such
as the proportion of all respondents in different marital status, the LFP rate, respondents’
ages and education levels, etc.) for Quebec and the rest of Canada (with Ontario, Nova
Scotia, Newfoundland and Labrador excluded), before and after the Civil Code amend-
ment, separately. After comparing the summary statistics of these two groups in the
pre-intervention periods, we can see that, on average, Quebec has a similar proportion
of married/common-law couples and a slightly smaller proportion of divorced/separated
people than other provinces. The proportion of single people is similar between these two
groups. The average hours of work and the mean LFP rate in Quebec is slightly lower than
those in other provinces. The proportion of female and respondents’ age are on average
very similar. Overall, we conclude that, before the Civil Code amendment, the Quebec
sample shared attributes similar to those of the other provinces sample. Even though
39
there are some differences, they are not large in magnitude. The similarity of observations’
attributes between Quebec and the control group in the pre-intervention period suggests
that the parallel trends assumption discussed later in this subsection, might be satisfied in
our model.
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of Respondents’ Basic Characteristics in Quebec and Other
Provinces in Pre and Post Intervention Years
Rest of Canada
Quebec (with Ontario, Nova Scotia,
Newfoundland and Labrador excluded)
Before 1989 After 1989 Before 1989 After 1989
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Married/Common-law % 64.08 0.48 63.57 0.48 63.68 0.48 63.30 0.48
Divorced/Separated % 5.89 0.24 7.14 0.26 6.58 0.25 7.23 0.26
Single % 24.13 0.43 23.33 0.42 24.08 0.43 23.94 0.43
Female % 51.07 0.50 51.00 0.50 50.13 0.50 50.22 0.50
Age 41.52 16.84 42.85 16.73 41.50 17.45 42.66 17.34
High school or less % 68.34 0.47 55.60 0.50 63.81 0.48 52.20 0.50
First child 6 years or above % 33.40 0.47 32.22 0.47 31.26 0.46 30.97 0.46
No child % 57.48 0.49 59.06 0.49 59.41 0.49 60.65 0.49
Children under 5 years % 12.56 0.33 12.11 0.33 13.87 0.35 12.72 0.33
Labour force participation % 65.04 0.48 64.35 0.48 68.84 0.46 68.98 0.46
Hours of work (per week) 22.30 21.09 21.50 21.03 24.50 22.63 24.80 22.65
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on the Labour Force Survey (LFS), 1985 - 1995.
We restrict our sample to women aged 18 to 65 years to capture as many observations
with valid information on both labour supply and marital status as possible in the women’s
labour supply analysis. In contrast, for the analyses of individuals’ marital decisions and
of potential assortative matching, we restrict our sample to individuals aged 18 years and
above to ensure all respondents had reached the legally marriageable age. In these three
analyses, we have imposed further conditions, described in Section 2.4, on our sample to
better investigate our research questions.
For the measures of labour supply outcomes, we use women’s labour force participa-
tion and the usual number of hours worked per week. To analyze the impact of the law
change on divorce, we exploit the longitudinal 6-month panel format of the LFS data to
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create monthly marital status transitions. Additionally, to analyze the potential assorta-
tive matching implications of the Quebec amendment, we use differences in educational
attainment between spouses as our main interest by following the existing studies (Mare
(1991); Kalmijn (1994); Pencavel (1998); Watson et al. (2004)) since individuals’ education
decisions are more likely took place before the law change. Moreover, peoples’ education
attainments are related to their earnings. Employing this measure as our outcome of inter-
est allows us to explore whether the reforms induced people to marry a partner with similar
financial status. Appendix Table B.2 presents the summary statistics for our sample of
married/common law women based on the LFS data.
It should also be noted that the family patrimony rules in Quebec apply only to married
couples, not common-law unions. Each partner in common-law unions usually keeps his/her
own property and is responsible for his/her own debts after separation.24 However, the
marital status question in the LFS does not distinguish the two groups in the years studied.
We will present robustness checks the estimations using alternative data coming from the
Census in which married and common law couples are separately identified.
Table B.3 in the Appendix presents the differences-in-differences framework for the
married women’s labour-force analysis, and describes the treatment group (T) and control
groups (C).
In differences-in-differences identification strategies, a parallel-trend assumption is re-
quired for consistency. Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 present the average hours of work and
the labour force participation rate, respectively, of the women in the treatment group
(women married/cohabited before 1989 in Quebec) and the control group (women mar-
ried/cohabited before 1989 in the other provinces) from 1985 to 1995. From each graph,
an upward trend can be seen in both the treatment and control groups, while the hours of
work and labour force participation rate are higher in the control group. After comparing
the trends in the outcome of interest between these two groups in the pre-intervention
periods (LFS, 1985-1989), we might suggest that the parallel trend assumption appears
24The share of married couples versus common-law unions in Quebec as well as the rest of Canada is
presented in Appendix Table B.7. In general, married individuals represent the majority of the population
in a couple relationship.
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Figure 2.1: Hours of Work among married Women, 1985-1995
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on the Labour Force Survey (LFS), 1985 - 1995.
to be satisfied. In addition, we also use Equation 2.1 to test whether the treatment and
control groups have common trends in the pre-policy periods.






αkQuebec ∗ yeark + εipt (2.1)
We test the hypothesis that the coefficients of Quebec ∗ yeark are equal to each other
(Test results are reported in Appendix Table B.4). The coefficients of Quebec ∗ yeark,
which indicate the potential anticipated effects among women in Quebec before the policy
changes, are statistically insignificant suggesting evidence of parallel trends.
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Figure 2.2: Labour Force Participation Rate among married Women, 1985-1995
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on the Labour Force Survey (LFS), 1985 - 1995.
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2.4 Analysis
2.4.1 Impact of the Quebec Family Patrimony Rules on Married
Women’s Labour Supply
In this section, we are interested in analyzing the impact of the Quebec family patrimony
rules on wives’ labour market behaviour. We use the changes in the family patrimony
rules in Quebec as the treatment and the population of married women as the population
susceptible to respond to the treatment and apply a differences-in-differences identification
method using group of married wives in other provinces which did not experience changes
in family patrimony rules over that time period as the control group.
In 1970, Quebec experienced a change in its matrimonial regime. For couples who mar-
ried before July 1, 1970, the “community of property” was the default regime. After that
date, the default regime became the “partnership of acquests”. However, the “community
of property” regime can still be chosen by couples today in a marriage contract. To insure
that our sample of wives faced the same default regime at marriage throughout the sample
period, we need to exclude couples whose matrimonial regime is the “community of prop-
erty”. Based on 1985 data from Quebec statistics, only 0.06% of couples were under the
“community of property” regime that year (Mailloux and Olivier (1986)). This suggest
that the exclusion of the couples under this regime is not a major sample selection concern.
More importantly for our analysis of the labour market response of married women
before and after the 1989 law changes, we need to insure that our sample faced the same
matrimonial property laws at marriage which implies that they all married before the 1989
law change.
Sample
The choice of sample is based on information regarding the duration or the year of the re-
spondent’s marriage. Identifying couples who married before 1989 for the pre-intervention
periods (LES, 1985-1989) is straightforward. For instance, if a respondent’s status is
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indicated as “married” in these survey years, he/she automatically matches the rule of
being married before 1989. However, selecting couples married before 1989 for the post-
intervention periods is tricky without information on the year of the marriage or marriage
duration. The 6-month panel format of the LFS is too short and cannot be used to estimate
marriage duration. We proxy for duration by using information on the age of the couples’
first child if the couple has children. The first child of a couple who married before 1989
will be five years of age or above by the time of the post-intervention survey years of 1991
and 1995.252627
For wives without children, we calculated the average age of women without children
who married before 1989 using the information from the General Social Survey (GSS),
Cycle 5, 1990 and Cycle 10, 1995 because these two cycles of the GSS provide abundant
details of respondents’ marriages including age at marriage. Using wives’ ages at marriage
and their current age, we are able to figure out the date of their marriages and then select
those who were married between 1970 and 1989 and have no children in their family. Based
on this group of women, we calculated an average age of 40 in Cycle 5, 1990, and 51 in
Cycle 10, 199528. Therefore, we select wives without children aged more than 40 years for
25Note that this approximation (age of the first child) is only suitable for women in their first marriages.
Women in the second or third marriages could have children from previous relationships. Therefore, the
age of the first child cannot approximate the duration of the current marriages. On the other hand,
according to the General Social Survey (GSS), Cycle 5, 1990, 89.49% of married women aged 40 years
and above (an age group who are more likely to have children five years of age or above) are in their
first marriages. Note also that children could be born when parents are living in common-law (prior to
marriage). However, according to the GSS, Cycle 5, 1990, the proportion of women having children prior
to their first marriages is only 7.38%.
26The retrospective nature of the GSS data allows us to distinguish whether a respondent’s current
marriage is his/her first as well as obtain his/her duration of marriage. However, we do not use this
dataset in our study for two reasons. First, the small sample size of the GSS is a main limitation of
conducting our research using the differences-in-differences method when the treatment group only focuses
on a specific group of women in Quebec. Second, the potential recall bias problem of using the retrospective
data has been addressed by many researchers (Horvath (1982); Sable (1999); Paull (2002)).
27We use measures that indicate the number of children in a specific age group in the LFS (e.g., the
number of children between 0 to 5 years, the number of children between 6 to 14 years) to capture the age
of first child in the household. Due to this categorical variable nature, we restrict our sample to married
women with the first child aged 6 years or above rather than 5.
28Some women without children in 1990 may give birth in the next five years and exist from this group.
Thus, the average age of this group in 1995 is higher than expected.
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all post-intervention years. We also impose this restriction on all pre-intervention years to
keep the pre-intervention and post-intervention samples as similar as possible. This age
restriction also allows to exclude the group of married women who might be influenced
by the amendment of the social assistance policy which took place in Quebec in 1989.
This amendment improved the benefit of childless social assistance for individuals under
30 years who have no children living with them, which further affected their labour market
behaviour (Lemieux and Milligan (2008)).
Our sample selection strategy serves an additional purpose which is to further identify
the population most likely to be impacted by the treatment reflected in the 1989 Act.
Because divorce risk declines over the course of a marriage (see Simard-Duplain (2018) for
a detailed structural analysis of the dynamics of marital and labour supply decisions over
the life cycle), a divorce reform may have weaker effects on more mature married couples
who have optimized their choices of labour supply and marital status. However, the 1989
Civil Code amendment reflected an unexpected change in the redistributive divorce law and
as a result, created a transitory (one-time change) and unanticipated wealth change which
is expected to generate a labour supply response through a leisure-inducing income effect
and the response is also expected to be stronger for older spouses who have accumulated
assets.
Specification and Estimation
To estimate the effect of the family patrimony rules on the married women’s labour supply,
the differences-in-differences specification of this analysis is:
yipt = α0 + α1Aftert + α2Tip + α3Tip ∗ Aftert +
∑
n
βnXipt + δt + fp + cpt + µipt (2.2)
where yipt is either the number of hours worked by women or women’s labour force partic-
ipation. Aftert is the post-intervention periods’ indicator, which is equal to 0 for survey
years 1985-1989, and 1 for survey years 1991-1995. Tip is the treatment group indicator.
Therefore, our main interest, α3, indicates the responsiveness of married women’s labour
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market behaviour to Quebec’s family patrimony rules. Xipt is a group of control variables:
age dummies, whether they have children or not, whether they have children under five
years, whether they have a high school degree or less, and the age of their first children
dummies29. We also include the province fixed effects (fp), year-by-month fixed effects
(δt), and province-by-time fixed effects (cpt) in our model to control for some provincial
and nation-wide changes, as well as the differential trends of female labour force partici-
pation.30 The standard errors (µipt) are clustered at the province-by-time level (Bertrand
et al. (2004))3132.
At the extensive margin, we apply the linear probability model (LPM) as our baseline
estimation. We also employed the Logit estimation as a robustness check. At the intensive
margin, we use the OLS estimation as our baseline model. In our sample, a fairly large
proportion of married women worked zero weekly hours (they are either out of the labour
force or unemployed). Thus, we use the Tobit and Heckman models as a robustness check
(Heckman (1977)). Additionally, we estimate the impact of the family patrimony rules
on married women’s hours of work using unconditional quantile (UQ) regression following
Firpo et al. (2009))33 We explore the effects of Quebec’s family patrimony rules on hours
of work per week for three different samples of married women according to the strength of
their attachment to the labour force. First, we focus on the sample of all married women,
which is the one used at the extensive margin (follow Angrist and Pischke (2009)). Second,
the sample is restricted to married women who are in the labour force, either employed
29Including the age of their first children dummies can help us to control differential mar-
riage/relationship duration among married women.
30The results are similar whether or not we include province-specific time trends.
31798 clusters: 7 provinces times 10 years times 11.4 months (The observations between July 1, 1989,
and Dec 31, 1990, have been dropped.).
32Researchers have questioned the correlation across clusters of clustering on province-year pair
(Cameron and Miller (2015)). Therefore, we estimate the standard errors clustered at different levels
(cma-by-time and province-by-cluster). While the results are not shown to avoid lengthening the ap-
pendix (but available upon author’s request), we find that the level of statistical significance of the results
do not change across the various clustering methods. We also performed the two-step method in Donald
and Lang (2007) as an additional robustness check and the results were also very similar.
33We used the Stata programs generously shared by their authors on Nicole Fortin’s webpage at fac-
ulty.arts.ubc.ca/nfortin/datahead.html. The UQ approach has been used previously to analyze labour
supply effects of policy changes in Schirle (2015) and Koebel and Schirle (2016).
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or unemployed and more strongly attached to the labour force compared to the women in
the first group. Third, we further restrict the sample to married women who have been
employed 6 years or more (to insure they were employed before the policy changes and
stayed employed afterwards). This group of women has the strongest attachment to the
labour force. Estimating the impact of the family patrimony law change over this group
of women who were employed before the law change remained employed throughout the
period helps isolate the intensive margin response and eliminates any compositional effects
coming from a change in married women labour force participation before and after the
law change.
Note that we report coefficient estimates rather than marginal effect given the problems
of calculating and interpreting the marginal effect of an interaction term in a nonlinear
model have been discussed in many studies (Athey and Imbens (2006); Lechner et al.
(2011); Buis et al. (2010); Puhani (2012); Karaca-Mandic et al. (2012)). As the authors
point out, calculating the first derivative of the interaction term as the marginal effect can
lead to a biased result when using a differences-in-differences approach(Buis et al. (2010)).
Puhani (2012) and Buis et al. (2010) provide an alternative way to calculate the interaction
effect and some tips of interpreting it, respectively.
Results
Table 2.2 indicates the treatment effects on married women’s labour supply using Equa-
tion 2.2 at both the intensive and extensive margins. A full set of control variables described
in Section 2.4.1 is included in each specification.3435
At the intensive margin (rows 1-3), the OLS estimations (column 1) imply that the
labour supply of married women in Quebec (subject to the family patrimony law change)
has declined by 0.43 hours per week (not statistically significant) compared to those in the
other provinces. When we restrict our sample to married women in the labour force, as
34Due to the 6-month panel nature of the LFS, only one observation (the first one) per individual is
included in the model.
35In the Heckman selection model, we include the spousal education as the additional variable in the
selection equation.
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expected, this negative effect of the Civil Code reforms in Quebec on wives’ work hours is
stronger and significant. The estimated reduction in labour supply is 1.42 hours per week.
Furthermore, when the sample is restricted to married women who were employed before
and after the policy changes, the labour supply reduces by 0.70 hours per week significantly
among this group of women. The magnitude of the hours adjustment is smaller among
employed women with longer tenure.
The results of the Tobit (column 2) and Heckman regression (column 3) estimations are
consistent with those in the OLS estimation. The UQ estimates (column 4) also indicate
that, at the median, the impact of the Civil Code reforms in Quebec on wives’ hours worked
is strongest when we restrict our sample to married women in the labour force.
At the extensive margin (row 4), the results from the LPM estimation (column 1) and
the Logit model (column 2) show that the family patrimony rules had no statistically
significant effect on the probability of married women entering the labour force.
In summary, we find a statistically significant negative effect of the Civil Code reforms
in Quebec on wives’ working hours and the impact is consistent with the prediction of the
collective model by Chiappori et al. (2002), which indicates that women will reduce their
labour supply when the intra-household bargaining power shifts to their benefit.
Robustness Checks
As mentioned earlier, the family patrimony rules in Quebec apply only to married couples,
not common-law unions but the marital status question in the LFS data does not identify
separately couples who are married from those who are cohabiting. Since spillover effects
of the Quebec marital property law change on cohabiting couples are possible, the labour
supply effects of the law change we find could be driven by the women living in common-
law unions. A few studies noted that the incidence of common-law unions is substantially
higher in Quebec than in the rest of Canada (Statistics Canada (1997); Le Bourdais and
Lapierre-Adamcyk (2004)). In Appendix Table B.7 we present summary statistics from the
Census data for the years 1981, 1986, 1991 and 1996 based on the same sample selection
rules as those we used with the LFS data for comparison. The demographic characteristics
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Table 2.2: Family Patrimony Rules Effects on Married Women’s Labour Supply
Intensive margin (Weekly hours worked): T*After OLS Tobit Heckman UQ Median N
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
All married women -0.43 -0.38*** -0.60 0.13 252796
(0.27) (0.07) (0.39) (1.91)
Married women in the labour force -1.42*** -1.57*** -0.99*** -0.67*** 144952
(0.31) (0.33) (0.29) (0.24)
Married women employed 6+ years -0.70* -0.71** -0.14 64461
(0.37) (0.37) (0.29)
Extensive margin (Labour force participation): LPM Logit
Coefficient Coefficient
All married women 0.01 0.04 252796
(0.01) (0.04)
* Significance at 10% ** Significance at 5% *** Significance at 1%
Note: The full set of controls includes age dummies, whether they have children or not, whether
they have children under five years, whether they have a high school degree or less, the age of their first
child dummies, year-by-month fixed effects, province fixed effects, province-by-time fixed effects. Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered at the province-by-time level.
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on the Labour Force Survey (LFS), 1985 - 1995.
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are similar between the two datasets. We note as well the relatively higher rate of common-
law unions in Quebec compared to other provinces.
We performed a differences-in-differences analysis using the Census data and estimating
separately the impact of the Quebec marital property law change for married and common-
law unions. The results however (not included but available from the authors upon request)
were inconclusive because of the fact that having two data points for the pre-intervention
period does not generate sufficient variations to allow precise and meaningful estimations.36
On the other hand, if we calculate the trends in the incidence of common-law unions
and compare the pre-intervention and post-intervention periods (Appendix Table B.8), we
see that the within trends in Quebec and the rest of Canada have evolved in a remarkably
similar way. The rates increased by 2.62 ppt in Quebec and 0.51 ppt in the rest of Canada
before 1989 and increased by 2.96 ppt in Quebec and 0.87 ppt in the rest of Canada over
the 1991-1996 time period. In both cases, the trends have increased by about the same
quantity (0.3 ppt) before and after the 1989 marital property law change. We therefore
do not observe a relatively greater change in the common-law trends in Quebec compared
to the other provinces around the year of the law change. We do however note a greater
increase in the trend in Quebec between 1986 and 1991 compared to the rest of Canada.
Many factors could explain the relatively steeper trend in Quebec during that time period
including a reaction from new couples to the government imposing the definition of a
family patrimony as well as its equal sharing at marriage dissolution. If our sample of
married women includes a relatively greater proportion of women in common-law unions
in Quebec relative to the rest of Canada as a result, we expect potential differences in
labour supply behaviour between women in cohabiting couples and married women to be
similar in Quebec and the rest of Canada.37
36The results showed estimates of the effect of the Quebec law change for both married and common-law
union women that were of larger magnitude and with standard errors that were four to five times larger
than the magnitude of the estimated standard errors based on the LFS data. This may not be surprising
as small variations in the covariates create a large inverse matrix X ′X affecting simultaneously both the
magnitude of the estimated betas and their standard errors.
37El Lahga and Moreau (2007) find using German data that married women on average work less than
women living in common-law as they allocate more time in non-market domestic work. Our estimate
reflecting the work disincentive effects of the law change would have been more negative if we had been
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Furthermore, we performed an event study using the LFS data by estimating the impact
of the marital property law change at the different post-intervention years. The results
(presented in Appendix Table B.9) show that the estimated effects of the law change on
the labour supply of married women are strong and statistically significant only in the
first two years following the law change, a time period during which the incidence rate of
common-law unions was not growing particularly more strongly in Quebec compared to
the rest of Canada (from our previous trends analysis).
Overall these additional results suggest that the labour supply impacts found in Ta-
ble 2.2 using the LFS data are unlikely to be driven by a change in the relatively greater
incidence of common-law unions in Quebec compared to the rest of Canada.
Another concern relates to the possibility that other policy changes occurred in Quebec
around 1989 that may have impacted the labour supply of married women. In particular,
in the May 1988, Quebec province introduced a baby bonus program — the Allowance
for Newborn Children (ANC) — under the Act Respecting Family Assistance Allowances
(Milligan (2002)).38 Moreover, in September 1989, the Quebec government announced its
intention to provide 27 weeks of paid leave (in addition to the 15 weeks covered by federal
maternity benefits) to parents who have three or more children and grant 34 weeks of
unpaid paid parental leave Baker (1994)). Since these family policies potentially affected
the fertility decisions of all families with and without children, our analysis needs to control
for the presence of a newborn in addition to controlling for the couples’ number of children.
Appendix Table B.10 shows the results of estimations replicating the analysis done to
produce the results of Table 2.2 but adding an additional control for the presence of a
newborn. The results are very similar whether or not we control for the fact that women
may have responded to the baby bonus and extended parental leave incentives.
able to exclude the cohabiting women from our sample.
38In Milligan (2002), the author has described the details of this program: “Payments under the ANC
took the following form. Initially, families received $500 on the birth of their first child, $500 for a second
child, and the first of eight quarterly payments of $375 (totalling $3,000) when a third or subsequent
child joined the household. By 1992, the benefit grew to $500 for a first child, $1,000 for a second,
and 20 quarterly payments of $400 (totalling $8,000) for a third or subsequent child”. (Retrieved at
http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/milligan_backgrounder.pdf)
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Also, new income and employment support programs were introduced in Quebec in
1988 and 1989 (Canadian Social Research Links (2014)). The programs targeted families
with a spouse with a mental or physical condition limiting employment (See Canada, 1988.
Bill S-3.1.1. for a description of the financial support program), or low-income families with
at least one dependent child (See Canada, 1988. Bill S-3.1.1. as well for a description of
the parental wage assistance program). To be eligible for the first program, one spouse
has to be incapacitated and unable to work. To be eligible for the second wage assistance
program, the family cannot own a property. We reran our estimations separately for the
sample of married women who would not qualify to any of these two programs. In the
first case, the estimations were done over the sample of married women with an employed
husband (Appendix Table B.11) and in the second case, over the sample of married women
of families who indicate being home owners (Appendix Table Table B.12 ).39 In both cases,
the results are very similar to our main results in Table 2.2. We conclude that the labour
supply effects found in Table 2.2 are not driven by the financial support or the parental
wage assistance programs.
An additional way to test for the validity of our differences-in-differences model is to
perform a falsification test. Since the Civil Code reform was designed for married couples,
single people in Quebec are unlikely to have been affected by the change in family patrimony
rules. We can therefore impose a “false” treatment in 1989 for single women in Quebec.
The identification, estimation method and results of this analysis are presented in Appendix
Table B.13. As expected, the results show that single women in Quebec did not respond
to the family patrimony rules, since the results are small and statistically insignificant in
all the estimations.
Heterogeneous Effects
Next, we further explore the effects of the Quebec law change by considering possible
factors by which the law change affected intra-household bargaining power: the potential
39The results based on home renters are not included because the sample size drop was too large for the
results to provide any additional useful information.
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returns to the wife’s investments in the labour market, as well as its interaction with the
accumulated property wealth (the size of the pie to be equally divided in the event of a
divorce). We estimate the wife’s potential returns to labour market investments using her
education level. We proxy for the magnitude of the wealth associated with the property
by using information on her household’s property ownership.
Table 2.3 shows the impact of the family patrimony rules further interacted by the
wife’s highest level of education achieved (HSLess is equal to 1 if wives have a high school
education or less, and equal to 0 if wives have post-secondary education) The differences-
in-differences specification equation for this analysis is:
yipt = α0 + α1Aftert + α2Tip + α3Tip ∗ Aftert + α4HSLessi + α5Tip ∗HSLessi
+α6Aftert ∗HSLessi + α7Tip ∗ Aftert ∗HSLessi +
∑
n
βnXipt + δt + fp + cpt + µipt
(2.3)
In this case, α3 indicates the potential impact of the family patrimony rules on wives’
labour market behaviour who are more-educated, while the sum of α3 and α7 indicates the
potential impact among less-educated wives. α7 presents the differential impact between
these two groups.
At the intensive margin, the results among all married women (rows 1-2), indicate
that the decline of women’s labour supply due to the Quebec reform found in Table 2.2
seems to be mainly driven by the more-educated wives. For instance, as mentioned, the
effect for more-educated wives in Quebec is represented by the coefficient of Tip ∗ Aftert.
The effect for less-educated wives is given by the sum of the coefficients for Tip ∗ Aftert
and Tip ∗ Aftert ∗ HSLessi. In the OLS model (columns 1-2), the sum is -1.05 + 0.71
= -0.34 and statistically insignificant (SE 0.31), while the coefficient of Tip ∗ Aftert is
negative and significant. The Tobit (columns 3-4) and Heckman (columns 5-6) estimates
are qualitatively similar to the OLS estimates. In addition, the UQ estimation (columns
7-8) indicates consistent and stronger results at the median than those obtained with the
OLS. This could be the case because a greater proportion of less-educated wives may not
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be working and have no hours of work to adjust down from40.
Among married women who are more strongly attached to the labour force (rows 3-6),
the results indicate that the decline in working hours is mainly driven by the less-educated
wives, consistent with the idea that the law change provided more bargaining power to the
group of women who had the least of it prior to the change. Given the lower returns from
the labour market for less-educated wives, an equal division of the family property would
be relatively more attractive financially compared to more-educated working wives whose
potential earnings are greater. In fact, this impact is expected to be stronger, the larger
the size of the property wealth to divide. We analyze this hypothesis in the next table.
At the extensive margin (rows 7-8), we see that more-educated wives are significantly
more likely to exit the labour force, while less-educated wives are more likely to join the
labour force. For instance, the effect for less-educated wives is -0.02 + 0.04 = 0.02 and
statistically significant from 0 (SE 0.01) in the LPM model. The Logit estimates are
qualitatively similar to the LPM estimates. This result showing opposite effects of the law
change by wives’ education level at the extensive margin is surprising. This finding may
result from the endogenous joint labour market decisions of couples who stayed married
after the law change (Manser and Brown (1980); McElroy and Horney (1981); and Goussé
et al. (2017)). The larger work disincentive response of the more educated married women
could be explained using the leisure-inducing income effect mechanism of the life-cycle
model which is plausibly large among couples where the wife (and husband) are more
educated and have therefore accumulated greater wealth. This is likely even more the case
given that more educated women are older, more likely to be married later with wealth
accumulated prior to marriage.
We are also able to further test whether the differential impact of the law change by
education is driven by the size of the assets to be divided at divorce with house owners
having a relatively larger pie to divide than house renters. Table 2.4 summarizes the results
from estimating the effects of Quebec’s family patrimony rules on married women’s labour
supply by education among house owners. At the intensive margin (rows 1-6), we see that,
40In the sample, less-educated married women have median hours of work of 0.
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as expected, the decline in labour hours supplied due to the reform is similar and slightly
stronger (except the UQ regression) compared to the results in Table 2.3.
At the extensive margin (rows 7-8), we see that more-educated wives whose household
owns a house are more likely to leave the labour force, as before. Unlike the results shown
in Table 2.3, less-educated women in a household who owns a house did not statistically
significantly respond to the reform in this case. For instance, the effect for less-educated
wives is -0.03 + 0.04 = 0.01 and statistically insignificant (SE 0.01) in the LPM model.
The Logit estimates are qualitatively similar with that in the LPM.
Couples who rent a house might be unlikely to have been affected significantly by the
equal division of the family property since a house usually represents the major family
asset. However, the changes in family patrimony rules can influence their labour market
behaviour through redistributing the pension in the event of a divorce. We further analyze
the family patrimony rules effects among house renters by husbands’ education as the
husband is usually the principal earner in the household (Gray (1998); Chiappori et al.
(2002); Stevenson (2008)). Their education level, which is related to the potential returns
to labour market investments, could be a proxy for the magnitude of the pension to be
equally divided in the event of a divorce. However, the results based on home renters are
not reported here because the sample size drop was too large for the results to provide any
additional useful information.
A concern is that our post-policy sample is not randomly selected since the Civil Code
reforms may affect individuals’ marital decisions (e.g., likelihood of divorce). For instance,
we have selected women who stayed married in the post-policy sample excluding from the
analysis the possible impact of the law change on the labour supply of women who divorced
as a result of the amendment. The Civil Code reforms in Quebec, by changing the intra-
household bargaining positions of each spouse, may have encouraged divorce for people
who wanted to prior to the law but could not afford to. In this case, wives who married
before the law change and decided to stay married afterwards may have different labour
supply response than those whose marriages did not survive. This fact may influence our
estimations through introducing a selection bias in the results. We investigate this issue
in the next section when we analyze whether the family patrimony rules affect marital
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decisions.
Evidence that the Quebec family patrimony rules impacted divorce rates will indicate
that while the labour supply response we have estimated is conditional on staying married,
ignoring the labour supply response associated with divorce can only provide a lower bound
to the overall short-run female labour supply response coming from the law change.41
Note also that given our results in Table 2.3, if more education provides married women
with the bargaining power to drop the labour force while staying married, it is possible
and we suspect that education may also moderate the impact of the Quebec redistributive
law change on divorce rates. The less educated spouse, being the one most likely to benefit
from equal sharing of the family patrimony may be more likely to divorce after the law
change relative to the more educated spouse. We therefore also investigate this potential
differential effect by education in the next section.
41Abstracting from the changes in the patrimony rules, the labour supply of divorced women is generally
greater than the labour supply of married women with a working spouse. Our results for married women
are therefore likely to suffer from a downward bias given that divorced women with generally greater labour



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.4.2 Impact of the Quebec Family Patrimony Rules on Divorce
Transitions and Assortative Matching
Impact on Divorce Transitions
In this section, we want to further explore whether the Quebec family patrimony rules
affected individuals’ divorce decisions. In order to analyze the dynamics of divorce, we use
the 6-month panel format of the LFS 1985-1995 and select both women and men aged 18
years and above who were already married when they were first surveyed, and then follow
their marital status over the 6 survey months to identify a change in marital status by the
end of the 6-month period. We define our dependent variable indicating the transition from
married to divorce (or separation) as a dummy variable equal to 1, if a person reports being
divorced/separated sometime during the second to 6th month, and 0 if the person stayed
married during the 6-month window. Table B.5 in Appendix presents the differences-in-
differences framework for divorce transitions, and describes the treatment group (T) and
control group (C).
The parallel trend test results (reported in Appendix Table B.4 ) using Equation 2.1
(where yipt is a dummy variable of 1, reflecting a person divorce/separation, or 0, reflecting
married/common-law) allow us to not reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients of
Quebec∗yeark are equal to each other42 . Additionally, all the coefficients of Quebec∗yeark
are statistically insignificant, which implies that no effect was anticipated among people in
Quebec in response to the 1989 Act.
To estimate the treatment effect on individuals’ divorce transitions, we use Equation 2.2
to regress the dummy variable that reflects whether an individual gets divorced or stays
married using the Logit estimation. Additionally, the impact of the family patrimony
rules on individuals’ divorce transitions may differ depending on their own and spouses’
education. For instance, a relatively less-educated spouse who is less likely to accumulate
the majority of family assets during the marriage might take advantage of the relatively
42We use the cross-sectional format of the LFS to perform the parallel trend test due to the small number
of people getting divorced/separated within a 6-month window in the panel format.
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more-educated spouse due to the equal division of the family property. This possibility
might have encouraged divorce for people who are less-educated than the spouse and
wanted to divorce prior to the law but could not afford to. Therefore, we further extend
this analysis depending on whether a respondent is less, or more than, or equally educated
to the spouse, using Equation 2.4 with the Logit estimation. α3 indicates the potential
impact of the Quebec family patrimony rules on divorce decisions of respondents who have
the same education as their spouses, while the sum of α3 and α6 indicates the potential
impact of respondents who are less educated than their spouses, and the sum of α3 and α7
indicates the potential impact of respondents who are more educated than their spouses.43
yipt = α0 + α1Aftert + α2Quebecip + α3Quebecip ∗ Aftert + α4lessi + α5morei




βnXipt + δt + fp + cpt + γipt
(2.4)
Table 2.5 (Column 1) presents the effect of the Quebec family patrimony rules on in-
dividuals’ divorce decisions regardless of the differential education between spouses. The
results provide little evidence that these rules affect couples’ divorce decisions. However,
once the differential education between spouses is taken into account, the results in this
table (Columns 2-4) suggest that, as initially speculated, it is the less educated spouse
who is more likely to get divorced/separated. For instance, the potential impact on di-
vorce of individuals who are less educated than their spouse, calculated by the sum of
the coefficients of Quebecip ∗ Aftert and Quebecip ∗ Aftert ∗ lessi, is 0.79 + 0.40 = 1.19
and statistically significant (SE 0.63). In contrast, the potential impact of individuals
who are more educated than their spouses, calculated by the sum of the coefficients of
Quebecip ∗ Aftert and Quebecip ∗ Aftert ∗ morei, is 0.79 - 0.22 = 0.57 and insignificant
(SE 0.52). The potential impact of individuals who are equally educated as their spouses,
indicated by the coefficient of Quebecip ∗ Aftert, is insignificant as well.
43The sample only contains the main respondents, therefore, the unit of observation is a couple rather
than an individual.
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These results on the impact of the change in family patrimony rules on divorce by
education are consistent with our findings in the previous section and help us provide
a more complete interpretation of the impact of the redistributive law change on married
women’s labour supply. By reinforcing the bargaining power of the least advantaged spouse
in the marriage, the redistributive law change lead to a decline in hours worked stronger
for the less educated married women. At the same time, since it is the group of the less
educated men and women who is also more likely to divorce to take advantage of the equal
sharing rule, the estimated hours decline we find among the sample of married women
(excluding women who divorced after the amendment) corresponds to a lower bound of
the labour supply response. The overall labour supply response, including married and
divorced women would have created an even greater hours decline associated with the law
change.
Table 2.5: Impact of the Quebec Family Patrimony Rules on Divorce Transitions
All by Differential Education
between Spouses
Quebec*After Quebec*After Quebec*After*Less Quebec*After*More
0.76 0.79 0.40 -0.22
(0.52) (0.64) (0.55) (0.46)
H0 : Quebec*After + Quebec*After*Less/Quebec*After*More = 0
Wald test 1.88 1.12
p-value 0.06 0.27
N 309081
* Significance at 10% ** Significance at 5% *** Significance at 1%
Note: The controls include age dummies, sex, whether they have a high school degree or less, year-by-
month fixed effects, province fixed effects, province-by-time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at
the province-by-time level.
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on the Labour Force Survey (LFS), 1985 - 1995.
Assortative Matching
The changes in the Quebec family patrimony rules may also affect individuals’ decisions
of whom to marry. Due to the equal share of family property in the event of a divorce,
62
people who marry after 1989 are more likely to look for a partner with equal financial
background relative to before 1989. This probably occurs because couples with similar
economic backgrounds are more likely to make equal contributions during the marriage
than those who have unequal backgrounds, which makes the equal share of family property
at divorce more fair and reasonable.
For this question, we mainly focus on differential educational attainment between
spouses since individuals’ education level approximates well earnings potential and using
current earnings creates endogeneity problems. We note that the education trends have
been similar in every province in Canada. Table 2.6 presents the proportion of individuals
with high school education or less in Quebec and the rest of Canada by gender in both
pre and post intervention periods. The proportion has declined after 1989 as both men
and women are getting more educated after the Civil Code reform. Moreover, the change
in the proportion before and after the reform is of similar magnitude for each gender as
well as similarly in Quebec and the rest of Canada. Any results we find cannot therefore
be driven by the differential in educational attainment between Quebec and the rest of
Canada prior to 1989 or the gender differential in educational attainment.
For this analysis, we select couples whose decision to marry took place either before
or after 1989. We use individuals’ age to approximate whether they got married after
1989 or not. For instance, we assume that young couples aged 30 years or less are more
likely to have married after 198944. This restriction (age ≤ 30) is also imposed on cou-
ples married before 1989 to ensure similarity of the attributes between pre-intervention
and post-intervention samples. Additionally, this age restriction helps us to insure that
couples’ current marriages/relationships are their first unions. Second, we calculate the
differential educational attainment between spouses and compare this difference between
couples married before and after 1989 in Quebec relative to the other provinces, using a
differences-in-differences approach. Table 2.7 presents how we derive the differential educa-
tional attainment between spouses, which has three values, -1, 0, or 1. Appendix Table B.6
presents the differences-in-differences framework for the assortative matching analysis, and
describes the treatment group (T) and control group (C).
44At least one of the spouses was 30 years or less.
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Regarding the parallel trend assumption, according to the parallel trend test results
(reported in Appendix Table B.4) using Equation 2.1 (where yipt is the differential ed-
ucation between spouses), we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients of
Quebec ∗ yeark are equal to each other.
Table 2.8 presents the treatment effect using Equation 2.2.45 We carry out separate
analyses based on three different base outcomes (when the differential educational attain-
ment = 0): both spouses have a high school education or less, both spouses have more
than high school education, and pool these two cases together as the base outcome. The
coefficients of Tip ∗Aftert based on the first and third base outcomes suggest that, among
young couples (age ≤ 30) in Quebec, the equal share of family property in the event of a
divorce has contributed to a high proportion of unions in which the wives are more edu-
cated than the husbands; and the results based on the second one imply that the reforms
have contributed to a low proportion of unions in which the wives are less educated than
the husbands.46
Table 2.6: Summary Statistics of Respondents’ Education in Quebec and Other Provinces
in Pre and Post Intervention Years by Gender
High school or less % Female Male
Before 1989 After 1989 ppt. change Before 1989 After 1989 ppt. change
Quebec 70.04 57.67 -12.37 66.54 53.40 -13.14
Rest of Canada 64.32 53.20 -11.12 63.34 51.21 -12.13
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on the Labour Force Survey (LFS), 1985 - 1995.
45T is Quebec dummy in this case and there is no demographic control variables Xipt.
46We also used a measure of the differential age between spouses. However, the results, not reported,
were statistically insignificant likely because the age restriction (age ≤ 30) imposed in the analysis has
removed most of the variations in the sample.
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Table 2.7: The Differential Educational Attainment Between Spouses
Differential Frequency (%) Husband’s Education Wife’s Education
Educational Attainment
-1 11.80 Have High School or Less More Than High School
0 73.05 Have High School or Less Have High School or Less
More Than High School More Than High School
1 15.14 More Than High School Have High School or Less
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on the Labour Force Survey (LFS), 1985 - 1995.
Table 2.8: The Multinomial Logistic Regression of the Differential Educational Attainment
between Spouses
Base Outcome
Both more-educated or both less-educated Both more-educated Both less-educated
Differential Education Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
between Spouses T*After T*After T*After
-1 versus 0 0.21*** 0.12 0.32***
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08)
1 versus 0 -0.05 -0.15* 0.06
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
N 211913 122193 153486
* Significance at 10% ** Significance at 5% *** Significance at 1%
Note: The controls include year-by-month fixed effects, province fixed effects, province-by-time fixed
effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the province-by-time level.
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on the Labour Force Survey (LFS), 1985 - 1995.
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2.5 Conclusions
In this study we examine the impact of an amendment of the Quebec Civil Code towards
greater economic equality between spouses on married women’s labour supply and on
divorce decisions and the decision of whom to marry. We exploit detailed information on
individuals’ labour market and marital status from the Labour Force Survey to analyze
short-run changes in outcomes before and after the reform in Quebec relative to other
provinces which did not experience the changes in the marital property laws over that time
period.
Consistent with the prediction of the bargaining model of marital decisions (Chiappori
et al. (2002)), family patrimony rules that improve economic equality between spouses
reduce married women’s hours of work. We estimate a decline of about 22 hours per year.
This effect is stronger among married women with stronger attachment to the labour force.
The estimated decline in hours for the group of women employed before the law change
is 36 hours per year. In addition, we also find that the adverse employment effect of the
Quebec changes in family patrimony rules is relatively stronger for less educated women
(the most disadvantaged spouse) and among couples with larger wealth as measured by
the ownership of the couples’ property.
At the extensive margin, we find that the redistributive law change significantly de-
creased the labour force participation of the relatively more educated married women.
While educated women have greater earnings potential and therefore and would have less
to gain in bargaining power from the law change, the decline in labour force participation
driven by more educated women could be explained by a simple leisure-inducing unantici-
pated income effect. Surprisingly, the law change increased the labour force participation
of the relatively less educated women (among married women who stayed married after
the change). This differential result by education among married women suggests that the
labour supply impact of the redistributive law change likely depends on the decision to
stay married as marital decisions are also part of the household bargaining outcome. We
investigate this question by studying the Quebec amendment impact on divorce rates and
the decisions of whom to marry.
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We find that the redistributive law change had no impact on overall divorce but sig-
nificantly increased the likelihood of divorce/separations among less educated spouses. In
addition, over the sample of young individuals deciding whether or not to marry, the Civil
Code amendment contributed to increasing the proportion of marriages in which the wife
is more educated than the husband.
Together these results suggest that family reforms with the goal of promoting economic
equality between spouses in the long-run, may create unintended short-run vulnerabilities.
Indeed, our results show that the redistributive law change lead the less educated married
women to reduce their working hours. Married women who are more educated and are
therefore relatively less disadvantaged are also more likely to drop the labour force as a
result of the law change. Furthermore, the less educated spouse is more likely to divorce
as a result of the law change and marriage, an institution that provides insurance against
poverty, is more likely to take place among couples where the woman is relatively more
educated than the man. These results also suggest that education remains a key element
to alleviate poverty and help reinforce the effectiveness of complementary family reforms.
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Chapter 3
House Prices and Female Labour
Supply: Evidence from Canada
3.1 Introduction
House prices in Canada have tripled over the past three decades. According to Statistics
Canada, the New Housing Price Index was at its lowest, 37.70, in 1983, and at its highest,
103.30, in 2017. Even after adjusting for inflation, real house prices have on average doubled
across the country since 1976 (Kershaw and Minh (2016)). This dramatic rise in house
prices has important effects on both homeowners and renters (potential house buyers). For
Canadian house owners, housing usually represents a significant and rising portion of the
total family wealth. Figure 3.1 shows the compositions of total family assets in 1999 (left)
and 2016 (right).12 In 1999, the share of the value of the principal residence and other real
estate over the total family assets was 39%, the largest component of family wealth. This
1The statistics are based on Survey of Financial Security (SFS) and 2016 is the most recent year of this
survey available on Statistics Canada’s website. Five types of assets consist total family assets: principal
residence and other real estate, private pension assets, financial assets (non-pension), vehicles and other
non-financial assets, and equity in business.
2The equity in business means “the estimated amount the respondent would receive if the business were
sold, after deducting any outstanding debts to be paid” (Statistics Canada (2012)).
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Figure 3.1: Compositions of Total Family Assets, 1999 (Left) and 2016 (Right)
Source: Statistics Canada Survey of Financial Security (SFS)
number increased to 47% in 2016, reflecting the significant increase in house prices over
the period, and the growing impact of homeownership on family wealth.3 Additionally, the
appreciated value of the house(s) a family owns allows them to relax borrowing constraints
over the life cycle (Campbell and Cocco (2007)). For renters, housing market appreciations
might have a negative wealth effect on them because it could raise rental prices as well
as future homeownership costs if they plan to purchase a house in the future (Campbell
and Cocco (2007); Begley and Chan (2018)). Based on the calculations from Kershaw and
Minh (2016) in 2016, young Canadians aged 25 to 34 (potential house buyers)4 need on
average more years of work to accumulate 20% down payment, 12 years. In contrast, they
needed only 5 years in 1976. These times will be longer if they live in Toronto (15 years)
or Vancouver (23 years).5
3Even though an increase in house prices for an infinitely-living house owner may not change their
real wealth and has no effect on their behaviours because they are hedged against fluctuations in living
costs and housing prices (Dougherty and Van Order (1982); Sinai and Souleles (2005); Campbell and
Cocco (2007)), finitely-living house owners may experience changes in their real wealth and adjust their
behaviours due to the house prices variations (Skinner (1989); Morris (2006)).
4The young generation aged 25 to 34 are more likely just starting their careers and families and are
more likely to enter homeownership.
5These calculations are based on average real local house prices and median real full-time earnings of
young Canadians aged 25 to 34, as well as the assumption of 15% saving rate from earnings of people (see
Kershaw and Minh (2016) for more calculations details).
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Wealth changes due to variations in house prices may influence people’s behaviour. In
this paper, I study the effect of house prices’ changes on female labour market outcomes
in Canada. Specifically, I focus on married or cohabitating women because house-price
changes may also influence a couple’s divorce/separation hazard by affecting the cost of
divorce/separation, such as the cost of separate residences after marital dissolution (Klein
(2017)); and marital status changes could possibly in turn impact individuals’ labour mar-
ket behaviours. Therefore, selecting women who stay married or cohabitating helps to
isolate the effect of changes in house-price on their labour supply per se. Additionally,
married women’s labour supply could be more responsive to house-price changes because
a female spouse usually has less labour market attachment compared to the male spouse
(who usually works in full-time already) due to the traditional gender roles and thus has
more space to adjust her labour market behaviours (Fortin (1995); Henley (2004); Kohara
(2010); Zhao and Burge (2017)). For instance, even though wives’ labour force partici-
pation and their contribution to family income have increased over time, female spouses
continue to work less than male spouses. Among dual-earner couples, on average, hus-
bands worked 42 hours per week in 2008 and wives worked 34.7 (Marshall (2009) based on
Canadian Labour Force Survey). Also, many studies have illustrated the fact that married
women were more likely to be influenced than married men by wealth changes caused by
various sources such as house-price changes (Henley (2004); van Huizen (2014)), marital
property division rules reforms (Lluis and Pan (2018)), and amendments of the generosity
of the unemployment insurance system (Lluis and McCall (2018)).6
This study addresses two main research questions: (1) Does an unexpected appreciation
of house prices impact married women’s labour supply in Canada? (2) How do these
effects differ across married women based on their house tenure choices (e.g., own or rent
a house), residence location, and other demographic characteristics such as education and
age? Understanding the effect of changes in house prices on female labour supply is an
important policy issue for policymakers who are trying to optimize the housing and labour
markets. For instance, if an appreciation in the housing market could influence female
6An analysis based on male spouses’ labour supply is also conducted (results are presented in Ap-
pendix C.2). As expected, there is no strong evidence showing that changes in house prices have effects
on their labour market behaviours.
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labour decisions through either discouraging or encouraging them to work, this might
provide policymakers with some insights on how to achieve gender equity in the labour
market. Moreover, married women’s labour decisions not only affect their own well-being
but also influence the welfare of their families especially their children. Informing the social
planners about a possible way of realizing gender equity in the labour market may also
assist welfare agencies in improving female and child benefits.
Family labour supply model and dynamic life-cycle theory predict that unexpected
gains in wealth should not only increase households’ consumption, but also decrease their
labour supply as leisure is also a normal good (Ashenfelter and Heckman (1974); Heckman
and MaCurdy (1980)).7 Empirical investigations attempt to document this relationship
through focusing on the effect of unanticipated shock in housing wealth on individual’s
labour market behaviours. However, the empirical evidences are relatively small and mixed.
On the one hand, after capturing the exogenous variations in local house prices, some
studies found evidence which is consistent with the predictions of the life-cycle theory of
labour supply (e.g., Henley (2004); Zhao and Burge (2017); Begley and Chan (2018)). And
these studies suggest that female spouses are more likely to response to the changes in the
housing wealth than male spouses. On the other hand, other research (not many) shows
that an appreciation in the housing market is positively related with house owners’ labour
supply, which is inconsistent with the theories (e.g., He et al. (2015); Zhao et al. (2018)).
However, there is a paucity of research exploring the effect of changes in house-price
on female labour supply in Canada. This is likely due to a lack of adequate Canadian
house-price data. Canadian surveys do not generally include questions about the value
of a respondent’s house as the U.S. surveys do (e.g., the Health and Retirement Study
(HRS)). Aggregated house price time series constructed by government agencies, on the
other hand, have not been offered at sufficiently detailed geographical level to be of use.
Besides the data limitation, there are other challenges of estimating the causal effects
7It is worth noting that a household’s leisure is defined by economists as non-labour time which includes
all unpaid activities such as (unpaid) household productive work as well as leisurely activities. A decrease
(increase) in an individual’s labour supply does not necessary mean an increase (decrease) in his/her
leisurely activities (Gray (1998)).
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of housing wealth changes on female labour supply which have been emphasized by re-
searchers. As mentioned, many researchers have tried to capture unanticipated variations
in local housing market, rather than variations that could be expected by households (e.g.,
Klein (2017); Begley and Chan (2018)). This is essential because the wealth changes due
to rising house prices could be anticipated by a household under the assumption of perfect
foresight and no liquidity constraints in the life-cycle theory of the labour supply. There-
fore, these expected wealth changes might have no impact on people’s labour supply due
to the fact that these changes could already have been incorporated into their decisions
(Henley (2004); Klein (2017); Begley and Chan (2018)). Applying an appropriate method
to derive the unanticipated changes in the housing wealth is necessary and demanding.
Another challenge of identifying the causal effects is the reverse causality between house
prices and female labour supply which has been highlighted in literature (Johnson (2014)).
For instance, rising housing prices induce more female spouses to participate in the labour
market to offset the future housing purchase costs if their families intend to enter homeown-
ership or balance rising rental prices. Nonetheless, it is also plausible that more working
women in one area, which contributes to a higher proportion of two-earner households
with stronger payment capacities, may bid up the house prices there. Identifying and
disentangling these two directions is a key in analyzing my research questions.
In this study, I complement the literature in two ways. First, I explore how wealth
changes due to house-price variations influence the labour supply of married women in
Canada. The mortgage finance system is non-trivial distinct in Canada compared to that
of many other countries from the institutional arrangements and regulations perspectives
(Fortin (1995); Walks and Clifford (2015); Clark and Ferrer (2019)). For instance, the
mortgage lending process and regulations are more uniform and rely on the federal state in
Canada compared to other countries because these rules have largely been dominated by
a national corporation, the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) (Fortin
(1995); Walks and Clifford (2015)). In addition, Canadian mortgage regulations are more
conservative with a relatively low loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and mortgages with a higher
LTV ratio (above 80%) must be insured. Also, the fixed-term mortgage contract has a
typically short period (around 5 years) in Canada compared to that of other countries
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such as the US which has 10 to 20 years of fixed-term mortgages (Fortin (1995); Walks and
Clifford (2015); Clark and Ferrer (2019)). Finally, in contrast with many countries like the
US, mortgage interest is not tax-deductible in Canada. Canadian households who intend
to purchase a house might be incentivized to make a larger down payment compared to
those in other countries (Clark and Ferrer (2019)). All of these differences in the Canadian
mortgage finance system relative to that of other countries might contribute to distinct
compositions in house owners as well as renters, which could lead to different results relative
to those studies focused on other countries.
I use time-series average house prices data from the Canadian Real Estate Association’s
Multiple Listing Service data set (CREA MLS) constructed by Clark and Ferrer (2019).
This dataset covers the entire Canada, 102 real estate boards (REBs), and provides detailed
geographical variations in house prices in both urban and rural areas. I link these house
prices to each respondent in the confidential longitudinal household files – the Survey of
Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) from 1993 to 2010. As there is no official house-
price data in Canada, the CREA MLS data are the best source available so far covering
all regions of the country and providing the most detailed geographical variations in both
urban and rural areas.8
The second contribution of this study is that I apply two strategies to overcome the
challenges of examining the effects of house-price changes on female labour supply which
have been addressed before. My first strategy is following Begley and Chan (2018) to
calculate a measure of unanticipated house-price shocks using an autoregressive process. I
also employ alternative measures of the house-price shocks for the consistency of results.
My second strategy is constructing topography instruments to address the reverse causality
between the house prices and female labour supply mentioned by Johnson (2014). Following
Saiz (2010) and Johnson (2014), I construct a comprehensive and exogenous measure of
fraction of buildable land in each REB and calculate the change in elevation between the
8Clark and Ferrer (2019) have noticed that, due to the significantly large size of Canada, observing
only 102 REB boundaries might not be robust enough to identify all variations in house prices within
each boundary because some of them are quite large. They explained that this might not be a problem
for panel data if house prices of adjacent neighborhoods (both low and high prices) within each REB are
moving together.
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lowest and the highest point in each REB as well. As far as I know, these are the first
comprehensive measures of buildable land/regional terrain in Canada at the REB level in
the economics literature. I utilize the fraction of buildable land and the change in elevation
as instruments of house-price changes. The share of land available for development (area
that is not covered by water, wetlands, and mountains) as well as the regional terrain could
be considered predetermined and exogenous (Saiz (2010)). These exogenous measures
provide plausible instruments to examine the labour market responses to changes in house
prices because a higher fraction of unbuildable land (area that is forgone to water, wetlands,
and mountains) or rough terrain inhibit housing supply growth. These make the housing
supply less elastic in the region and a relatively inelastic housing supply may induce higher
house prices when there is a housing demand shock (Saiz (2010); Johnson (2014)).
It is worth noting that heterogeneous effects of changes in house prices on female labour
supply could exist. For instance, households’ labour supply responses to a house-price ap-
preciation could differ by their house tenure choices since a housing market appreciation
might have different wealth effects on house owners versus renters. House owners might ad-
just downward their labour supply due to the unexpected gain in housing wealth.9 Renters,
on the other hand, either intending to purchase a house in the future or continue renting
might adjust upward the labour supply to balance the increasing future house purchase
costs as well as rising rental prices (He et al. (2015); Atalay et al. (2016); Begley and Chan
(2018); Disney and Gathergood (2018)).10 Nevertheless, an increase in house prices could
have little labour effect on renters in the short-run if they expect house prices will be back
to the original level and delay to enter homeownership. Or they might choose to find a
cheaper residence instead of adjusting their labour supply (Aladangady (2017); Zhao et al.
(2018)).
Although within the house owner group, the impact of a housing price appreciation
could also be different based on their demographic characteristics such as education, resi-
9The appreciated value of the housing a household own also allows him/her to relax borrowing con-
straints through refinancing the equity of the house, thus decreases his/her labour supply (He et al. (2015);
Atalay et al. (2016)). However, studies found little effect from relaxing borrowing constraint due to the
relatively strict restrictions of house equity loan (Begley and Chan (2018)).
10Studies found that rental prices usually are positively associated with house prices (e.g., Gallin (2008)).
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dence location, as well as age. For instance, a more-educated owner might respond to rising
housing wealth differently compared to a less-educated one because of his/her relatively
higher wages (the opportunity cost of leisure) when both the income and substitution ef-
fects are taken into account (Zhao and Burge (2017)). In addition, house values between
urban and rural regions are dramatically heterogenous. With the same percentage changes
in house prices, the size of changes in housing wealth of an owner in an urban centre differs
from an owner in a rural area. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that households in urban
area could have different responses compared to those in rural areas.11 Finally, consid-
ering housing as both an investment and consumption good, the diverse future housing
consumption (intention to downsize or upsize) among house owners with different ages
may contribute to heterogenous labour supply responses to a housing market appreciation
as well. A young house owner who is more likely to expand the family size and plan on
moving to a larger house might respond to rising house prices differently compared to an
elderly house owner who is more likely to downsize (Li and Yao (2007); He et al. (2015);
Atalay et al. (2016)).1213 The linkage of the rich longitudinal household information to lo-
cal house prices allows me to further study whether the impacts of unexpected house-price
changes differ based on women’s house tenure choices (e.g., own or rent a house), residence
location, and their demographic characteristics such as education and age.
In this study, I find that after capturing exogenous variations in local housing market
rather than variations that could be expected by households, among house owners, unex-
pected gains in housing wealth decrease women’s labour supply at both the extensive and
11The housing market appreciations may also vary relative to the different labour wages between urban
and rural area.
12Some studies suggest that a house owner who is planning on increasing the housing consumption
(either buying a second house or trading up the current house to a larger one) will increase the labour
supply due to the rising purchase costs; while a house owner who is intending to downsize will decrease
the labour supply due to the positive wealth effect as house prices rises (He et al. (2015); Atalay et al.
(2016)). These predictions rely on an assumption that the house prices growth rate is constant across
types of dwellings. That is, if an owner is planning on moving to a larger house, the present discounted
value of the planned purchase exceeds the fundamental value of the current house he/she owns. However,
if a house owner intends to downsize, the value of the current house he/she owns exceeds the value of the
future purchase. (He et al. (2015)).
13A household who has no plan on future housing consumption might not be affected by house price
appreciation because they are hedged against price fluctuations in the long-term (He et al. (2015)).
75
intensive margins. Additionally, I also find that house-price shocks have heterogeneous
effects on women’s labour force participation and their hours of work depending on edu-
cation level as well as residence location. These results are consistent with the predictions
of the life-cycle model of the labour supply. The instrumental variable (IV) approach also
provides consistent results.
A concern is that my sample is not randomly selected. For instance, as mentioned,
I focus on married women who stay married as the sample due to the fact that housing
wealth changes could also impact the likelihood of divorce and marital status changes could
affect women’s labour decisions as well. However, this sample selection might create an
endogenous issue in the analysis because women who choose to stay married may have
distinct characteristics and response differently in terms of their labour market behaviours
than those whose marriages are ended. This situation might have an impact on my results
through creating a selection bias in my estimations. Given that divorced women with gen-
erally greater labour supply compared to married women with a working spouse, ignoring
the labour supply response associated with divorce can only provide a lower bound to the
overall short-run female labour supply response coming from the changes in house price
(Lluis and Pan (2018)).
The remainder of the study is organized as follows: Section 3.2 reviews related existing
literature regarding my research questions. Section 3.3 illustrates the data and presents
descriptive statistics. Section 3.4 explains the measurements and methodology applied in
this paper as well as interprets the results. Section 3.5 concludes the study and discusses
future steps.
3.2 Existing Literature
The predictions of family labour supply model and dynamic life-cycle theory suggest that
unexpected gains in wealth should not only increase households’ consumption, but also
decrease their labour supply as leisure is also a normal good (Ashenfelter and Heckman
(1974); Heckman and MaCurdy (1980)). Many empirical investigations have shown in-
76
creasing interest in documenting this relationship by focusing on the effect of unanticipated
shock in housing wealth on individual’s labour market behaviours. However, the empirical
evidence are mix.
One the one hand, some studies found evidence which is consistent with the predic-
tions of the theory. For example, researchers have analyzed how house prices affect elderly
labour supply and retirement specifically. Zhao and Burge (2017) have utilized the exoge-
nous variations in the housing market during the boom/bust cycle and found that elderly
house owners decreased their labour supply relative to renters due to the housing wealth
appreciation (Zhao and Burge (2017)). Begley and Chan (2018) also found that adverse
housing shocks reduced elderly house owners’ probability of retirement after capturing
unexpected changes in local house prices and these results are consistent with those of
Milosch (2014).14 In terms of other studies focusing on the general labour market, van
Huizen (2014) examined the house prices effect on both men and women using a panel
data in the Netherlands. The results reveal that, among house owners, women decreased
their hours of work if housing wealth increased, whereas men barely adjusted their worked
hours in response to housing wealth changes. These findings are consistent with those of
Henley (2004), who investigated the impact of capital gains and loss on individuals’ hours
of work using British panel data. The author suggested that female house owners were
more likely to be influenced by housing wealth gains than males.15 Disney and Gather-
good (2018) revisited this question with panel data in the UK and found heterogeneous
individuals’ labour supply responses to house-price changes based on not only gender and
housing tenure, but also marital status and age. For instance, young female house owners
responded to house-price appreciation by decreasing their labour supply if they were mar-
ried or cohabiting, whereas elderly male house owners had the same responses regardless
14Zhao and Burge (2017) used both a MSA-specific house prices index and self-reported house wealth as
housing price measurements, and assumed that house-price changes only affect house owners not renters.
Thus, they employed a differences-in-differences method using elderly renters as the control group to
identify the house prices effect on elderly house owners’ labour market behaviours. In contrast, Begley and
Chan (2018) argued the problem of considering renters as the control group because rental prices usually
increase as house prices rise (Gallin (2008)), and then constructed unanticipated housing wealth shocks
only on house owners to examine their retirement decisions.
15Henley found that male workers were more likely to respond to housing wealth loss by increasing their
normal hours worked; however, this effect was found to be offset by a decrease in hours of the second job.
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of their marital status.16
On the other hand, some investigations show that an appreciation in the housing market
is positively related with house owners’ labour supply, which is inconsistent with predictions
of family labour supply model and life-cycle theory. He et al. (2015) focused on couples’
labour supply responses to house-price changes in the UK and allowed the labour decisions
of spouses to be interdependent. The results show that rising house prices boost hours of
work for both house owners and renters. Zhao et al. (2018) have also found this positive
association in Urban China indicating that house-price appreciation encouraged more house
owners to participate in the labour force. The results are robust across methods and
several house-price appreciation measurements, and are heterogeneous based on gender,
age, as well as provinces. For instance, a house-price appreciation encouraged more female
(not male) house owners to participate in the labour force, and young house owners were
more likely to be affected than old ones. House owners who were living in provinces with
rapidly increasing house prices are more likely to participate in the labour market. They
explained this positive effect of house value appreciation on participation decisions by the
consumption role of a house. This role suggests that house value appreciation leads to a
rise in the cost of housing consumption compared to that of other consumption not only
for renters but also house owners. And this rising living cost (in the long run) only can
be partially offset by the capital gains. Therefore, house value appreciation can induce
house owners either upward or downward adjustment of their labour supply depending on
their future housing consumption and behaviours of re-optimizing the housing stock due
to house-price changes. In addition, the cultural-specific view of a house as a wealth status
in China and the tradition of preparing children’s marriage houses, as well as the rapid
urbanization have also contributed to this positive relationship.
However, there is a paucity of literature in the Canadian context. This is likely due
to a lack of adequate Canadian house-price data which could offer sufficiently detailed
geographical level to be of use. This study fills the gap.
16Both the house prices index and self-reported housing values are available in Disney and Gathergood’s
paper. They used the house prices index as the instrument for the self-reported housing values because
housing values could be reported endogenously by house owners (Disney and Gathergood (2018)).
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3.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.3.1 Data
The main data is from the confidential files of the Canadian Survey of Income and Labour
Dynamics (SLID) from 1993 to 2010,17 which is a nationally representative longitudinal
annual household survey (excluding households who live on Indian reserves, northern ter-
ritories, and institutions). The SLID is designed as a rotating panel structure with two
panels always overlapped. Each panel interviewed the same respondent for a period of six
years, and a new panel of people is included every three years. It provides rich household
information, including not only household composition and income sources, but also labour
market experiences, human capital variables, and demographic characteristics. The rich-
ness and sufficiently sample size of the SLID as well as its six years panel nature allow me
to fulfill my research purposes and to control for time-invariant unobservable characteris-
tics that might affect female labour market behaviours. The house ownership information
provided in the SLID also allows me to analyze the possible different effects of changes in
house prices on female labour supply for house owners and renters. However, the SLID does
not include self-reported housing values for house owners, hence, another source of data
which provides a consistent measure of house prices with detailed geographical information
is essentially required.
The time-series average house prices data is from Clark and Ferrer (2019) who have
constructed this dataset from the Canadian Real Estate Association’s Multiple Listing
Service data set (CREA MLS). This data cover 93 REBs (both urban and rural areas)
for all provinces (except Quebec) of Canada and 6 Census Metropolitan Areas (CMAs) of
17The house ownership is not available in the first year of the survey (1993). Thus, most of the analyses
are conducted without the data of this year. The last available year of the SLID is 2010.
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Quebec, as well as the three territories for the period 1991-2010.181920 The mean house
prices in each REB is calculated as the total sales value in a board over the total number
of residential units sold there. The data also links REBs to Statistics Canada’s census
subdivisions (CSDs), facilitating the integration of REB house prices with most Canadian
surveys. In this data, boundaries for each REB are defined using information from the
various provincial websites of real estate board as well as through consulting with real
estate board representatives. Then, the house prices for a particular REB is assigned to
each unique CSD “when the geographic centre of the CSD area fell within that particular
Real Estate Boundary” (Clark and Ferrer (2019)).21 Using the CSD as the aggregate
geographic level might be appropriate because it is consistent to “a municipality or an
area that is deemed to be equivalent to a municipality for statistical reporting purposes”
(Statistics Canada, 2001), and size of the CSDs corresponds generally to the REBs (Clark
and Ferrer (2019)).
There are two other data sources of Canadian house prices: The new house price index
(NHPI) and The Teranet–National Bank House Price IndexTM. However, neither of them
provides as many detailed geographical variations in house prices as the CREA MLS. The
NHPI includes monthly indexes only at provincial and CMA/CA levels, and it does not
represent the whole housing market since it only includes all new detached, semi-detached
and townhouses constructed and listed for sale or sold in Canada, but not any old houses
for sale or sold in the resale market. The monthly Teranet–National Bank House Price
IndexTM, which is derived by tracking registered houses’ prices over time, only covers eleven
CMAs. These two data sources could be used in the future step for robustness checks.
18A full list of the 102 REBs in the CREA MLS is included in Appendix C.1. Clark and Ferrer (2019)
have also constructed a secondary house price data set (CREA MLS II) which covers 123 boundaries of
14 urban centres of the country. However, the CREA MLS II only started in 2005. Therefore, I chose the
CREA MLS as the main house prices dataset in this project due to its broader coverage as well as longer
time period. The CREA MLS II will be included in the future step to investigate the research questions
in urban centres particularly.
19House prices of 6 CMAs in Quebec are from the Quebec Federation of Real Estate Boards and not
available for the last three years of the sample.
20House prices of the three territories are collected by Clark and Ferrer (2019). However, these areas
are not covered by the SLID.
21Please see Clark and Ferrer (2019) for more details of the matching procedure.
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Additionally, a new survey, Canadian Housing Survey (CHS), has been first released by the
Statistics Canada in November 2019 and the second release will occur in Spring/Summer
2020. The CHS is sponsored by Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC)
and covers all provinces and territories including population centres and select CMAs and
CAs. However, the priority of the CHS is providing dwelling information, neighbourhood
satisfaction, first-time home buyers and housing affordability. Therefore, some household
characteristics such as labour market behaviors might not be available in this data.22
For the purpose of my analysis, I make several sample restrictions. First, I restrict my
sample to married/cohabitating women aged 18 to 64 years to collect as many observations
with valid information on labour supply, marital statuses, and house ownership. Second,
the marital status changes may result in substantial changes in family assets and couples’
labour market behaviour unrelated to house-price changes. Therefore, I only select mar-
ried/cohabitating women who stayed married/common-law across six years of the panel.
Results are however robust to alternate age and marital status restrictions discussed below.
For instance, I repeat the analysis based on the sample to married/cohabitating women
aged 25 to 64 years for a robustness check, and results are similar compared to those fo-
cused on women aged 18 to 64 years. Also, I repeat the analysis among married women
only (not cohabitating women) due to the potential different behaviours between these two
groups. The results are similar compared to those including both groups of women.
Third, house-price changes may not be exogenous for those who decide to sell their
current house and relocate across REBs (Clark and Ferrer (2019); Begley and Chan (2018)).
Thus, I further restrict my sample to those women who remained in the same REB (either
didn’t move or only move within the REB) across six years of the panel. This helps partly
addressing the simultaneity bias due to the reverse causality between the house price and
female labour supply since I follow the same cohort of women who did not move or moved
within the same REB. The variations I capture are not picking up any market level changes
in employment related to housing price changes and vice versa. However, this might also
creates a non-random selection bias in the results (people who didn’t move outside of the
22For more details of the CHS, please see https://www.statcan.gc.ca/eng/statistical-programs/
document/5269_D1_V1
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region might have different labour market outcomes than those who moved). Thus, the
analysis with a sample including both women who remained in the same REB (non-movers)
and those who moved across REBs (movers) has also been conducted as a robust check.
Following Begley and Chan (2018), the assigned house prices for movers are from their
original REBs which are the prices they would have experienced if they had not moved;
while the assigned house prices for non-movers are from the REB where they stayed over
time. The results reported in Appendix C.4 are similar with those using non-movers only.
Clark and Ferrer (2019) have used house prices from the original REBs of women as the
instrument of house prices they currently live for both movers and non-movers to address
the potential endogeneity of house prices (following Currie and Rossin-Slater (2013)). This
IV strategy are reported in Appendix C.4 as well.
I separate women whose households own a house (owners) from those whose households
do not (renters) in order to examine the different effects between these two groups. The
SLID asked each respondent whether the dwelling where he/she was living was owned by
any member in the household. It could be possible that a couple (with/without children)
lived with their relatives in the survey year and the dwelling was owned by the relatives
not the couple. For the purpose of deriving clear house ownership information, I restrict
my sample to households which only contains one (census) family. Finally, since house
ownership status changes may relate to life course transitions such as the first house pur-
chasing of a couple (Clark and Ferrer (2019)) or losing the house ownership due to family
financial crisis, which may also influence wives’ labour market behaviours. I only focus on
women who are either owners or renters consistently over six years of the panel.
The data attrition for each sample selection (e.g., staying married, remaining in the
same REB, and owning/renting consistently) is about 10 to 15% among homeowners.
However, the attrition is high among renters (about 30 to 50 %) due to the fact that house
renters are more likely to move across REBs.
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3.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Figure 3.2, from Clark and Ferrer (2019), presents the CREA MLS time-series real average
house prices (2002 = 100) for REBs in Canada by region/province from 1993 to 2010. There
are large variations in house prices both across and within regions. Across regions, the real
average house prices in British Columbia, Alberta, and Ontario are higher compared to the
other provinces or regions. Within regions, house prices usually are higher in urban centres
compared to rural areas (e.g., the regions of Toronto versus Chatham Kent). A significant
but not common co-movement in house prices across REBs within region/province can
also be noted (Clark and Ferrer (2019)). The summary statistics of several measures of
the CREA MLS real average house prices are indicated in Panel A of Table 3.1. The mean
of real average house prices among 99 REBs (the three territories are excluded) is about
$ 151,900 and the mean of percentage change in real house price is 3.32%. The mean of
real house-price shock calculated using an AR(2) process, the fraction of buildable land as
well as the difference in elevation that are used as instruments of changes in house prices
are also presented in Panel A of Table 3.1 and will be discussed in the later sections.
Panel B of Table 3.1 presents the descriptive statistics of SLID subsample described
above for the main variables used in the analyses.23 Columns 1-2 show values for house
owners, whereas Columns 3-4 show values for renters. In general, owners are more likely to
participate in the labour force and work more hours compared to renters. These phenomena
are consistent with owners being older, more-educated, less likely to have children under 5
years old, and less likely to have a disability at work than renters (presented in the table as
well). Additionally, husbands are more likely to have a university degree and to participate
in the labour market among owners than renters, which suggests a higher proportion of
two-earner families among owners. Renters are more likely than owners to be immigrants
and to live in an urban centre.
23The number of observations in the summary statistics differs from those in regressions because variables
used in the latter case are 1-year lagged.
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Figure 3.2: Real average housing price by REBs by Region/Province, 1993-2010
Source: This figure is excerpted from Clark and Ferrer (2019). Note: Each line in the graph represents a
REB in the region. 84
Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Panel A: REB Variables Mean Std. Dev. N. observations N. REBs
House prices ($10,000) 15.19 7.03 1733 99
House-price changes (%) 3.32 6.81 1634 99
House-price shocks (%) -0.02 6.93 1436 99
Fraction of buildable land (%) 91.43 13.88 1760 99
Difference in elevation (meter) 691 937 1760 99
Panel B: Individual Variables
Sub-sample
House owners Renters
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Labour force participation (%) 70.72 45.50 56.43 49.59
Hours of work (annually) 1194.17 923.83 874.99 924.27
Age 46.12 9.48 43.27 10.80
University degree (%) 21.97 41.41 10.15 30.20
Number of children 1.33 1.15 1.21 1.27
Children under 5 years (%) 7.02 25.56 7.30 26.01
Husband university degree (%) 24.14 42.79 10.35 30.47
Husband labour force participation (%) 82.26 38.20 73.66 44.06
Immigrant status (%) 17.49 37.99 25.57 43.63
Disability at work (%) 14.86 35.57 21.73 41.24
Provincial UR (%) 7.18 2.08 7.51 1.94
CMA size (10,000) 114.09 158.28 169.81 179.09
Urban area (%) 78.02 41.40 91.81 27.42
Number of observations 76193 4260
Source: Authors’ tabulations based on Canadian Survey of Income and Labour Dynamics confidential files
and CREA MLS average house prices from Clark and Ferrer (2019)
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3.4 Methods and Results
3.4.1 Estimating the house prices effect on female labour supply
with unexpected shocks
Due to the anticipation and endogeneity of house prices emphasized by researchers, I apply
two strategies to overcome the challenges of estimating the effects of changes in house prices
on female labour supply in this study. The life-cycle theory of the labour supply emphasizes
that unexpected gains in wealth should decrease household labour supply. However, wealth
changes due to rising house prices could be anticipated by a household. Thus, there
might be no effect if the household was forward looking and incorporated these expected
wealth changes into their decisions (Henley (2004); Klein (2017); Begley and Chan (2018)).
Therefore, following Begley and Chan (2018), my first strategy is to calculate a measure
of house-price shocks to capture unanticipated variations in local house prices, rather than
variations that could be expected by households. The measure of real house-price shocks
is defined as the difference between the actual real house price growth and predicted real
house price growth. First, to calculate the predicted real house prices growth, I estimate a
two-period logarithmic autoregressive model (AR(2)) with a time trend of real house prices
in each REB, separately, using Equation 3.1.2425
lnPj,t = α0j + α1jlnPj,t−1 + α2jlnPj,t−2 + α3jt+ εj,t (j = 1...99) (3.1)
where Pj,t is the real house prices in REB j and year t and Pj,t−1 (Pj,t−2) is its 1-year
(2-year) lagged real house prices. Then I obtain the prediction of real house prices P̂j,t
in each REB and calculate the predicted percentage change in real house prices in REB
j between year t − 1 and t, ∆P̂j,t. The real house-price shocks since t − 1, Shockj,t, are
derived as the difference between the actual percentage change in real house prices, ∆Pj,t,
24Although there is no fully adequate method to estimate the variable of house price shocks in the
housing literature, the AR(2) specification provides a decent and simple benchmark (Begley and Chan
(2018)).
25The unit root hypothesis is rejected using the Fisher-type test, which suggests that the real house
price process is stationary over time and house-price shocks do not show lasting effects(He et al. (2015)).
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and the predicted percentage change in real house prices, ∆P̂j,t.
I also employ two alternative measures of unexpected house-price shocks as a robustness
checks. First, I use AR(3) and AR(4) processes rather than AR(2) for the house-price
dynamics in Equation 3.1.26 Second, I use house-price shocks based on house price levels
rather than house price growth. The estimation results using these alternative measures
reported in Appendix C.5 are not dramatically different from those using the AR(2).27 In
Table 3.1, the mean of the house-price shocks using the AR(2) process, reported, is -0.02%.
The density functions of this measure, reported in Figure 3.3, are almost symmetric around
the mean. The variance is larger if the data are restricted to the years after 2000 compared
to those before 2000, which implies more fluctuations in house prices after 2000.
A housing market appreciation, for instance, might have different wealth effects on
house owners versus renters. Therefore, households’ labour supply responses to a house-
price appreciation could differ by their house tenure choices. I explore the house-price effect
on female labour supply for house owners and renters, separately, using Equation 3.2.
Yi,j,t = β0 + β1Shockj,t +
∑
n
βnXi,j,t−1 + Zi + yt + cj,t + µi,j,t (3.2)
At the extensive margin, Yi,j,t is labour force participation indicator for woman i living
in REB j in year t; Shockj,t is the unanticipated house-price shocks for REB j since year
t− 1, as described above. The house-price shocks are also further separated into positive
house-price shocks and negative house-price shocks to capture potential asymmetric effects
between these two variables (Farnham et al. (2011); Klein (2017); Begley and Chan (2018)).
Xi,j,t−1 contains a set of lagged time-varying variables such as a quadratic age variable and
education dummies of women, whether they have children under five years, as well as their
husbands’ education and labour force status dummies;28 Zi contains a set of time-invariant
26I regress the evolution of house prices on their more lagged variables (up to 4 periods) for each REB
and the coefficients of the third and fourth lags are insignificant among most cases.
27From tables in Appendix C.5, the coefficients using house-price shocks calculated with the price level
are different in magnitude from the estimates using house-price shocks based the percentage change. This
is because these two calculated house-price shocks are measured in different units ($10,000 versus %).
28In order to avoid the potential endogeneity issue, the husbands’ education and labour force status
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Figure 3.3: Housing Price Shock Density Functions
Source: Authors’ calculations based on CREA MLS average house prices from Clark and Ferrer (2019)
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variables such as race/ethnicity and birth cohort; yt is year fixed-effect
29. I also include
REB-by-year fixed-effect (cj,t) in my model to account for some regional and nation-wide
variations, differential housing market fluctuations in each REB, as well as the distinct
trends of female labour force participation30. The standard errors (µi,j,t) are clustered at
the REB level to account for the aggregated nature of house price data (Bertrand et al.
(2004); Clark and Ferrer (2019))31 I use the linear probability model (LPM) as my baseline
estimation. As a robustness check, I also repeat results using Logit.
At the intensive margin, I follow the studies which focus directly on changes in hours
of work rather than looking at hours of work in levels (e.g., Kohara (2010) and Bryan and
Longhi (2018)). Unlike estimating a simple association between the number of hours of
work and house-price shocks, looking at changes in hours of work allows me to examine the
labour reaction of married women to changes in house-price shocks as well as how much
stronger the reaction is when house-price shocks are larger. Therefore, Yi,j,t is the change
in hours worked for woman i living in REB j between year t and year t−1 and ∆Shockj,t is
used instead of Shockj,t. The control variables such as Xi,j,t−1 also are first-differentiated.
Furthermore, estimating changes in hours of work of women but not the levels can help to
deal with the problem of time-invariant omitted variables (Kohara (2010)). I focus on the
sample used at the extensive margin (all married women) and apply the OLS estimation as
my baseline model (Angrist and Pischke (2009)). Following the method I used in Lluis and
Pan (2018), an unconditional quantile (UQ) regression (Firpo et al. (2009)) to examine the
female labour reaction to changes in house-price shocks at the median as well as at various
dummies are controlled for in the model to approximate family income information instead of including
this income variable directly. Additionally, controlling for husbands’ labour market status can help me to
isolate the house-price shock effects on female labour supply per se because changes in husbands’ labour
market status could impact wives’ labour supply as well (Kohara (2010); Bryan and Longhi (2018)).
29The REB fixed-effect is absorbed in the individual fixed-effect (Zi) because I restrict my sample to
non-movers only.
30A specification without this REB-by-year fixed-effect has been tested when estimating Equation 3.2,
and the estimated effects of house-price shocks are robust (results are not reported here to prevent oversize
appendix).
31Researchers have emphasized the possible correlation across clusters when clustering the standard
errors by region and year pair (Cameron and Miller (2015)). Thus, I choose to cluster the standard errors
at the REB rather than REB-time pair level.
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percentiles has been conducted.3233 A median (or average) estimation might not be able
to capture women’s labour hours reaction when focusing on the changes in hours of work
because a fairly large proportion of women have not altered their hours of work and these
changes are zero. Therefore, exploring the relatively low and high percentiles of changes in
hours of work (when changes in hours of work could be either negative or positive) can help
to observe women’s labour hours reaction and examine how much stronger the reaction is
when house-price shocks change more.
Table 3.2 reports the effect of house-price shocks on the labour supply of married
women’s among owners. At the extensive margin (Panel A), the LPM estimations (col-
umn 1) imply that a 10% increase in house-price shocks causes a statistically significant
0.71% (0.5 percentage point) reduction in the likelihood of labour force participation for
married women.3435 Results are similar after including individual fixed effects (column 2).
Following Klein (2017), I further separate the house-price shocks into positive and negative
house-price shocks (represented as 0 when a shock with the opposite sign occurs) to capture
potential asymmetric effects between these two variables (column 3)36. The results consis-
tently suggest that an appreciation of house-prices induces women to supply less labour,
while a depreciation of house-price has little effect. For instance, a 10% increase in posi-
tive house-price shocks significantly reduces the likelihood of labour force participation by
about 1.7% (1.2 percentage point), whereas the negative house-price shocks have negligible
effects on female labour participation. The results of the Logit specifications (columns 4-6)
are qualitatively similar to those in the LPM estimation37.
32The study has benefited from using the generously shared Stata programs on Nicole Fortin’s webpage
by the authors at faculty.arts.ubc.ca/nfortin datahead.html. The RIF-OLS regression specification is used
in this study, which assumes that the outcome quantiles are linearly related with the observed covariates.
33Unlike the conditional quantile regression, the unconditional quantile estimation allows me to exam-
ine how an increase in the entire population’s house-price shock growth alters a certain quantile in the
unconditional distribution of women’s changes in hours of work (Lindqvist and Vestman (2011)).
34Linear regression coefficients at the extensive margin are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation.
35The labour force participation rate among married women whose family own a house is 70.72%. A
0.5 percentage point reduction in the participation probability of this group leads to a 0.71% decrease
(0.5/70.72 ≈ 0.71%).
36In order to easily interpret coefficients of these shocks, following Klein (2017), I use the absolute value
of the negative house-price shocks.
37I repeat the analyses by further controlling for the dwelling type, a potential measure of the quality
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At the intensive margin (Panel B), the OLS estimates (column 1) indicate that a married
woman responds to a 10% increase in the house-price shocks with a decrease in annual work
hours by about 4 hours. However, this effect is not statistically significant. The results
of the UQ regression at the median (column 2) also show an insignificant reaction in
terms of hours of work of married women. The lack of significance at mean/median is not
surprising because they are consistent with the fact that a fairly large proportion of women
have not altered their hours of work. On average, the changes in hours of work among
female owners in my sample is 0.05. Therefore, I explore the 10th percentile (column 3)
and 90th percentile (column 4) to analyze whether the hours of work reaction of these
women are stronger. At the 10th percentile, I find that a 10% increase in the house-price
shocks induces a woman to further reduce her annual hours of work by about six hours
and this response is statistically significant, whereas the adjustment of labour hours at the
90th percentile is small and insignificant. Even though the magnitude of the labour hours
reduction found at the lower tail is small (6 hours annually), this negative effect due to the
house-price appreciation is non-negligible given the fact that the majority of women in the
sample have not change their hours of work.
The effect of house-price shocks on married women’s labour supply among renters is
presented in Table 3.3. The results imply no evidence of renters’ labour market adjustments
to house-price shocks at both the extensive or intensive margins. These findings are not
surprising if variations in house prices have been anticipated in the short-run and renters
expect house prices to be back to the original levels and respond by delaying entrance
into homeownership. Alternatively, they may choose to find a cheaper residence instead of
adjusting their labour supply (Aladangady (2017); Zhao et al. (2018)). These insignificant
results also are consistent with many studies (e.g., Disney and Gathergood (2018); Clark
and Ferrer (2019)) which generally find evidence showing that wealth changes driven by
house-price changes have important effects on house owners, but little effects on renters.38.
In summary, I find a statistically significant negative effect of an appreciation in house
of a house, to capture variations across houses at both the extensive and intensive margins. The results
are almost the same as before.
38It is worth noting that although the coefficients are insignificant, they are positive among all regressions.
So it is likely that these results are imprecisely estimated due to the small sample size among renters.
91
prices on married women labour supply among owners but not renters at both the extensive
and intensive margins. The findings are consistent with the prediction of the family labour
supply and life-cycle theories which indicates that unexpected gains in wealth should de-
crease household labour supply, and concentrates at the intensive at the lower tails of the
distribution of hours of work.
Table 3.2: Effect of House-price Shocks on Labour Supply of Married Women among
Owners
Panel A: Labour Force Participation LPM Linear FE Linear FE Logit Logit FE Logit FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Odds Ratio Odds Ratio Odds Ratio
House-price shocks (%) -0.05* -0.05** 0.99** 0.99**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.14) (0.20)
Positive house-price shocks (%) -0.12*** 0.98*
(0.04) (0.68)
Negative house-price shocks (%) -0.02 0.99
(0.06) (0.75)
Number of observations 61589 61589
Number of individuals 14743 14743 14743 14743
(Pseudo) R-squared or Chi-squared 0.16 0.69 0.69 0.14 268.57 402.86
Panel B: ∆ Hours of Work OLS UQ-Median UQ-10th p. UQ-90th p.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
∆ House-price shocks (%) -0.39 -0.01 -0.64* -0.06
(0.39) (0.01) (0.39) (0.29)
Number of observations 43425 43425 43425 43425
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
* Significance at 10% ** Significance at 5% *** Significance at 1%
Note: Linear regression coefficients at the extensive margin are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation. The individual and household
controls include age, age squared, education indicators, number of children, whether having children under five years, the husband’s education
dummies, the husband’s labour force status dummies, immigrant status, and whether having a disability at work. All of these control variables
are lagged. Other controls include provincial unemployment rate, CMA population size, year fixed-effect, and REB-by-year fixed-effect. Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered at the REB level in Specifications (1)-(4) and replicated bootstrap standard errors clustered at the REB level
are in Specifications (5)-(6).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Canadian Survey of Income and Labour Dynamics confidential files and CREA MLS average house
prices from Clark and Ferrer (2019)
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Table 3.3: Effect of House-price Shocks on Labour Supply of Married Women among
Renters
Panel A: Labour Force Participation LPM Linear FE Linear FE Logit Logit FE Logit FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Odds Ratio Odds Ratio Odds Ratio
House-price shocks (%) 0.03 0.04 1.00 1.00
(0.11) (0.11) (0.60) (0.66)
Positive house-price shocks (%) 0.20 1.00
(0.41) (2.39)
Negative house-price shocks (%) 0.12 1.00
(0.32) (2.66)
Number of observations 3409 3409
Number of individuals 844 844 844 844
(Pseudo) R-squared or Chi-squared 0.20 0.64 0.64 0.18 22.52 20.50
Panel B: ∆ Hours of Work OLS UQ-Median UQ-10th p. UQ-90th p.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
∆ House-price shocks (%) 0.57 0.01 2.33 1.12
(1.77) (0.04) (4.63) (3.05)
Number of observations 2380 2380 2380 2380
R-squared 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02
* Significance at 10% ** Significance at 5% *** Significance at 1%
Note: Linear regression coefficients at the extensive margin are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation. The individual and household
controls include age, age squared, education indicators, number of children, whether having children under five years, the husband’s education
dummies, the husband’s labour force status dummies, immigrant status, and whether having a disability at work. All of these control variables
are lagged. Other controls include provincial unemployment rate, CMA population size, year fixed-effect, and REB-by-year fixed-effect. Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered at the REB level in Specifications (1)-(4) and replicated bootstrap standard errors clustered at the REB level
are in Specifications (5)-(6).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Canadian Survey of Income and Labour Dynamics confidential files and CREA MLS average house
prices from Clark and Ferrer (2019)
As mentioned in Section 3.1, there could be an heterogenous effect of housing price
appreciation within the house owner group. Therefore, I further explore the effects of
house-price shocks by considering possible factors that contribute to heterogeneous labour
market responses of married women: the opportunity cost of reducing labour supply, as
well as the approximated size of housing wealth change per one percentage change of house-
price shock. I estimate the women’s opportunity cost of reducing labour supply using her
education level, and approximate the magnitude of the housing wealth changes using the
residence location (whether in an urban centre or rural area).
Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 show the effects of house-price shocks further interacted by the
highest level of achieved education of married women and their residence location using
























βnXi,j,t−1 + Zi + yt + cj,t + µi,j,t
(3.4)
where UnivDegree (or NoUnivDegree) is equal to 1 if wives have a university degree (or
don’t have a university degree), and equal to 0 otherwise; Urban (or Rural) is equal to 1
if wives live in an urban centre (or a rural area), and equal to 0 otherwise.
In this case, β′2 (or β
′
3) indicates the potential impact of house-price shocks on labour
market behavior of wives who have a university degree (or don’t have a university degree).
β′′2 (or β
′′
3 ) indicates the potential impact of house-price shocks on labour market behavior
of wives who live in an urban (or a rural) area.
Table 3.4 presents the results by women’s education which suggest that the decline
of women’s labour force participation indicated in Table 3.2 are mainly driven by those
less-educated women who do not have a university degree. This is consistent with the
idea that the opportunity cost of leisure for a less-educated woman is lower than that of a
more-educated one because of her relatively lower returns from the labour market. Thus,
when a positive housing wealth shock occurs, a less-educated woman is more likely to exit
the labour force compared to a more-educated one with greater potential earnings.
Although the estimates for hours of work are insignificant, given that the size of the
effects (magnitude of the coefficients) is similar to Table 3.2, this is likely a matter of power
of the estimation. It is worth noting that, at the 10th percentile, the negative effect is still
significant for the low educated which suggests that the response is more homogeneous for
this group.
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Table 3.4: Effect of House-price Shocks on Labour Supply of Married Women by Education
among Owners
Panel A: Labour Force Participation LPM Linear FE Linear FE Logit Logit FE Logit FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Odds Ratio Odds Ratio Odds Ratio
House-price shocks (Univ Degree) -0.04 -0.03 0.99 0.99
(0.04) (0.04) (0.30) (0.65)
House-price shocks (No Univ Degree) -0.05 -0.06* 0.99* 0.99*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.18) (0.27)
Pos house-price shocks (Univ Degree) -0.11 0.98
(0.12) (1.88)
Neg house-price shocks (Univ Degree) -0.06 0.99
(0.08) (1.48)
Pos house-price shocks (No Univ Degree) -0.12** 0.98*
(0.04) (0.72)
Neg house-price shocks (No Univ Degree) -0.01 0.99
(0.08) (0.91)
Number of observations 61589 61589
Number of individuals 14743 14743 14743 14743
(Pseudo) R-squared or Chi-squared 0.15 0.69 0.69 0.13 299.17 395.38
Panel B: ∆ Hours of Work OLS UQ-Median UQ-10th p. UQ-90th p.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
∆ House-price shocks (Univ Degree) -0.52 0.01 -0.77 -0.51
(0.96) (0.04) (0.72) (0.66)
∆ House-price shocks (No Univ Degree) -0.37 -0.01 -0.60 0.04
(0.43) (0.02) (0.43) (0.31)
Number of observations 43425 43425 43425 43425
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
* Significance at 10% ** Significance at 5% *** Significance at 1%
Note: Linear regression coefficients at the extensive margin are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation. The individual and household
controls include age, age squared, whether having a university degree, number of children, whether having children under five years, the
husband’s education dummies, the husband’s labour force status dummies, immigrant status, and whether having a disability at work. All of
these control variables are lagged. Other controls include provincial unemployment rate, CMA population size, year fixed-effect, and REB-by-
year fixed-effect.a Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the REB level in Specifications (1)-(4) and replicated bootstrap standard
errors clustered at the REB level are in Specifications (5)-(6).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Canadian Survey of Income and Labour Dynamics confidential files and CREA MLS average house
prices from Clark and Ferrer (2019)
a
Education dummies are excluded because of the inclusion of Univ Degree indicator in the regressions.
95
Table 3.5 shows the estimates based on wives’ residence location, indicating that the
downward adjustment of women’s labour supply found before is mainly driven by wives
living in an urban area. These findings are consistent with the idea that an owner in an
urban area might experience a larger magnitude increase in the housing wealth compared
to one in a rural area when a certain percentage increase in house-price shock occurs due to
the significant variations in housing values between these two areas. Thus, when facing an
increase in house-price shocks (or an increase in the growth of house-price shocks), a woman
living in an urban centre is more likely to withdraw from the labour force (or respond by
reduce her hours worked more) due to her relatively larger income effect compared to a
woman in a rural area39.
In addition, considering housing as both an investment and consumption good, the
diverse future housing consumptions (intention to downsize or upsize) among house owners
with different ages may also contribute to heterogenous labour supply responses to housing
market appreciation. However, I do not get significant results using this approach of
women’s age groups.40
39In order to explore whether the found impact of house-price appreciation on female labour supply is
mainly caused by women living in large urban areas such as Toronto and Vancouver, an analysis which
excludes the 3 biggest cites (Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver) has been conducted. Similar results are
reported in Appendix C.3.
40I investigate the possible heterogeneous effects of house-price shocks by married women’s age groups
(young, mid, and elderly age groups). However, the results are inconsistent and almost insignificant across
specifications.
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Table 3.5: Effect of House-price Shocks on Labour Supply of Married Women by Residences
Location among Owners
Panel A: Labour Force Participation LPM Linear FE Linear FE Logit Logit FE Logit FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Odds Ratio Odds Ratio Odds Ratio
House-price shocks (Urban) -0.06* -0.06** 0.99* 0.99**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.19) (0.28)
House-price shocks (Rural) -0.04 -0.03 0.99 0.99
(0.04) (0.04) (0.23) (0.41)
Pos house-price shocks (Urban) -0.14*** 0.98***
(0.04) (0.50)
Neg house-price shocks (Urban) -0.03 0.99
(0.06) (0.71)
Pos house-price shocks (Rural) -0.04 1.00
(0.10) (1.55)
Neg house-price shocks (Rural) 0.02 1.00
(0.13) (1.58)
Number of observations 61589 61589
Number of individuals 14743 14743 14743 14743
(Pseudo) R-squared or Chi-squared 0.16 0.69 0.69 0.13 259.57 563.23
Panel B: ∆ Hours of Work OLS UQ-Median UQ-10th p. UQ-90th p.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
∆ House-price shocks (Urban) -0.60 -0.01 -0.90** 0.07
(0.42) (0.02) (0.39) (0.32)
∆ House-price shocks (Rural) 0.23 -0.01 0.09 -0.43
(0.77) (0.03) (0.79) (0.61)
Number of observations 43425 43425 43425 43425
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
* Significance at 10% ** Significance at 5% *** Significance at 1%
Note: Linear regression coefficients at the extensive margin are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation. The individual and household
controls include age, age squared, education indicators, number of children, whether having children under five years, the husband’s education
dummies, the husband’s labour force status dummies, immigrant status, whether having a disability at work, whether living in an urban area.
All of these control variables are lagged. Other controls include provincial unemployment rate, CMA population size, year fixed-effect, and
REB-by-year fixed-effect. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the REB level in Specifications (1)-(4) and replicated bootstrap
standard errors clustered at the REB level are in Specifications (5)-(6).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Canadian Survey of Income and Labour Dynamics confidential files and CREA MLS average house
prices from Clark and Ferrer (2019)
3.4.2 Estimating the house price effect on female labour supply
with topography instrument
The reverse causality between house prices and female labour supply (bid-up effect) has
been emphasized in literature (Johnson (2014)). For instance, rising housing prices induce
more female spouses to work to offset the future housing purchase costs if their families
plan to buy a house or balance rising rental prices if they continue renting. Nonetheless, it
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is also plausible that more working women in one area, which contributes to a higher pro-
portion of two-earner households with stronger payment capacities, may bid up the house
prices there.41 Furthermore, factors affecting house prices, such as expectations of future
income, may also influence households’ labour market behaviors as well as consumption
(Johnson (2014); He et al. (2015); Aladangady (2017)). Previous research has employed
various instruments for house prices or house-price growth to address these sources of en-
dogeneity. Saiz (2010) studied effects of unbuildable land and land-use regulations on the
housing supply elasticity and suggested that the proportion of area that is forgone to wa-
ter, wetlands, and steep slopes makes the housing supply to be less elastic in metropolitan
areas in the U.S. This relatively inelastic housing supply may induce higher house prices
when there is a housing demand shock (Saiz (2010); Johnson (2014)). Johnson (2014)
identified the effect of exogenous changes in house prices across metropolitan areas in the
U.S. on female labour supply by using these topography measures as the instruments. He
used a fraction of buildable land (area not covered by water or outside of the country) and
a fraction of sloped land (with a degree more than 20%) calculated using Census maps
as instruments of house prices. Aladangady (2017) utilized the housing supply elasticity
calculated by Saiz (2010) directly, and interacted it with long-term real interest rates as
an instrument of house prices growth in the U.S. to estimate the consumption responses
to house prices changes.42 The author assumed that this instrument is valid as long as the
consumption responses to interest rate changes are not varying across the housing supply
elasticity.
The second strategy I use to estimate the causal effect of changes in house prices on
female labour supply is constructing topography instruments. Following Saiz (2010), I
construct a comprehensive measure of the area that is available for building real estate
(for both residential or commercial purposes) in each REB of Canada using geographic
41To address the reverse causality, Johnson (2014) has constructed an equilibrium model in metropolitan
areas that incorporates residence location choices and wives’ participation decisions. The author assumed
that two-earner families are more eager to pay a high price to live near the city center in order to reduce
the commuting time compared to one-earner families. Therefore, a higher female labour force participation
rate (more two-earner families) is expected to bid up house prices near the city center.
42The housing supply elasticity that Saiz (2010) has calculated is based on the land availability as well
as land-use regulations.
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information system (GIS) techniques. The measure is calculated as the fraction of land
not covered by water, wetlands, mountains, and greenbelts (if applicable). I utilize the
coordinates of all census subdivisions in each REB obtained from Clark and Ferrer and
digitizing polygon files with ArcGIS Pro versions 2.3.1 and 2.2 software.43 It is worth
knowing that it is extremely time consuming to generate slope maps using elevation data
at a decent resolution (e.g., 90-m was used in Saiz (2010)) for the significantly large size
of Canada. Therefore, instead of excluding steep slope area from buildable lands like Saiz
(2010), I remove the area covered by mountains when constructing my land availability
measure. However, due to the data limitation, mountain information is only calculated in
Alberta and British Columbia where buildable land is influenced by mountain significantly.
Additionally, the greenbelt information is available only in the REBs of Ontario that
experienced greenbelt regulation amendments since 2005. Thus, this topography measure
is time-invariant for all REBs except those in Ontario.
Besides the fraction of buildable land, I calculate the change in elevation between the
lowest and the highest point in each REB using the GIS techniques as another time-
invariant topography measure and apply it as the instruments. As generating slope maps
for the whole Canadian area is very time consuming, this topography measure could be
an easy substitution of that to approximate the terrain in each REB and capture more
cross-regional variations in house prices.
As far as I know, in the economics literature, these are the first comprehensive measures
of calculating buildable land and evaluating regional terrain in Canada at the REB level.
Then, following Johnson (2014), I use these measures as the instruments of the percentage
change in house prices.44 The mean of the fraction of buildable land, reported in Table 3.1,
43Unlike other studies in the literature such as Saiz (2010) using the geographic data in the U.S., water
such as oceans, lakes, rivers, and other internal water bodies has already been removed from Canadian
land in the ArcGIS Pro software. Thus, the variations in this statistic are driven by wetlands, mountains,
and greenbelts. Neglecting water variations when calculating the fraction of buildable land could lead
this fraction to be relatively large (see Table 3.1). However, this might not be an issue if we focus on
land/ground only when considering whether the area is available for building real estate.
44Introducing the interest rate into the instrument might bring additional wealth changes such as changes
in mortgage payment, which could also affect individuals’ labour supply. And these effects might differ
across regions based on the heterogeneity of house prices. Therefore, I choose to use topography measures
themselves as the instruments.
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is 91.43%, which implies that most areas of Canada have a high land availability.45 And
the mean of the difference between maximum and minimum elevation points is 691 meters.
This large number is mainly driven by the REBs in Alberta and British Columbia.
The instrumental variable (IV) estimates are conducted using a two-step least squares
(2SLS) procedure at both the extensive and intensive margins. The two-stage model can
be described with the following equations:
Yi,j,t = β0 + β1∆Pj,t +
∑
n
βnXi,j,t−1 + yt + µi,j,t (3.5)






γnXi,j,t−1 + yt + vi,j,t (3.6)
cov(Gj,t, µi,j,t) = 0 (3.7)
where Yi,j,t is the labour force participation indicator at the extensive margin and the
hours worked at the intensive margin. Changes in hours of work are not used at the
intensive margin because the instruments can not be differentiated due to its time-invariant
nature in most of the REBs.46 ∆Pj,t is the percentage change in house prices in REB j
between year t − 1 and t. Gj,t are the topography instruments which are the fraction of
buildable land in REB j in year t described as above47 and the difference in elevation
in REB j. Xi,j,t−1 contains lagged time-varying variables and yt is year fixed-effect.
48
The identifying assumption in Equation 3.7 is that the fraction of buildable land and the
45As mentioned, this high number could be driven by the fact that water variations are neglected when
calculating the fraction of buildable land.
46Individual fixed-effect model is not used in the IV approach due to the nature of the time-invariant
topography measures.
47As mentioned, this topography measure is only time-varying for REBs in Ontario that experienced
greenbelt regulation amendments.
48The REB fixed-effect and REB-by-year fixed-effect are not included in the instrument analysis due to
their possible collinearity with the instruments.
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difference in maximum and minimum elevation do not directly influence female labour
market behaviours and therefore has zero covariance with the error term.
The implication of the model is that the share of land available for development as
well as the topography could be considered predetermined and exogenous (Saiz (2010)).
These exogenous topography measures provide valid instruments to examine the labour
market responses to changes in house prices. A lower fraction of buildable land makes the
housing supply to be less elastic in the region. This relatively inelastic housing supply may
induce higher house prices when there is a housing demand shock (Saiz (2010); Johnson
(2014)). Additionally, the ease of building is evaluated by the terrain. Rough terrain or
large changes in elevation inhibit housing supply growth which might increase house prices
as well.
The results of the effect of changes in house prices on the labour supply of married
women among owners using the IV approach are indicated in Table 3.6. The first-stage
results imply that the coefficients of the excluded instruments (the fraction of buildable land
and the difference in elevation) on the percentage change in house prices are significant at
1% at both the extensive and intensive margins. In addition, the F-tests for the excluded
instruments reported in Table 3.6 exceed the Stock and Yogo (2002) thresholds at the
15 and 10 percent level for relative size and bias at the extensive and intensive margins,
respectively. All of these statistics present the excluded topography instruments as strongly
relevant to REB-level house price growth. For the exogeneity, the fraction of buildable land
and the difference in elevation also pass conventional exogeneity tests with a p-value of 0.46
(the extensive margin) and 0.10 (the intensive margin) in the Sargan–Hansen J test.49
It is worth noting that the predictions of these two instruments on changes in house-
price are not always in the expected direction. For instance, from the first stage in Table 3.6,
a rise in the changes in the maximum and minimum points of elevation accelerates the
house-price growth. This prediction is expected because rough terrain inhibit housing
49Even though the endogeneity of the house prices or growth has been highlighted by researchers, the
Durbin Hausman-Wu tests I conduct do not reject the null hypothesis of emphasizing house prices are
considered as exogenous (the p-value is 0.11 and 0.15 for the extensive and intensive margins, respectively).
However, given the relative small p-value, it is also reasonable to use instruments in the analysis.
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Table 3.6: Effect of Changes in House Prices on Labour Supply of Married Women among
Owners with Instruments
Panel A: Labour Force Participation Linear IV
Coefficient
Changes in house-price (%) -0.92*
(0.56)
First stage: Fraction of buildable land (%) 0.04***
First stage: Difference in elevation 0.01***
Stock and Yogo First stage F-test 19.86
(p-value) 0.00
Test of overidentification (p value of Sargan–Hansen J test) 0.46
Number of observations 64713
R-squared 0.14
Panel B: Hours of Work Linear IV
Coefficient
Changes in house-price (%) -21.50
(15.26)
First stage: Fraction of buildable land (%) 0.04***
First stage: Difference in elevation 0.01***
Stock and Yogo First stage F-test 20.63
(p-value) 0.00
Test of overidentification (p value of Sargan–Hansen J test) 0.10
Number of observations 61899
R-squared 0.14
* Significance at 10% ** Significance at 5% *** Significance at 1%
Note: Linear regression coefficients at the extensive margin are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation. The individual and household
controls include age, age squared, education indicators, number of children, whether having children under five years, the husband’s education
dummies, the husband’s labour force status dummies, immigrant status, whether having a disability at work. All of these control variables
are lagged. Other controls include provincial unemployment rate, CMA population size, year fixed-effect. Standard errors in parentheses are
clustered at the REB level.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Canadian Survey of Income and Labour Dynamics confidential files and CREA MLS average house
prices from Clark and Ferrer (2019)
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supply growth and could appreciate house prices. However, an increase in the fraction of
buildable land also boost the house-price growth. This finding is surprising but it could
be caused by the dynamic house-price profile which could change over time. For example,
as mentioned, a higher fraction of buildable land with a more elastic housing supply in the
region is expected to cool down house prices. So regions with plenty of buildable area (see
Regina and Saskatoon in Table 3.7) usually have low house prices in level, but they also
have a high house-price growth at the same time. This could occur because these regions
with adequate housing supply and low original house prices are attractive for residences
and investors due to their large potential of community development in the long-run and
much space for house price growing. One the other hand, cities with scarce available land
(see Vancouver and Toronto in Table 3.7) often have high house prices in levels but low
growth rates because these cities’ prices are already high and there might be no much
capacity for growing.
Table 3.7: Fraction of Buildable Land and Housing Markets
REB Fraction of buildable land (%) House prices ($10,000) House-price Growth (%)
Regina 97.81 12.40 6.27
Saskatoon 99.87 14.88 6.72
Vancouver 10.56 38.61 3.14
Toronto 46.96 29.72 2.89
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Canadian Survey of Income and Labour Dynamics confidential files and CREA MLS average house prices
from Clark and Ferrer (2019)
In Table 3.6, when instrumented, I find that an increase in changes in house-price
causes a statistically significant reduction in the likelihood of participation for married
women whose families own a house. This is consistent with the findings using the house-
price shocks approach presented in the last section. For women’s hours of work, I also find
a negative effect of an increase in house-price growth although this effect is insignificant.50
The IV approach is also conducted to analyze the effect of changes in house prices
50The number of observations at the intensive margin is different from the one at the extensive margin
because of the existence of missing values in hours of work. Some respondents did not report their hours
worked in the survey even though they were in the labour force.
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among renters’ labour market behaviours. Consistently with the results using the house-
price shocks approach, the estimates using the IV approach reported in Table 3.8 are
insignificant at both the extensive and intensive margins.
Besides these two topographic measures, land-use regulations which restrict the de-
velopment of real estate are also associated with a relatively inelastic housing supply and
might have an impact on house prices (Saiz (2010); Green et al. (2016)). Green et al. (2016)
have derived a summary index of regulation in Canadian housing market (not available to
the public). A future step could be following up with the authors to collect this index.
However, using the land-use regulations as the instruments also have some challenges. The
endogeneity of land-use regulations has been addressed in Saiz (2010) due to the reverse
causality from higher prices to more regulations. This implies that restrictive land-use reg-
ulations are more likely to occur in regions with high house prices. Also, the geographical
coverage and boundaries of regions in Green et al. (2016) are different from mine. There-
fore, mapping their land-use regulation index to my REBs could be very challenging due
to this boundary mismatch and this fact could lead the results to be biased.
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Table 3.8: Effect of Changes in House Prices on Labour Supply of Married Women among
Renters with Instruments
Panel A: Labour Force Participation Linear IV
Coefficient
Changes in house-price (%) -0.53
(1.60)
First stage: Fraction of buildable land (%) 0.05***
First stage: Difference in elevation 0.01***
Stock and Yogo First stage F-test 11.39
(p-value) 0.00
Test of overidentification (p value of Sargan–Hansen J test) 0.15
Number of observations 3598
R-squared 0.17
Panel B: Hours of Work Linear IV
Coefficient
Changes in house-price (%) 33.87
(29.04)
First stage: Fraction of buildable land (%) 0.05***
First stage: Difference in elevation 0.01***
Stock and Yogo First stage F-test 14.13
(p-value) 0.00
Test of overidentification (p value of Sargan–Hansen J test) 0.02
Number of observations 3430
R-squared 0.17
* Significance at 10% ** Significance at 5% *** Significance at 1%
Note: Linear regression coefficients at the extensive margin are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation. The individual and household
controls include age, age squared, education indicators, number of children, whether having children under five years, the husband’s education
dummies, the husband’s labour force status dummies, immigrant status, whether having a disability at work. All of these control variables
are lagged. Other controls include provincial unemployment rate, CMA population size, year fixed-effect. Standard errors in parentheses are
clustered at the REB level.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Canadian Survey of Income and Labour Dynamics confidential files and CREA MLS average house
prices from Clark and Ferrer (2019)
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3.5 Conclusions and Discussions
In this study, I investigate the impact of changes in house prices on the labour supply
of married women in Canada using two approaches. After capturing unanticipated varia-
tions in local house prices instead of variations that could be expected by people, among
house owners, I find that a 10% increase in (positive) house-price shocks causes a 1.7%
(1.2 percentage point) reduction in married women’s likelihood of participation. At the
intensive margin, I find that a 10% increase in the house-price shocks induce a decrease
in annual work hours of a woman by about 6 hours at the 10th percentile. Additionally,
I find heterogeneous effects of house-price shocks on women’s labour supply depending on
their education level and residence location. These results are consistent with the predic-
tion of family labour supply model and life-cycle theory, which indicates that unexpected
gains in wealth should decrease household labour supply. There is no evidence showing
that house-price shocks have a labour effect on renters in this study, which might suggest
that they choose to delay to enter homeownership or find a cheaper residence instead of
adjusting their labour supply when an appreciation of house prices occurs (Aladangady
(2017); Zhao et al. (2018)). The IV approach, which uses the fraction of buildable land
and the difference in elevation as the instruments, also provides consistent results.
Many studies in the housing literature have not explored the exogenous variations in
house prices when investigating the effect of changes in house-price on households’ labour
market behavious. However, neglecting the anticipation and endogeneity of house prices
could lead to biased estimations. In this study, one of my contributions to the literature is
applying the house-price shock approach and the IV methodology to exploit the exogeneity
of house prices to overcome the challenges of examining the effect of house-price changes on
female labour supply. To my knowledge, in Canada, no research has used these two methods
to analyze this effect. In addition, the instruments I construct are the first comprehensive
measures of buildable land/regional terrain in Canada at the REB level in the economics
literature. Overall, the consistency of the results using these two approaches suggests that
the effect of changes in house-price found in this paper is quite robust across models. Also,
comparison of my findings to those of earlier research in other countries (the U.S. mainly)
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which have employed the instruments or house-price shocks (e.g., Johnson (2014); Begley
and Chan (2018)) reveals generally similar conclusions.
Governments and researchers are paying more and more attention to the impact of
excessive increase in house prices (especially in large cities) on people’s consumption and
labour behaviours, as well as their life quality. Many studies point out that a dramatic rise
in house prices decreases the lifetime welfare of young individuals and induces them to work
longer and consume less to accumulate down payment if they intend to enter homeown-
ership (Kershaw and Minh (2016); Li and Yao (2007)). Governments have implemented
several measures (e.g., increasing down payments and tax to foreign housing buyers) to
help contain house prices and ease the stress of (young) people who intend to purchase a
house but can not afford to. This study, on the other hand, provides evidences showing the
influence of rising house prices on people’s labour market decisions among those who have
already own a house and might help social planners to develop a more complete picture of
the effects caused by the rising house prices.
Additionally, I find that an appreciation of the housing market discourages married
women to work. However, this is not true among married men. This highlights gender
asymmetries in labour responses to shocks that may have long-term effects for women
welfare. In particular, an asymmetric response to short-term higher housing wealth may
lead to lower human capital and long time wealth accumulation for women, which leaves
them in vulnerable positions in case of marital dissolution. Moreover, a family in which
the mother shares a higher proportion of the household earned income will invest more
in children’s goods (Lundberg et al. (1997), Kenney (2008), Kornrich and Furstenberg
(2013)). This adverse employment effect on women which could lower their human capital
and long time wealth accumulation might also have an impact on their children’s well-
being. Investigating the effect of changes in house prices on married women’s labour
market behaviours might inform the social planners about a better way of understanding
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A.1 Effect of Transition in Family Structure
Table A.1: Effect of Transition in Family Structure on Academic Performance
Reading Math
OLS VA OLS VA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reading (t-1) - - 0.59*** Math (t-1) - - 0.53***
- - (0.03) - - (0.03)
Transitions in family structure
Stay in Non-intact family -5.19*** -5.18** -2.50 Stay in Single parent family -10.18* -11.10 -7.23
(1.47) (2.25) (2.08) (6.02) (7.46) (6.47)
Stay in Step family 3.51 -9.04 -5.21
(10.30) (9.25) (8.05)
Changed family structure -4.76*** -4.10** -4.22** Changed family structure -3.19 -7.59 -5.18
(1.63) (1.89) (1.72) (9.01) (8.22) (7.46)
Household Income (7 indicators) NO YES YES - - -
Household Income (Thousands) - - - NO 0.13*** 0.07**
(0.03) (0.03)
Transitions in PMK’s employment NO YES YES NO YES YES
Previous family structure - - - NO YES YES
Previous PMK’s employment - - - NO YES YES
Other child and PMK’s characteristics NO YES YES NO YES YES
R-squared 0.02 0.14 0.44 0.15 0.53 0.61
Number of observations 2934 2934 1962 4454 4454 4454
Note: Children remained in an intact family across cycles are the reference groups. See Table 1.1 for a full
set of table descriptors. Robust standard error values are in parentheses.
The child longitudinal weights provided in the NLSCY are used in the analysis. * Significance at 10%
** Significance at 5% *** Significance at 1%
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on the NLSCY, Cycles 1-6.
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Table A.2: Effect of Transition in Family Structure on Academic Performance by Gender
Reading Math
OLS VA OLS VA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reading (t-1) or Math (t-1) - 0.59*** - 0.53***
- (0.03) - (0.03)
Child-female -1.28 -2.54*** -6.32* -5.20*
(0.89) (0.79) (3.54) (3.03)
Transitions in family structure
Stay in Non-intact family -6.26** -3.46 - -
(2.65) (2.70) - -
Stay in Single parent family - - -14.60 -9.30
- - (9.07) (8.34)
Stay in Step family - - -2.25 -1.13
- - (10.81) (9.07)
Changed family structure -4.27* -5.24** 4.76 5.01
(2.47) (2.14) (10.61) (9.61)
Girl*Stay in Non-intact family 2.41 1.92 - -
(2.21) (2.77) - -
Girl*Stay in Single parent family - - 4.84 2.61
- - (9.40) (9.22)
Girl*Stay in Step family - - -25.91** -15.92
- - (11.26) (9.69)
Girl*Changed family structure 0.39 2.32 -25.60** -21.02*
(2.63) (2.58) (13.13) (12.08)
Transitions in PMKs’ employment YES YES YES YES
Household Income 7 indicators 7 indicators Thousands Thousands
Previous family structure - - YES YES
Previous PMK’s employment - - YES YES
Other child and PMK’s characteristics YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.14 0.44 0.53 0.62
Number of observations 2934 1962 4454 4454
Note: Children remained in an intact family across cycles are the reference groups. See Table 1.1 for a full
set of table descriptors. Robust standard error values are in parentheses.
The child longitudinal weights provided in the NLSCY are used in the analysis. * Significance at 10%
** Significance at 5% *** Significance at 1%
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on the NLSCY, Cycles 1-6.
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Table A.3: Effect of Transitions in Family Structure on Academic Performance by Catholic
Affiliation
Reading Math
OLS VA OLS VA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reading (t-1) or Math (t-1) - 0.58*** - 0.53***
- (0.03) - (0.03)
PMK - Catholic -1.06 -0.34 -7.05* -4.87
(1.09) (1.07) (3.91) (3.50)
Transitions in family structure
Stay in Non-intact family -4.63* -1.57
(2.62) (2.41)
Stay in Single parent family -20.95** -13.92*
(8.74) (8.11)
Stay in Step family -16.20 -10.44
(10.90) (9.40)
Changed family structure -4.17* -2.79 -7.96 -6.73
(2.38) (2.34) (12.56) (10.93)
Catholic*Stay in Non-intact family 1.12 -2.34
(2.55) (3.33)
Catholic*Stay in Single parent family 17.73* 12.13
(9.42) (9.17)
Catholic*Stay in Step family 12.97 9.75
(12.77) (10.38)
Catholic*Changed family structure -1.60 -3.44 -0.81 2.18
(2.76) (2.60) (13.45) (12.41)
Transitions in PMKs’ employment YES YES YES YES
Household Income YES YES YES YES
Previous family structure - - YES YES
Previous PMK’s employment - - YES YES
Other child and PMK’s characteristics YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.14 0.44 0.53 0.61
Number of observations 2934 1962 4454 4454
Note: Children remained in an intact family across cycles are the reference groups. See Table 1.1 for a full
set of table descriptors. Robust standard error values are in parentheses.
The child longitudinal weights provided in the NLSCY are used in the analysis. * Significance at 10%
** Significance at 5% *** Significance at 1%










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A.2 Distribution and Data Descriptors
Table A.5: Dataset Description
Cycle Survey year Age of children
Initial cycle 1994-1995 1-5
Second cycle 1996-1997 3-7
Third cycle 1998-1999 5-9
Fourth cycle 2000-2001 7-11
Fifth cycle 2002-2003 9-13
Sixth cycle 2004-2005 11-15
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on the NLSCY, Cycles 1-6.
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Table A.6: Summary Statistics of Reading Sample (St. Dev.)
All Intact Family Single Parent Step Family
Family
Reading Skill (Scores) 100.69 101.46 96.77 96.64
(14.90) (14.80) (14.95) (14.11)
Child’s characteristics
Child’s age in months 66.37 65.25 69.17 82.41
(22.60) (22.57) (22.00) (18.12)
Girls (%) 50.35 52.02 40.36 47.67
(0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50)
% with educational disability 1.14 1.00 2.03 -
(0.11) (0.10) (0.14) -
Number of siblings 1.29 1.34 0.94 1.26
(0.98) (0.98) (0.94) (0.95)
PMKs’ characteristics
PMK age 34.37 34.75 32.97 30.55
(5.37) (5.18) (6.06) (4.67)
Women (%) 93.45 93.44 92.93 95.43
(0.25) (0.25) (0.26) (0.21)
% of native-born 86.73 85.35 92.22 99.04
(0.34) (0.35) (0.27) (0.10)
Age at birth 30.12 29.57 32.49 34.29
(9.57) (4.78) (19.13) (25.68)
% teenage parent 2.40 1.26 7.96 8.87
(0.15) (0.11) (0.27) (0.28)
% high school education or less 68.77 70.88 57.38 61.07
(0.46) (0.45) (0.49) (0.49)
PMK’s depression score 4.79 4.31 7.55 5.97
(9.09) (8.66) (10.21) (12.18)
Households’ characteristics
N. adults (exclude parents) 0.11 0.10 0.16 0.02
(0.46) (0.46) (0.48) (0.14)
CMA (%) 71.69 71.09 76.86 67.03
(0.45) (0.45) (0.42) (0.47)
% low-income Family 22.73 15.06 69.31 31.86
(0.42) (0.36) (0.46) (0.47)
Family functioning score 8.47 7.87 12.26 8.87
(9.44) (7.87) (15.26) (11.80)
Number of observations 3924 3274 517 133
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on the NLSCY, Cycles 1-6.
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Table A.7: Summary Statistics of Math Sample (St. Dev.)
All Intact Family Single Parent Step Family
Family
Math Skill (Scores) 457.13 456.25 454.70 471.40
(98.73) (98.98) (94.70) (104.62)
Child’s characteristics
Child’s age in months 139.13 137.94 140.97 146.19
(26.09) (25.86) (26.46) (26.01)
Girls (%) 48.72 49.90 50.06 34.15
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.47)
% with educational disability 3.20 3.30 3.01 2.71
(0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.16)
Number of siblings 1.46 1.57 1.07 1.34
(1.02) (1.02) (0.94) (1.04)
PMKs’ characteristics
PMK age 40.33 40.60 40.43 37.49
(5.08) (4.72) (5.77) (5.74)
Women (%) 97.93 99.78 91.98 94.46
(0.14) (0.05) (0.27) (0.23)
% of native-born 83.49 83.43 77.90 97.52
(0.37) (0.37) (0.42) (0.16)
Age at birth 30.22 29.09 34.19 31.58
(10.95) (4.32) (19.54) (20.31)
% teenage parent 2.08 1.07 3.29 8.84
(0.14) (0.10) (0.18) (0.28)
% high school education or less 64.30 66.97 60.40 47.93
(0.48) (0.47) (0.49) (0.50)
PMK’s depression score 3.87 3.23 6.59 3.55
(4.98) (4.22) (6.56) (5.19)
Households’ characteristics
N. adults (exclude parents) 0.24 0.22 0.35 0.16
(0.66) (0.58) (0.72) (0.43)
CMA (%) 77.90 76.68 83.91 75.21
(0.41) (0.42) (0.37) (0.43)
Household income ($) 75913 85256 39772 73031
(57653) (59146) (39841) (42965)
Family functioning score 8.16 7.98 9.42 6.87
(4.83) (4.76) (4.87) (4.81)
Number of observations 6681 5202 979 500














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.9: Distribution of Children by Transition in Family Structure and Transition in
PMKs’ Work Status between adjacent cycles
Panel A. Distribution of Children by Transitions in Family Structure and in PMKs’ Work Status
Reading Sample Math Sample
Transition in Family Structure (%) Cycles 1-2 Cycles 2-3 Cycles 4-5 Cycles 5-6
Stay in Intact Family 83.23 78.49 74.04 71.20
Stay in Non-intact Family 10.99 12.27 - -
Stay in Single Parent - - 15.42 15.92
Stay in Step Family - - 5.44 6.67
Changed Family Structure 5.78 9.24 5.10 6.21
Transition in PMKs’ Work Status (%)
Stay in Employment 63.65 67.40 76.94 79.03
Stay in Non-employment 6.39 5.92 4.36 3.10
Employment - Non-employment 9.94 11.32 5.51 8.05
Non-employment - Employment 20.03 15.36 13.19 9.82
Panel B. Distribution of Children in cycles 4 through 6 by cycles 1-3 transition in Family Structure
Previous Transition in Family Structure (%) Math Sample
Stay in Intact Family through cycles 1-3 80.04
Stay in Non-intact Family through cycles 1-3 8.13
Changed Family Structure through cycles 1-3 11.83
Previous Transition in PMKs’ Work Status
(%)
Stay in Employment through cycles 1-3 58.35
Stay in Non-employment through cycles 1-3 12.27
Changed Employment Status through cycles 1-3 29.38
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on the NLSCY, Cycles 1-6.
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Stay in a nonintact family - 6.76
- (7.92)
Experience a change in family structure - 6.47
- (6.47)
Previous PMK’s employment
Stay persistently non-employed - 3.90
- (4.71)
Experience unstable work patterns - -2.68
- (2.91)
Child’s characteristics




Disability on education -19.94*** -53.20***
(4.37) (4.99)
Number of siblings -1.57*** 3.12**
(0.41) (1.37)
PMK and family’s characteristics






Age at birth -0.03 0.26
(0.04) (0.17)
Teenage parent -1.31 -9.89
(1.54) (6.39)
High school education 4.20*** 20.48***
(0.89) (2.69)




PMK’s depression score -0.04 -0.24
(0.07) (0.25)
Family functioning score -0.09 -0.02
(0.07) (0.24)
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Table A.11: Summary Statistics - by Cultural and Religious Affiliation
Reading Sample Math Sample
Canadian French Catholic Canadian French Catholic
Reading/Math (Scores) 101.62 101.42 100.80 459.40 461.13 458.80
Child’s characteristics
Child’s age in months 66.63 66.92 66.69 139.41 140.13 139.16
Girls (%) 49.39 47.20 49.80 46.20 47.02 48.12
% with educational disability 0.82 0.78 1.09 3.63 2.87 2.26
Number of siblings 1.19 1.13 1.21 1.34 1.33 1.40
PMKs’ characteristics
PMK age 34.14 33.93 34.55 40.26 39.75 40.36
Women (%) 91.41 92.83 93.17 97.74 99.06 98.09
% of native-born 98.87 96.12 85.97 98.97 98.11 85.22
Age at birth 30.33 29.54 30.15 30.22 28.89 30.25
% teenage parent 2.63 3.22 2.06 2.13 3.08 1.95
% high school education or less 69.40 67.37 67.82 63.17 59.20 61.17
PMK’s depression score 4.97 5.00 4.95 3.73 3.96 3.79
Households’ characteristics
N. adults (exclude parents) 0.04 0.06 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.23
CMA (%) 69.06 67.27 72.74 74.16 73.53 77.16
% low-income family 20.89 24.64 22.25 70147 70494 73492
Family functioning score 7.67 7.47 8.33 7.82 8.01 8.19
% Unique cultural affiliation 35.88 19.34 - 33.20 15.95 -
N 1580 1070 1730 2907 1860 3179









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.12 and Table A.13 present the distribution of children by family structure and
cultural groups across Cycles 1-3 and across Cycles 4-6, respectively. The distribution
is similar between Canadian and Non-Canadian families, as well as between French and
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Table B.1: Summary of Marital Property Laws in Each Province in 1989
(Compiled from the sites listed at end)
Quebec
Civil Code 1989
“Marriage = Family Patrimony + Matrimonial Regime”
A. Family patrimony:
“Properties included in the family patrimony:
1. The family’s homes: houses, family cottage, vacation condo, etc.
2. Objects furnishing or decorating the family’s homes: furniture, appliances, electronics
and artwork.
3. Family’s motor vehicles: cars, motor homes.
4. Money saved in a retirement savings plan during the marriage: RRSP, pension fund.
In the event of a divorce, the value of the family patrimony after deducting any debts is equally divided amongst
spouses, even if some of the property belongs exclusively to one spouse. Any property not included in the family
patrimony will be divided under the rules of the matrimonial regime at the event of a divorce.”
B. Matrimonial Regime:
1. “Community of property:
Spouses’ property is divided into three categories: husband’s or wife’s property, community property and wife’s
reserved property.
Husband and wife do not have the same rights and powers during the marriage. Both spouses can manage, use and
dispose of their private property but the husband manages the community property on his own. The husband needs
the wife’s consent to alienate or otherwise use valuable community property in investment matters. The wife manages
her reserved property but needs the husband’s consent to alienate or otherwise use her property in investment matters.
In the event of a divorce, the wife can accept or waive the community property. If she accepts it, the community property
and her reserved property will be divided equally, and the wife becomes a co-owner of the community property. If the wife
waives the community property, the husband will keep the community property while the wife keeps her reserved property.”
2. “Partnership of acquests:
Spouses’ property is divided into two categories: acquests and the private property of the parties.
The acquests consist of all the property not declared to be private property of the parties (this is mainly the property
accumulated during the marriage).
The value of the acquests is divide when the marriage is over. Each spouse administers his or her own private property
and acquests and is responsible for his or her own debts.”
3. “Separation as to Property:
Each spouse is independent under the regime of separation as to property. For example, a spouse can manage, use and
dispose of her property without her spouse’s consent, and is responsible for her own debts.
Under the regime of separation as to property, the spouses take back their own property after the marriage is over. Any
property owned by both spouses is considered to be owned in equal shares, unless there’s proof that this isn’t the case.”
“If a couple signed a marriage contract in front of a notary, the matrimonial regime is the one stated in the contract.
If they did not sign a marriage contract in front of a notary, or if their marriage contract doesn’t mention a matrimonial
regime, then the regime depends on when they were married:
Marriage before July 1, 1970: community of property





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































B.2 Data Summary of Married/Common-law Women
using LFS data
Table B.2: Summary Statistics of Respondents’ Basic Characteristics in Quebec and Other
Provinces in Pre and Post Intervention Years with LFS Data
Quebec Rest of Canada
(Ontario, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland
and Labrador excluded)
Before 1989 After 1989 Before 1989 After 1989
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Age 38.95 12.08 40.10 11.56 38.93 12.14 39.97 11.51
High school or less % 71.09 0.45 54.40 0.50 63.61 0.48 49.87 0.50
First child 6 years or above % 48.95 0.50 47.72 0.50 47.61 0.50 47.35 0.50
No child % 36.39 0.48 38.37 0.49 37.19 0.48 39.12 0.49
Children under 5 years % 20.45 0.40 19.72 0.40 22.63 0.42 20.56 0.40
Labor force participation % 57.20 0.49 62.27 0.48 61.64 0.49 67.51 0.47
Hours of work (per week) 17.74 18.44 19.52 18.52 18.95 19.13 21.54 19.33
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on the Labour Force Survey (LFS), 1985 - 1995.
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B.3 DiD Approach Summary and Tests
Table B.3: The Differences-in-Differences Framework for Married Women’s Labour-Force
Analysis
before 1989 after 1989
Treatment Group Women married/cohabited before 1989 Women married/cohabited before 1989
with children in Quebec with children in Quebec
(T) (first children aged 6 years or above) (first children aged 6 years or above)
Women married/cohabited before 1989 Women married/cohabited before 1989
without children in Quebec without children in Quebec
(age > 40) (age > 40)
Control Group Women married/cohabited before 1989 Women married/cohabited before 1989
with children in other provinces with children in other provinces
(C) (first children aged 6 years or above) (first children aged 6 years or above)
Women married/cohabited before 1989 Women married/cohabited before 1989
without children in other provinces without children in other provinces
(age > 40) (age > 40)
Table B.4: Parallel Trends Assumption Test
Hours worked LFP Rate Divorce/Separate Rate Differential Education
between Spouses
F-test 0.55 0.32 0.28 0.17
P-value 0.65 0.81 0.84 0.95
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on the Labour Force Survey (LFS), 1985 - 1995.
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Table B.5: The Differences-in-Differences Framework for Divorce Transitions Analysis
before 1989 after 1989
Treatment Group Both women and men who are married Both women and men who are married
(T) in the first survey month in the first survey month
in Quebec (age > 18) in Quebec (age > 18)
Control Group Both women and men who are married Both women and men who are married
(C) in the first survey month in the first survey month
in the other provinces (age > 18) in the other provinces (age > 18)
Table B.6: The Differences-in-Differences Framework for the Assortative Matching Analysis
before 1989 after 1989
Treatment Group Couples married before 1989 Couples married after 1989
(T) in Quebec (age≤30) in Quebec (age≤30)
Control Group Couples married before 1989 Couples married after 1989
(C) in the other provinces (age≤30) in the other provinces (age≤30)
B.4 Robustness Checks
B.4.1 Common Law Analysis
The data used in this analysis is based on the Census, 1981, 1986, 1991 and 1996, which
provide information on individuals’ labour supply and marital status as well as their demo-
graphic characteristics in both pre-intervention and post-intervention periods. Table B.7
below presents the Census summary statistics of our sample’s basic characteristics of Que-
bec and the rest of Canada (with Ontario, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland and Labrador
excluded), before and after the Civil Code amendment, separately.
We can see that the respondents in the Census show the similarity on their attributes

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the pre-intervention periods, we can see that, on average, Quebec has a slightly smaller
proportion of married or divorced/separated people, and a slightly larger proportion of
common-law or single people than the other provinces. The average hours of work and
mean LFP rate in Quebec are slightly lower than those in the other provinces. Respondents’
ages in these two groups are on average very similar. Overall, we may conclude that, before
the Civil Code amendment, the Quebec sample shared attributes similar to those of the
other provinces sample.
Table B.8: Proportion of population aged 18 and over that lived common-law, 1981-1996
Common-law Rate Difference Difference
% 1981 1986 1991 1996 1986-1981 1996-1991
Quebec 5.22 7.84 11.99 14.95 2.62 2.96
Rest of Canada 4.34 4.85 6.35 7.22 0.51 0.87











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































B.4.2 Alternative Policy and Falsification Checks
Table B.10: Family Patrimony Rules Effects on Married Women’s Labour Supply with
Control for Presence of a Newborn
Intensive margin (Weekly hours worked): T*After OLS Tobit Heckman UQ Median N
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
All married women -0.43 -0.37*** -0.60 0.18 252796
(0.27) (0.07) (0.39) (1.91)
Married women in the labour force -1.42*** -1.57*** -0.99*** -0.68*** 144952
(0.31) (0.33) (0.29) (0.24)
Married women employed 6+ years -0.70* -0.71* -0.14 64461
(0.37) (0.37) (0.29)
Extensive margin (Labour force participation): LPM Logit
Coefficient Coefficient
All married women 0.01 0.05 252796
(0.01) (0.04)
* Significance at 10% ** Significance at 5% *** Significance at 1%
Note: The full set of controls includes age dummies, whether they have children or not, whether they
have children under five years, whether they have a newborn or not, whether they have a high school
degree or less, the age of their first child dummies, year-by-month fixed effects, province fixed effects,
province-by-time fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the province-by-time level.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table B.12: Family Patrimony Rules Effects on Married Women’s Labour Supply among
House Owners
Intensive margin (Weekly hours worked): T*After OLS Tobit Heckman UQ Median N
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
All married women -0.53 -0.70 -0.43 -0.72 215277
(0.33) (0.58) (0.41) (1.13)
Married women in the labour force -0.94*** -1.04*** -0.65** -0.09 125980
(0.35) (0.37) (0.33) (0.26)
Married women employed 6+ years -0.74* -0.75* -0.23 59590
(0.39) (0.39) (0.31)
Extensive margin (Labour force participation): LPM Logit
Coefficient Coefficient
All married women 0.00 -0.01 215277
(0.01) (0.04)
* Significance at 10% ** Significance at 5% *** Significance at 1%
Note: The full set of controls includes age dummies, whether they have children or not, whether
they have children under five years, whether they have a high school degree or less, the age of their first
child dummies, year-by-month fixed effects, province fixed effects, province-by-time fixed effects. Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered at the province-by-time level.
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on the Labour Force Survey (LFS), 1985 - 1995.
As an additional robustness check, we impose a “false” treatment in 1989 among single
women in Quebec and explore their responsiveness to this policy change using the LFS,
1985-1995. The age restriction (age > 30) is imposed due to the childless social assistance
reform in Quebec which is mentioned before. Also, we excluded women who indicate they
are full-time students to avoid capturing labour supply effects associated with seasonal
part-time work fluctuations.
Table B.13 indicates the effects of Quebec’s family patrimony rules on single women’s
labour supply using Equation 2.2 at both intensive and extensive margins (Tip takes value
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1 for single women living in Quebec, while takes value 0 for single women living in the
other provinces.). As we expected, single women in Quebec did not respond to the family
patrimony rules since the coefficients of Tip ∗Aftert are small and statistically insignificant
in all the estimations.
Table B.13: Family Patrimony Rules Effect on the Single Women’s Labor Supply with
LFS Data





N(Weekly hours worked) OLS OLS OLS
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient


























N(Labor force participation) LPM LPM LPM
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient







* Significance at 10% ** Significance at 5% *** Significance at 1%
Note: The full set of controls includes age dummies, whether they have children or not, whether they
have children under five years, whether they have a high school degree or less, year-by-month fixed effects,
province fixed effects, province-by-time fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the
province-by-time level.
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on the Labour Force Survey (LFS), 1985 - 1995.
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Appendix C
Appendix for Chapter 3
C.1 Full List of 102 CREA Boundaries for MLS (ex-
cerpted from Clark and Ferrer (2019))
MLS I: (1993-2010)
British Columbia:
Northern, Chilliwack, Fraser Valley, Kamloops, Kootenay, Northern Lights, Okanagan-
Mainline, Powell River, South Okanagan, Vancouver, Vancouver Island, Victoria
Alberta:
Calgary, Central Alberta, Edmonton, Fort McMurray, Grande Prairie, Lethbridge, Lloyd-
minster(AB), Medicine Hat, North Eastern Alberta, South Central Alberta, Alberta West
Saskatchewan:
Battlefords, SE Saskatchewan, Lloydminster (SK), Melfort, Moose Jaw, Prince Albert,
Regina, Saskatoon, Swift Current, Yorkton
Manitoba:
Brandon, Portage La Prairie, Thompson, Winnipeg
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Ontario:
Bancroft, Barrie, Brantford, Cambridge, Chatham Kent, Northumberland Hills, Corn-
wall, Georgian Triangle, Grey Bruce Owen Sound, Guelph, Hamilton-Burlington, Huron
Perth, Kawartha Lakes, Kingston, Kitchener-Waterloo, London and St Thomas, Muskoka
& Haliburton, Niagara Falls - Fort Erie, North Bay, Oakville-Milton, Orillia, Ottawa,
Parry Sound, Peterborough & the Kawarthas, Quinte, Renfrew, Sarnia-Lambton, Sault
Ste. Marie, Simcoe, Southern Georgian Bay, St. Catharines, Sudbury, Thunder Bay, Till-
sonburg, Timmins, Toronto+Brampton, Durham Region, Mississauga, Orangeville, York
Region, Welland, Windsor-Essex, Woodstock-Ingersoll
New Brunswick:
Fredericton, Moncton, Northern New Brunswick, Saint John
Nova Scotia:





Montreal CMA, Quebec City CMA, Estrie(Sherbrooke) CMA, Mauricie-Trois-Rivieres
CMA, Outaouais(Hull) CMA, Saguenay-LacSaint-Jean CMA
Northwest Territories, Yellowknife, Yukon
Source: This list is excerpted from Clark and Ferrer (2019).
C.2 Analysis based on Married Males
Tables C.1 and Tables C.2 present the impact of changes in house prices on married men’s
labour supply among owners and renters, respectively. Overall, there is no strong evi-
dences showing that changes in house prices have effects on married men’s labour market
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behaviours. It worth noting that the negative effects on males’ labour force participation
in Linear FE model (Column 3) of Tables C.1 are mainly driven by the elderly men who
were at the edge of retirement. For instance, the sample (Column 3) is original restricted
to men under 65 years old. Once I further restrict my sample to males under 64 years
old in Column 4 of Tables C.1, these negative effects disappear. However, this is not the
case among women because I also repeat my female labour supply analysis with this age
restriction (age < 64) and the results are are very similar with before.
Table C.1: Effect of House-price Shocks on Labour Supply of Married Men among Owners
Panel A: Labour Force Participation LPM Linear FE Linear FE Linear FE (age < 64)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
House-price shocks (%) -0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.03)
Positive house-price shocks (%) -0.11* -0.09
(0.06) (0.06)
Negative house-price shocks (%) -0.13* -0.11
(0.06) (0.07)
Number of observations 58656
Number of individuals 14049 14049 13504
(Pseudo) R-squared or Chi-squared 0.19 0.60 0.60 0.56
Panel B: ∆ Hours of Work OLS UQ-Median UQ-10th p. UQ-90th p.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
∆ House-price shocks (%) -0.01 -0.02 -1.23 -0.15
(0.35) (0.02) (1.43) (0.29)
Number of observations 40595 40595 40595 40595
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
* Significance at 10% ** Significance at 5% *** Significance at 1%
Note: Linear regression coefficients at the extensive margin are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation. The individual and household
controls include age, age squared, education indicators, number of children, whether having children under five years, the wife’s education
dummies, the wife’s labour force status dummies, immigrant status, whether having a disability at work. All of these control variables are
lagged. Other controls include provincial unemployment rate, CMA population size, year fixed-effect, REB fixed-effect, and REB-by-year
fixed-effect. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the REB level.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Canadian Survey of Income and Labour Dynamics confidential files and CREA MLS average house
prices from Clark and Ferrer (2019)
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Table C.2: Effect of House-price Shocks on Labour Supply of Married Men among Renters
Panel A: Labour Force Participation LPM Linear FE Linear FE
(1) (2) (3)
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
House-price shocks (%) 0.14 0.12
(0.15) (0.15)
Positive house-price shocks (%) 0.34
(0.33)
Negative house-price shocks (%) 0.12
(0.22)
Number of observations 3236
Number of individuals 803 803
(Pseudo) R-squared or Chi-squared 0.16 0.59 0.58
Panel B: ∆ Hours of Work OLS UQ-Median UQ-10th p. UQ-90th p.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
∆ House-price shocks (%) -1.16 -0.11 -0.73 -5.45
(2.70) (0.26) (11.18) (10.31)
Number of observations 2203 2203 2203 2203
R-squared 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04
* Significance at 10% ** Significance at 5% *** Significance at 1%
Note: Linear regression coefficients at the extensive margin are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation. The individual and household
controls include age, age squared, education indicators, number of children, whether having children under five years, the wife’s education
dummies, the wife’s labour force status dummies, immigrant status, whether having a disability at work. All of these control variables are
lagged. Other controls include provincial unemployment rate, CMA population size, year fixed-effect, REB fixed-effect, and REB-by-year
fixed-effect. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the REB level.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Canadian Survey of Income and Labour Dynamics confidential files and CREA MLS average house
prices from Clark and Ferrer (2019)
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C.3 Analysis Excluding Large Urban Cities
Table C.3: Effect of House-price Shocks on Labour Supply of Married Women among
Owners (Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver are Excluded)
Panel A: Labour Force Participation LPM Linear FE Linear FE
(1) (2) (3)
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
House-price shocks (%) -0.03* -0.03*
(0.02) (0.02)
Positive house-price shocks (%) -0.11***
(0.05)
Negative house-price shocks (%) -0.05
(0.07)
Number of observations 57702
Number of individuals 13768 13768
(Pseudo) R-squared or Chi-squared 0.17 0.69 0.69
Panel B: ∆ Hours of Work OLS UQ-Median UQ-10th p. UQ-90th p.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
∆ House-price shocks (%) -0.07 0.01 -0.46 0.19
(0.38) (0.02) (0.41) (0.31)
Number of observations 40757 40757 40757 40757
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
* Significance at 10% ** Significance at 5% *** Significance at 1%
Note: Linear regression coefficients at the extensive margin are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation. The individual and household
controls include age, age squared, education indicators, number of children, whether having children under five years, the husband’s education
dummies, the husband’s labour force status dummies, immigrant status, whether having a disability at work. All of these control variables
are lagged. Other controls include provincial unemployment rate, CMA population size, year fixed-effect, REB fixed-effect, and REB-by-year
fixed-effect. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the REB level. Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver are excluded.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Canadian Survey of Income and Labour Dynamics confidential files and CREA MLS average house
prices from Clark and Ferrer (2019)
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Table C.4: Effect of House-price Shocks on Labour Supply of Married Women among
Renters (Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver are Excluded)
Panel A: Labour Force Participation LPM Linear FE Linear FE
(1) (2) (3)
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
House-price shocks (%) 0.01 0.03
(0.13) (0.13)
Positive house-price shocks (%) -0.01
(0.23)
Negative house-price shocks (%) -0.07
(0.21)
Number of observations 2923
Number of individuals 725 725
(Pseudo) R-squared or Chi-squared 0.22 0.67 0.64
Panel B: ∆ Hours of Work OLS UQ-Median UQ-10th p. UQ-90th p.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
∆ House-price shocks (%) -0.35 -0.01 -1.03 1.35
(1.81) (0.04) (5.15) (2.43)
Number of observations 2048 2048 2048 2048
R-squared 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.04
* Significance at 10% ** Significance at 5% *** Significance at 1%
Note: Linear regression coefficients at the extensive margin are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation. The individual and household
controls include age, age squared, education indicators, number of children, whether having children under five years, the husband’s education
dummies, the husband’s labour force status dummies, immigrant status, whether having a disability at work. All of these control variables
are lagged. Other controls include provincial unemployment rate, CMA population size, year fixed-effect, REB fixed-effect, and REB-by-year
fixed-effect. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the REB level. Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver are excluded.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Canadian Survey of Income and Labour Dynamics confidential files and CREA MLS average house
prices from Clark and Ferrer (2019)
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Table C.5: Effect of House-price Shocks on Labour Supply of Married Women by Education
among Owners (Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver are Excluded)
Panel A: Labour Force Participation LPM Linear FE Linear FE
(1) (2) (3)
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
House-price shocks (Univ Degree) -0.02 -0.02
(0.04) (0.05)
House-price shocks (No Univ Degree) -0.04 -0.04
(0.03) (0.03)
Pos house-price shocks (Univ Degree) -0.06
(0.17)
Neg house-price shocks (Univ Degree) -0.06
(0.12)
Pos house-price shocks (No Univ Degree) -0.12**
(0.06)
Neg house-price shocks (No Univ Degree) -0.05
(0.09)
Number of observations 57702
Number of individuals 13768 13768
(Pseudo) R-squared or Chi-squared 0.16 0.69 0.68
Panel B: ∆ Hours of Work OLS UQ-Median UQ-10th p. UQ-90th p.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
∆ House-price shocks (Univ Degree) -0.02 0.01 -0.52 -0.27
(0.92) (0.05) (0.76) (0.79)
∆ House-price shocks (No Univ Degree) -0.11 -0.01 -0.45 0.28
(0.42) (0.02) (0.46) (0.33)
Number of observations 40757 40757 40757 40757
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
* Significance at 10% ** Significance at 5% *** Significance at 1%
Note: Linear regression coefficients at the extensive margin are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation. The individual and household
controls include age, age squared, education indicators, number of children, whether having children under five years, the husband’s education
dummies, the husband’s labour force status dummies, immigrant status, whether having a disability at work. All of these control variables
are lagged. Other controls include provincial unemployment rate, CMA population size, year fixed-effect, REB fixed-effect, and REB-by-year
fixed-effect. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the REB level. Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver are excluded.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Canadian Survey of Income and Labour Dynamics confidential files and CREA MLS average house
prices from Clark and Ferrer (2019)
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Table C.6: Effect of House-price Shocks on Labour Supply of Married Women by Residences
Location among Owners (Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver are Excluded)
Panel A: Labour Force Participation LPM Linear FE Linear FE
(1) (2) (3)
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
House-price shocks (Urban) -0.04 -0.04
(0.03) (0.03)
House-price shocks (Rural) -0.04 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04)
Pos house-price shocks (Urban) -0.13***
(0.05)
Neg house-price shocks (Urban) -0.06
(0.07)
Pos house-price shocks (Rural) -0.04
(0.12)
Neg house-price shocks (Rural) -0.01
(0.17)
Number of observations 57702
Number of individuals 13768 13768
(Pseudo) R-squared or Chi-squared 0.16 0.69 0.69
Panel B: ∆ Hours of Work OLS UQ-Median UQ-10th p. UQ-90th p.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
∆ House-price shocks (Urban) -0.20 0.01 -0.67 0.40
(0.40) (0.02) (0.42) (0.32)
∆ House-price shocks (Rural) 0.26 -0.01 0.08 -0.39
(0.79) (0.03) (0.84) (0.66)
Number of observations 40757 40757 40757 40757
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
* Significance at 10% ** Significance at 5% *** Significance at 1%
Note: Linear regression coefficients at the extensive margin are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation. The individual and household
controls include age, age squared, education indicators, number of children, whether having children under five years, the husband’s education
dummies, the husband’s labour force status dummies, immigrant status, whether having a disability at work. All of these control variables
are lagged. Other controls include provincial unemployment rate, CMA population size, year fixed-effect, REB fixed-effect, and REB-by-year
fixed-effect. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the REB level. Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver are excluded.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Canadian Survey of Income and Labour Dynamics confidential files and CREA MLS average house
prices from Clark and Ferrer (2019)
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C.4 Analysis Including Movers outside REB
Table C.7: Effect of House-price Shocks on Labour Supply of Married Women among
Owners (with Movers Included)
Panel A: Labour Force Participation LPM Linear FE Linear FE Linear IV Linear IV FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
House-price shocks (%) -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Positive house-price shocks (%) -0.11**
(0.05)
Negative house-price shocks (%) -0.03
(0.08)
Number of observations 65014 64805
Number of individuals 15552 15552 15124
(Pseudo) R-squared or Chi-squared 0.16 0.68 0.68 0.16 0.02
Panel B: ∆ Hours of Work OLS UQ-Median UQ-10th p. UQ-90th p. Linear IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
∆ House-price shocks (%) -0.50 -0.01 -0.73** -0.13 -0.52
(0.40) (0.01) (0.35) (0.29) (0.42)
Number of observations 45756 45756 45756 45756 45576
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
* Significance at 10% ** Significance at 5% *** Significance at 1%
Note: Linear regression coefficients at the extensive margin are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation. The individual and household
controls include age, age squared, education indicators, number of children, whether having children under five years, the husband’s education
dummies, the husband’s labour force status dummies, immigrant status, whether having a disability at work. All of these control variables
are lagged. Other controls include provincial unemployment rate, CMA population size, year fixed-effect, REB fixed-effect, and REB-by-year
fixed-effect. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the REB level. House prices from the original REBs of women are the instrument
of house prices they currently live for both movers and non-movers.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Canadian Survey of Income and Labour Dynamics confidential files and CREA MLS average house
prices from Clark and Ferrer (2019)
159
Table C.8: Effect of House-price Shocks on Labour Supply of Married Women among
Renters (with Movers Included)
Panel A: Labour Force Participation LPM Linear FE Linear FE Linear IV Linear IV FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
House-price shocks (%) 0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.01
(0.09) (0.12) (0.09) (0.10)
Positive house-price shocks (%) 0.13
(0.39)
Negative house-price shocks (%) 0.04
(0.31)
Number of observations 3848 3835
Number of individuals 956 956 918
(Pseudo) R-squared or Chi-squared 0.20 0.63 0.63 0.23 0.06
Panel B: ∆ Hours of Work OLS UQ-Median UQ-10th p. UQ-90th p. Linear IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
∆ House-price shocks (%) 0.36 0.01 1.25 1.32 0.43
(1.62) (0.04) (1.69) (3.60) (1.73)
Number of observations 2662 2662 2662 2662 2651
R-squared 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.08
* Significance at 10% ** Significance at 5% *** Significance at 1%
Note: Linear regression coefficients at the extensive margin are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation. The individual and household
controls include age, age squared, education indicators, number of children, whether having children under five years, the husband’s education
dummies, the husband’s labour force status dummies, immigrant status, whether having a disability at work. All of these control variables
are lagged. Other controls include provincial unemployment rate, CMA population size, year fixed-effect, REB fixed-effect, and REB-by-year
fixed-effect. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the REB level. House prices from the original REBs of women are the instrument
of house prices they currently live for both movers and non-movers.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Canadian Survey of Income and Labour Dynamics confidential files and CREA MLS average house
prices from Clark and Ferrer (2019)
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